

COMITIUM

THE KENNESAW JOURNAL OF POLITICS

VOLUME 1

ISSUE 2



Research is formalized curiosity. It is poking and prying with a purpose.

Zora Neale Hurston (1891-1960)

Department of Political Science and International Affairs



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Letter from the Editor

Dear Reader,

It is with great enthusiasm that we present you with the second issue of *Comitium: The Kennesaw Journal of Politics*, KSU's recently founded student journal of international affairs and political science. Our aim in establishing this journal is to attract more undergraduate and graduate students from all disciplines to share their research and outstanding academic papers regarding topics connected to politics. With this outlet, we hope to contribute to the expansion and improvement of discussions regarding some of the most pressing issues present in the fields of political science and international affairs.

This is unfortunately the last issue of *Comitium* I will be a part of as Editor-in-Chief. I have had a most memorable time working with some of the brightest students at KSU in bringing forth the first issue of the journal. I have learned much from the process of setting up and running this journal and I shall certainly take this knowledge with me forward as I continue my journey through academia and the professional world. I believe that it is through extracurricular projects like this that students learn the most; and this project has added further credence to an observation I have been making over the past four years as an undergraduate: 10% of learning occurs in the classroom and 90% outside of it. Given this, I hope that this journal becomes an inexorable part of the Department of Political Science and International Affairs, and I am certain that the next editor will continue the journal's improvement and growth.

I have had the privilege of attending this university at a crucial period in its history. Kennesaw State has been growing in so many directions that it can be difficult to keep up with the changes at times. Seemingly everything from degree programs and student population to athletics and facilities is experiencing some level of expansion. Hopefully, this academic journal has commenced the pavement of another avenue of expansion with regards to undergraduate and graduate research that will eventually mirror KSU's globalist outlook and expand beyond the parameters of the campus.

I hope you enjoy reading the results of your classmates' hard work as much as my board and I did, and I wish you submit your own for the next issue!

Lastly, I would like to sincerely thank Dr. Barbara Neuby for serving as the faculty adviser for this publication and offering her valuable input and assistance on multiple occasions. I would also like to thank the Department of Political Science and International Affairs for housing this journal.

And thus, I bid *adieu* to all of the staff of *Comitium: The Kennesaw Journal of Politics*. And to all who have read this journal, thank you and never stop learning.

Sincerely,

Plamen Mavrov
EIC Comitium
Class of 2014

NOTE: The journal editing process functions on a blind review basis under the advisement of Dr. Barbara Neuby.

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COMITIUM: THE KENNESAW JOURNAL OF POLITICS

Volume 1, Issue 2, January 2014

CONTENTS

Journal Staff.....	39
Letter from the Editor.....	40
Copyright Notice.....	41
Current Events:	
The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Compounding Regional Economic and Social Impacts <i>Kayla Jones</i>	43
Russia's Role in the Ukrainian Protests <i>Justin Rivard</i>	48
Feature Articles:	
The Impact of the Recession on State Government Finances <i>Mike Elster</i>	51
An Exploratory Analysis of Developmental Disability Services in the State of Georgia <i>Michelle Rae Robison</i>	70
The Role of State Policy on Declining Christian-Muslim Relations in Israel <i>Mary Zaher</i>	87
Reviews:	
Demographic and Economic Consequences of Conflict - Kugler et al. <i>Plamen Mavrov</i>	98
Faculty Highlight:	
Dr. Kerwin Swint - Professor of Political Science, Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Affairs.....	104

CURRENT EVENTS

Kayla Jones is a senior studying International Affairs with a concentration in Diplomatic and International Service. She hopes to work internationally through the Peace Corp after graduation before pursuing graduate school for law or economics. While attending KSU, Kayla has had the great opportunity of working with the Model United Nations simulation team. In the multiple conferences she has attended, she has worked in many human rights-related committees such as the World Food Programme as well as economically motivated bodies like the G20. Currently, she is the Secretary-General for the 29th annual KSU High School MUN conference to be held on campus in March.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Compounding Regional Economic and Social Impacts

Kayla Jones

INTRODUCTION


In early March 2011, the massive protests against the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad that erupted in the southwestern city of Dar were evidence of the Arab Spring's continued expansion in scale and intensity. Violence and civil unrest can be expected when reigning authoritarian regimes have their legitimacy challenged by those they oppress, but government responses varied over the region. States like Bahrain and Syria used military force against the protesters, while the governments of Jordan and Algeria successfully appeased demonstrators with political reforms. Four years later, as various states affected by the Arab Spring make some progress, Syria alone has continued a deeply entrenched civil war and consequently down the path of economic and social destruction. Initially, the regime's response to the protests was mostly indifferent; however, by April of that year, after only several weeks of protests, the regime responded with violence in the form of tear gas and live ammunition. The conflict quickly evolved into a civil war with Syrian forces and an opposition composed of various factions fighting for control of major cities like Aleppo and the capital Damascus, each with populations of over two and five million, respectively.

Since the onset of the violence in 2011, more than two million Syrians have been forced from their homes with almost no option but to seek refuge in a neighboring country. The majority of Syrian refugees are currently residing in one of five major host countries: Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq, with an estimated 31,000 filing for asylum outside of this region.¹ The conflict will continue to have deeply unsettling consequences for Syria and the region as a whole due to its impact on the Syrian people, infrastructure, physical property, and the national economy. The Council of Foreign Affairs has stated that hyperinflation and a depreciating Syrian pound has forced Assad to rely on credit and aid from close global allies and estimates that real GDP has decreased by 50-80% since 2012.² Regionally, governments and host communities are attempting to protect and assist the Syrian refugees who are flooding across their borders. The United Nations has estimated that by December 2014 the number of Syrian refugees seeking asylum in one of the major regional host countries will total about four million; therefore, there will be a requirement of over \$4.2 billion of international aid to meet basic needs like food

¹ The UNHCR. 2014 Syrian Regional Response Plan. Strategic Overview. Introduction.

² Council on Foreign Relations. Syria's Crisis and the Global Response.

security, shelter, and access to healthcare, and potable water.³ It appears that Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey face the most direct ramification from the Syrian Refugee Crisis.



SOURCE: European Commission: Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2014.
<http://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Maps/Daily-maps-catalogue #486>

LEBANON

According to a recent United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimate, presently there are more than one million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and this number is expected to rise to around 2.3 million by the end of this year.⁴ The Syrian refugees in Lebanon mostly reside in urban areas with inadequate shelter, as well as community public service institutions not capable of accommodating such a huge influx of people. Most notably, the education and health sectors are being stressed with an overwhelming number of Syrian school children expected to register in the next academic year as well as depleting fiscal aid for health services in the face of an expensive Lebanese system. The health sector has experienced a large shock with a significant increase in wounded Syrian fighters and civilians since the outbreak of violence in 2011. According to the UNHCR, in December 2012 about 40% of hospital visits were Syrian nationals.⁵ In addition, even after an expansion of educational facilities Lebanon can

³ The UNHCR. 2014 Syrian Regional Response Plan. Strategic Overview. Introduction

⁴ The UNHCR. Regional Analysis of Syria.

⁵ Ibid.

only make accommodations for 100,000 of the 300,000 Syrian school children.⁶ Socially, tensions between Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees have begun to increase as violent incidents and discontent spread throughout urban areas. Localized clashes spread as Syrians compete for jobs, resources continue to deplete, and food and other goods prices increase. The Lebanese government has refused to build camps or extra housing, even on a temporary basis, for refugees and has established aid and movement restrictions. Lebanese officials have stated that their accommodations of Syrian refugees are not sustainable and have expressed need for greater assistance from the international community.

JORDAN

Nearly 600,000 Syrian nationals currently reside in Jordan and the UNHCR expects this figure to surpass one million by the end of 2014.⁷ Prior to hosting over half a million Syrian refugees, the Jordanian government was already fighting detrimental economic conditions such as a public debt ratio of over 70% of GDP going into 2011.⁸ The Kingdom is also characterized by limited resources, most notably a lack of water access. Though camps have been established within Jordan, only about 20% of the Syrian refugees reside in these temporary structures, with the remaining population attempting to take refuge in the nation's biggest governorates of Amman, Irbid, and Mafraq.⁹ Assessments of standards of living across Jordan have found that about 21% of Syrians and 16% of Jordanians suffer from food insecurity or are at risk of food insecurity.¹⁰

Similar to the conditions in Lebanon, Jordan's public service sector is overburdened and stresses are resonating on a social and economic level. Tensions in the urban communities are increasing with limits in public finance, a trade deficit, and the losses of key economic sectors. With Syrians now making up 10% of the Jordanian population, their demographic and economic structures have been greatly altered. In 2012, the Jordanian government was pressured to accept a \$2 billion IMF loan in order to cope with the roughly 2% reduction in GDP due to the refugee situation.¹¹ The Jordanian government has reached out multiple times to the international community for aid in managing the refugee burden. While speaking at the Second International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria at the beginning of the year Ibrahim Salif, the Jordanian Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, stated in front of representatives from donor countries like Kuwait and Qatar that "his country needs about \$3 billion to cover the costs of hosting Syrian refugees this year."¹²

TURKEY

Turkey almost immediately opened its borders to crossing Syrian natives, and has been exceptionally accommodating by setting up over 20 camps with schools and clinics. Moreover, the government has not placed movement restrictions on Syrian nationals like in other host countries. Today, almost 600,000 Syrian refugees reside in Turkey, with more likely to come due

⁶ Wilson Center. Humanitarian Crisis: Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.

⁷ UNHCR. Syria Regional Refugee Response. Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal. Jordan.

⁸ Jordan Public Debt. Indexmundi.com

⁹ The UNHCR. Regional Analysis of Syria.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Reuters. 'Jordan's economic growth hit by Syrian refugee burden.'

¹² Middle East Monitor. 'Syrian refugees in Jordan need about \$3 billion in aid.'

to the government's open door policy for them. Under this temporary protection order Syrians are provided assistance and unlimited stay with protection against forcible return.¹³ By March 2013 the overall cost of operating camps and hosting refugees for the Turkish government had risen to about \$1.5 billion.¹⁴ In addition to causing an economic and fiscal burden on the Turkish Republic, the refugees may directly or indirectly cause ethnic fluxes as they occupy some of the most ethnically diverse regions of the state. The sectarian balance of these regions has been greatly altered as of recently; for example, the Hatay province historically has been majority Alawites, however a large increase in Sunni Arab Syrians has increased tensions by making the Alawites a minority.¹⁵ Some believe that this could have influenced the anti-government protests that erupted in Istanbul's Gezi Park in May 2013 against Prime Minister Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP).¹⁶

The presence of refugees is creating economic pressures like internal cost of living increases in food and home prices. Also, many firms in the Turkish business and industrial sectors have lost revenue with the lack of access to Syrian markets. The Turkish government has put emphasis on handling the refugee crisis alone, and seems to be more concerned with the ethnic consequences of the war as well as its effect on the state's relationship with the European Union (EU). Prior to 2013, the EU was very critical of Turkey's asylum policy which through the strongly enforced 1934 Settlement Law did not provide comprehensive protection for refugees and made it very difficult for those seeking admittance into Turkish borders.¹⁷ However, the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection has been noted as a strong progressive step and may have influenced the renewal of progressive EU-Turkish communication at the end of last year. The immigration of refugees through Turkey to cross other international borders could possibly strain regional ties with governments like Bulgaria. The government of Bulgaria has issued statements expressing desires to build a wall along its border with Turkey. The state feels overwhelmed by Syrian refugees as well and has sought international aid.

CONCLUSION

The Syrian Civil War will undoubtedly continue to have significant unfavorable consequences for the state of the Syrian economy and its civil society. With massive internal damage to regional infrastructure and entire cities, the Syrian government left to deal with the aftermath of this conflict will need decades to get its country back on track to economic growth and socio-political stability. Not only has the economic collapse of Syria caused regional issues, but the country's unprecedented humanitarian crisis will also like have a long term economic effect on regional growth. While still attempting to surpass the detrimental challenges and setbacks of the economic crisis of 2008, Syria's neighbors are now presented with the fiscally difficult task of housing millions of homeless, unemployed Syrians. While economic adjustments may eventually rectify and adapt to the fiscal hardships faced by these states, social and ethnic tensions within this region have proven to be more difficult to resolve. Each of the states discussed above, as

¹³ The UNHCR> Regional Analysis of Syria.

¹⁴ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 'The Impact of Syria's Refugees on Southern Turkey.'

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Global Turkey in Europe. The EU and Turkey's Asylum Policies in Light of the Syrian Crisis.

well as most states in this region, maintain delicate sectarian balances that even under normal environmental pressures are prone to spontaneous disturbances or violence.

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Justin Rivard is a senior at KSU. He is currently working toward his BA in International Affairs and minor in Asian Studies. He has extensive academic debate experience and, as a result, has distinguished himself at Model United Nations simulation conferences both on the regional and international levels while at KSU. After he graduates he plans to attend graduate school and pursue a master's in International Conflict Management.

Russia's Role in the Ukrainian Protests

Justin Rivard

INTRODUCTION

On November 21, 2013 Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and Prime Minister Mykola Azarov declared that Ukraine would halt plans to sign bilateral economic agreements with the European Union and would instead move toward a Russian-led customs union with former Soviet bloc members. The Ukrainian officials' reason for not signing the deal with the EU was that Ukraine was on the brink of financial collapse and an aid package from the International Monetary Fund would have installed too strict austerity measures. Also, the benefit to be had from the EU deal was considered too small and the EU would not have been willing to expand the proposed amount of \$900 million in aid and a possible \$1 billion in trade.¹⁸ Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to be continuing to use economic leverage and coercion with this former Soviet republic. Russia supplies most of Ukraine's energy needs in the form of natural gas. It has, on multiple occasions, previously shut off the gas supply when the Ukraine was unable to pay its neighboring supplier. For one week in August 2013 Russia brought Ukrainian exports to a complete halt when Russian customs began to significantly increase inspections along the border. These actions were a clear message to Ukraine that this is what the immediate short term consequences for signing a trade agreement with the EU would be. As a result, Yanukovich's termination of talks with the EU was expected, as was the quickly subsequent Russian announcement that it would purchase \$15 billion worth of



Source: Ria Novosti: Infographics
<http://en.ria.ru/infographics/20120117/170800440.html>

¹⁸ Ward, Olivia. Russia and Ukraine: Historic tug of war playing out. *Toronto Star*. December 2, 2013.

Ukrainian bonds and reduce prices of Russian natural gas to Ukraine by one third.¹⁹ Yaukovich had evidently folded to Russian demands and had sold off the state's soaring debt. Unfortunately, this has been a long running pattern of events between these two countries spanning back to Tsarist Russia. Ukraine has too often been forced to play a subservient role due to Russian dominance, and this trend does not seem to be changing soon.

ESCALATING PROTESTS

Not long after the initial collapse of the EU trade talks, small protests in favor of a renewal of talks began in Kiev. On November 30, 2013 riot police brutally suppressed some 54 protestors, many of whom were college students.²⁰ This in turn sparked a massive protest where somewhere between 250,000 and 500,000 Ukrainians took to the streets, outraged by the reaction of their government and sick of the indifference of their leaders. This anger had been building up for years ever since political opposition to Yanukovich had been jailed, namely former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko back in 2011. As part of trade talks with the EU Lutsenko was pardoned by the president, but when a bill to pardon the former prime minister was brought to Parliament, debate was postponed.²¹ This was a clear sign that many Ukrainian politicians were beginning to fold under Russian pressure and beginning to slowly distance themselves from the EU. It is regrettable that had the Ukrainian government stood firm in its EU talks and pushed through the economic shocks caused by Russia, it might actually have had a chance of escaping from the control of its former Soviet leader. In more recent weeks the opposition leaders of Yanukovich's government have been trying to remove his government through a vote of no confidence. The vote has been unsuccessful and now it seems that both sides are becoming increasingly polarized and unwilling to back down. At the same time, the clashes between protesters and Ukrainian security forces have turned extremely violent and casualties have been reported. Continual demonstrations have created a ripple effect throughout the country as small protests have started in central and eastern Ukraine. Economic costs of having the center of the capital occupied and roadblocks set up by both the opposition and by the government are beginning to mount considerably.

RUSSIAN LEVERAGE

However, the Ukrainian situation is complex. Central eastern Ukraine has always been more closely affiliated culturally with Russia, whereas western Ukraine has always been closer to Europe in terms of culture; not surprisingly, the protests have been met with mixed results. The United States has been unusually quiet about the escalating protests. Aside from US Senator John McCain and Chris Murphy addressing the crowd of demonstrators in Kiev, there has been a lack of US official support for the protests.²² Yet, US Secretary of State John Kerry cancelled an upcoming meeting with Ukrainian officials, possibly showing quiet disapproval of the recent actions of the Ukrainian government towards its people.²³ Unfortunately, Secretary of State

¹⁹ Zinets, Natalia. Ukraine borrows \$2 billion from Moscow, signals bailout on track. *Reuters*. January 27, 2014.

²⁰ Soldak, Katya. Maidan doesn't give up the fight. *Forbes*. December 10, 2013.

²¹ The New York Times. Ukraine's path to unrest. *The New York Times*. December 11, 2013.

²² Englund, Will. In Ukraine, Sens. McCain, Murphy address protesters, promise support. *Washington Post*. December 15, 2013.

²³ Cameron, Gary. State Department says Kerry will not attend OSCE meeting in Ukraine. *Reuters*. November 22, 2013.

Kerry needs Russian support for two key international issues in Syria and Iran. Last year's success in getting the Syrian government's approval to let the United Nations Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to begin dismantling chemical weapons currently held in Syria was due in large part by Russia getting Bashar al-Assad to agree to the removal of these weapons. The historic deal in regard to Iran's cessation of its nuclear program in exchange for the easing of some economic sanctions was helped in large part by Iran's major foreign ally, Russia. Such help from Russia in American foreign policy may explain as to why the US is so silent on the Kiev question. However, with the Iranian and Syrian talks underway, assuming they are successful with the help of Russia, the US cautious maneuvers around the Ukrainian issue may no longer be necessary. By that point the protests may have achieved their goal, however.

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FEATURE ARTICLES

Mike Elster will graduate with a Master's degree in Public Administration in May 2014. He earned a Bachelor of Science in Biology from Kennesaw State University. He holds a managerial position for the Georgia Environmental Protection Division with future plans to move into upper management. Mike is also an active member of the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials (ASTSWMO) and holds a position on their Hazardous Waste Recycling Task Force. Mike has a particular interest in budgeting due to a job responsibility that includes grant management for three federal grants.

The Impact of the Recession on State Government Finances

Mike Elster

While there are positive indications that the economy is improving, the recent economic recession has undoubtedly affected the ability of federal, state, and local government entities to fund their programs. Furloughs, layoffs, fee increases, and programmatic cuts have been utilized to combat fiscal concerns for several years, and in many instances, those cuts have significantly reduced service levels for state programs. In times of fiscal instability, it is critical to search for a better understanding of the cause of and effect that a recession has on state finances. This quantitative study examines state fiscal stress, and the programmatic effects thereof, for states in the southeastern United States during the period of 2007 through 2011. The research aims to answer the question of how southeastern states responded to the recent economic downturn. Fiscal stress has been quantified for each state by calculating percentage carryover, or actual state year-end balance in the general fund data as a percentage of the annual general fund expenditures. In addition, state expenditure data was analyzed to determine if there was an association between actual state year-end balances in the general fund from the previous state fiscal year and state expenditures for the following state fiscal year and a regression to determine the degree of change between the independent variable produced in the dependent variable. The study finds a drop in the percentage carryover for states starting in 2008 continuing to a low point in 2009 and beginning to slowly increase in the years 2010 and 2011, which generally follows the timeline of the economic recession that began in late 2007 and continued through 2009. In addition, the results of the analysis indicates that there was a moderate to strong association between the state year end balances from the previous year and select state program expenditure levels for the following year. Further, the regression analysis shows a strong causal relationship between declining end of year balances and declining expenditures.

INTRODUCTION

According to Lee, Johnson, and Joyce (2013), the United States entered into an economic recession between the years 2007 through 2009, and while there are indications that the recession has passed, the effects of the recession still continue to affect federal, state, and local government entities. To reduce deficits and fill budget gaps, government agencies have had to turn to furloughs, layoffs, fee increases, and programmatic cuts. Spending cuts have been utilized as a primary tool to combat fiscal concerns for several years, and in many instances, the cuts have significantly reduced service levels for government funded programs. This issue can be studied at multiple levels of government; however, this paper is narrowed to state fiscal health, and the programmatic effects thereof, for the following southeastern states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.

According to Jimenez (2009), nearly every state has faced historic budget shortfalls as a consequence of the recession, which has been one of the most severe national economic recessions of the last half century. However, as discussed further below, there are positive

indications that the situation is changing such as the increase of state revenues by 6.6 percent in 2011 and by 2.5 percent in 2012 (Sigriz 2013). When state revenues decrease, states must make difficult programmatic decisions with regards to funding to their programs including, but not necessarily limited to, important public services such as education, human services, environmental protection, and public safety. According to McArdle, “A recession may be the worst time to raise taxes, but it is also the worst time to cut services” (2011, p.36). Further, even if revenues continue to increase, it will likely take years for states to be able to return to pre-recession levels of service.

The overall fiscal condition for states appears to be changing as state revenues are projected to increase 3.9 percent in fiscal year 2013, which will be the third consecutive year of growth (Sigriz 2013). In addition, state general fund expenditures are expected to increase by 2.2 percent, and therefore, general fund spending for 2013 is now only 0.8 percent below peak spending levels from 2008 (Sigriz 2013). While these figures appear promising, it is worth noting that after adjusting for inflation, the 2013 spending levels remain down 7.9 percent from 2008 figures (Sigriz 2013). Further, eight states made mid-year budget cuts totaling \$1.7 billion in 2012, which is a significant decrease from a 2009 high of 41 states that totaled \$31.3 billion (Sigriz 2013). Only one state has made a net mid-year budget cut in fiscal year 2013 through December 2012, which is arguably an indicator that states are either experiencing revenue growth or are exercising spending restraint that is more in line with their budget projections (Sigriz 2013).

Total balances, which include both ending balances and balances in states’ budget stabilization funds, are reserve funds that can be utilized in response to unforeseen circumstances. According to Sigriz, these funds peaked from \$69 billion in 2006 (11.5 percent of expenditures) followed by a decline to \$32.5 billion (5.2 percent of expenditures) by 2010. However, balances in these funds are projected to reach a total of \$61.3 billion (9 percent of expenditures) in 2013. However, Sigriz noted that Alaska and Texas represent almost half of the 2013 total balance. Once these states are removed, total balances fall to only 5 percent of expenditures. Again, the fiscal condition for states appears to be slowly improving, but a full recovery may still take years to occur due to an increased demand for services and slow revenue growth.

Researchers such as Jimenez (2009) have studied how fiscal stress affects the allocation of expenditure responsibilities between state and local governments. Jimenez (2009) defined fiscal condition as the capacity of governments to meet financial and service level obligations, and he stated that a decline in such capacity equates to fiscal stress. Unfortunately, Jimenez (2009) noted that there is no single widely accepted indicator of fiscal stress, and while there are numerous ways to assess fiscal condition, the measure has its limitations. Fiscal stress can be defined in several ways and may contain biases that, according to Jimenez (2009), can distort the phenomenon they are attempting to measure. Therefore, the selection of indicators is a critical step in the process of studying fiscal stress.

Jimenez noted that a measure of fiscal stress can be studied by taking year-end balances as a percentage of annual general fund spending. This carryover or “rainy day fund” is utilized by states to avoid tax increases during recessions and to save during more favorable years. Jimenez noted that year-end balances in the general fund and balance stabilization fund as a percentage of

annual general fund expenditures have been a commonly used mechanism to measure fiscal health.

According to Perlman (2009), when demands for public services outstrip the revenues that are available to pay for them, the government entity will experience fiscal stress. Perlman noted that fiscal distress occurs when revenues fall and there is an expected likelihood that revenues will continue to fall in the future. Fiscal stress will be examined for the purposes of this study due to the ability to quantify fiscal stress through the percent carryover calculation. However, fiscal distress, which has a qualitative component for future revenue expectations, will not be considered for this study. While revenue collections are projected to grow 3.9 percent in fiscal year 2013, the effects of fiscal stress remain high as demands for services continue to increase (Sigritz 2013).

Perlman stated that governance will need to change as a result of the recent recession because state and local governments will need new mechanisms and processes to meet the needs of their citizens. Perlman also stated that state and local governments will need to focus on setting priorities, defining objectives, and finding efficient ways to reach their objectives. Studying the effects of this stress to state governments may help states cope with fiscal stress in the future.

A coursework connection has been presented during the research described further below in that public service values for public administrators are to be considered at all times, especially when state officials are making budgetary decisions or cutbacks. The values of effectiveness, efficiency, responsibility, and equity must all be considered both during these times and during times of routine daily operation. For example, public administrators must ensure effectiveness of their programs by designing and implementing these programs in a manner that meets or exceeds the established goals set by their legislative body (Perry 2005). These goals are often unclear, and it is the responsibility of public administrators to determine what the stated goals are and how best to achieve those goals in an efficient, responsible, and equitable manner.

One of the most directly related public service values to the research provided below is efficiency. Public administrators are expected to use tax dollars in a conservative manner by achieving the goals set forth by the legislature with the least amount of resources (labor, materials, tax dollars, etc.) as possible (Major 2011). Efficiency is a constant concern that must be considered when budgets for programs are being increased or more likely, decreased. The same is true for the public service value of responsibility. Responsibility is an expectation that is held by the public that administrators will be responsible in all aspects of their job (Major 2011). During difficult budget times, public administrators must ensure that they focus on projects and programs that provide the best performance to the most citizens.

Lastly, the public service value of equity must also be considered during the daily operations of public administration. Equity or fairness is an ideal that agencies are intended to run on standard operating procedures that treat all persons in the same manner without any form of favoritism or discrimination (Major 2011). Public administrators must continually strive to maintain this public service value and each of the other values described above.

RESEARCH QUESTION

The Research Question for this study is, as follows: How have states in the southeastern United States responded to the recent economic downturn? Nearly every state in the Union has recently faced or is currently facing historic budget shortfalls as a consequence of the recent recession. Funding has been cut for state programs such as education, human services, environmental protection, public safety, and more. Citizens are directly affected by these cuts that may continue into the future as long as demands for services outstrip revenues. As revenue levels change and state budgets either remain stagnant or only slightly increase over time, the uncertainties on what will happen next will continue. In times of fiscal instability, it is critical to search for a better understanding of the cause and effect that a recession has on state finances. As a result of cutbacks, difficult decisions regarding program budgets may have to be made for years to come.

LITERATURE REVIEW

According to Perlman, while state and local governments provide public services that help to enrich the lives of those within the community, government entities will experience fiscal stress when service demands outstrip revenues (Perlman 2009). Further, these government entities will usually be able to determine when they are under fiscal stress, because actual revenues do not keep pace with revenue projections. This may occur for several reasons, such as an unexpected increase in service levels, increased project costs, increased employee fringe benefit costs, and more.

The problem of fiscal stress can be persistent over time because the effects of fiscal stress may remain for several years even after the economy begins to recover. This may occur for various reasons including but not necessarily limited to the following: underfunded retirement program liabilities, substantial Medicaid spending growth, local government fiscal stress, and eroding state tax bases (Boyd and Dadayan 2013). As an example, Medicaid costs have been growing faster than state revenue since the program's inception due to increased enrollment and increases in health care costs. According to Boyd and Dadayan, Medicaid now encompasses approximately 16 percent of state general funds alone.

Some argue that fiscal stress is very difficult to measure due to a belief that the multi-dimensional nature of a government's fiscal condition makes it very difficult for study (Jimenez 2009). However, as noted above, Jimenez argued that a measure of fiscal stress can be studied by taking year-end balances as a percentage of annual general fund spending. This carryover or "rainy day fund" is utilized by states to avoid tax increases during recessions and to save during more favorable years (Jimenez 2009). Jimenez also noted that year-end balances in the general fund and balance stabilization fund as a percentage of annual general fund expenditures have been a commonly used mechanism to measure fiscal health.

Inman (2010) also noted that the 2007-2010 recession has placed fiscal hardships on state and local governments by reducing state revenues and increasing state expenditures, which has resulted in state budget deficits. The effects from increases in expenditures create fiscal stress for the government entity. According to Inman (2010), state and local government entities have responded to the deficits by increasing taxes, cutting spending, and withdrawing funds from

“rainy day” funds. The effect is that as states enter into fiscal stress, they must require employee layoffs and furloughs, program cuts, and/or tax increases in order to balance the budget. However, according to Perlman, those effects can usually be mitigated in the short run through responses such as the use of reserves, the shifting of unspent fund balances into operations, the shifting of operating costs to capital funds, and more.

However, when states have an ongoing mismatch between taxes and spending, they will not be able to sustain a plan of budget gimmicks and/or backdoor borrowing forever; the state will usually either find a way to bring their budgets into balance, or they will run out of money and enter into default (McArdle 2011). The use of so-called “quick fixes” usually causes fiscal problems to compound over time, which then leads to substantial cuts to services if and when revenues actually do go into the negative. In effect, fiscal stress occurs when revenues fall below budget projections or when revenues cannot keep up with inflation (Perlman 2009).

Perlman (2009) argued that the declining fiscal conditions caused by the current recession has contributed to the decline of state and local resources and has limited their ability to address fiscal issues due to increased borrowing costs and reduced access to capital. A difficult situation usually presents itself in this instance, because the state or local government under fiscal pressure continues to receive external pressures and demands for services continue from lawmakers and the community. For example, state and local governments in New York have an unfunded liability of about \$200 billion dollars for retiree health care alone (McArdle 2011). In another example, approximately 4.8 million more people are projected to be eligible for subsidized health insurance through Medicaid in 2012 than were enrolled in 2008 (Oliff, Mai, and Palacios 2012). Health related obligations like Medicaid and health-care reform simply just add to the fiscal problem. Over time, government agencies will continue to deal with situations such as this by either increasing taxes or cutting spending, both of which can obviously be difficult during bad economic times. Obviously, raising taxes in a fragile economy likely depresses growth, but cutting spending may have the same effect since cuts put government workers out of a job in a market that is already flooded with people looking for work (McArdle 2011). Additionally, spending cuts reduce overall demand which can worsen an already difficult fiscal situation (Oliff, Mai, and Palacios 2012).

According to Inman (2010), the national unemployment rate jumped from 4.7 percent in January 2006 to 9.5 percent in February 2009. According to the United States Department of Labor, the unemployment rate as of August 2013 has been reduced to 7.3 percent, and while this number is lower than the February 2009 figure, the unemployment rate continues to be higher than the 4.7 percent rate from January 2006 (2013). Further, by the middle of FY 2009, a total of 44 states were facing significant fiscal deficits totaling over \$78 billion dollars. However, the fiscal picture for states does appear to be improving as state revenues are projected to grow by 3.9 percent (\$26.1 billion) for fiscal year 2013. In order to evaluate the policy responses of the states to the economic recession, Inman (2010) looked at aggregate fiscal performance of the general fund for state governments for the period of 2006 to 2010, and found that all state revenues exceeded state spending by 18.2 billion dollars for the year 2006. Inman (2010) noted that the overall fiscal balances were effectively in balance in 2007, however state revenues fell by 2 billion dollars and state spending rose by 11.5 billion dollars in 2008. By 2009, state revenues fell by over 30 billion dollars, while state spending was only reduced by just over 14 billion

dollars. However, according to the 2011 Annual Survey of State Government Finances by the U.S. Census Bureau, state government general revenue increased 5.7 percent from fiscal year 2010, and state government general expenditure in 2011 increased 3.7 percent from fiscal year 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). A review of the southeastern states' fiscal year end balances in the general fund for the period of 2007 to 2011 appears to generally match the national picture.

In order to address this issue, Inman (2010) noted that the federal government responded with the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 in an effort to protect core state services and respond to states in economic distress. This act provided billions of dollars to state and local governments for relief. While significant federal assistance through ARRA and state cuts in government spending may have helped states on their way to recovery, Inman (2010) argued that the burden to keep state governments fiscally sound should solely be placed on the states as opposed to the federal government. This concern may be warranted now that the federal government has, at least for the most part, allowed ARRA aid to expire at the end of fiscal year 2011 (Oliff, Mai, and Palacios 2012).

Similarly, Perlman argued that state and local governments must react to fiscal distress by focusing on operational objectives (Perlman 2009). Fiscal pressure also creates increased challenges and reduced support for social services. According to Perlman, an objectives focus can assist in the area of fiscal and financial management and in social-sector services. By shifting an operational focus from short-term to a more long-term approach; Perlman argued that state and local government agencies can better maintain financial sustainability. For example, a shift from a traditional budgeting approach focused on costs to an outcome-based budgeting approach helps to establish how much citizens are willing to pay for the results that they want, which in turn, allows government entities to better set priorities and define outcomes. Public pension systems are also strained during times of fiscal stress. Perlman noted that state and local government entities must react to this problem by enacting regulations to reduce the range of investments open to pension systems, forbidding the use of third-party agents, and changing the mixture of asset classes in portfolios.

In order to react to these concerns, Perlman argued that government entities will need to rethink service delivery and develop new ways to pay for social services. For example, one suggested alternative is to focus on shared services and intergovernmental cooperation. Ultimately, in an effort to maintain fiscal stability, even in difficult budgetary times, states must continue to prioritize their focus toward providing their services to meet citizen demand at competitive tax rates. McArdle argued that one way to help in the current situation is for lawmakers to trim Medicaid reimbursements, place new state workers into defined-contribution plans rather than traditional pensions, and reduce retiree health benefits (McArdle 2011).

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Clearly, tracking revenue and expenditures is critical at both the state level and at the individual program level. As funding shifts, program managers and budget officials must review the current trends and make budgetary and personnel decisions based on the data. The overall goal of this study is to examine fiscal stress in the southeastern United States and study how states

have responded. Fiscal stress can be examined by calculating actual state year-end balance in the general fund data as a percentage of the annual general fund expenditures (percent carryover). For the purposes of this study expenditure data from the years of 2007 to 2011 have been selected in order to determine fiscal stress levels for the southeastern states.

Next, state expenditure data can be obtained in an effort to determine if there is an association between actual state year-end balances in the general fund from the previous state fiscal year and state expenditures for the following state fiscal year and a regression analysis to determine the degree of change the independent variable produces in the dependent variable. To accomplish this goal, the following dependent variables will be collected: elementary and secondary education expenditures, higher education expenditures (capital inclusive), total public assistance expenditures, Medicaid expenditures, corrections expenditures (capital inclusive), transportation expenditures (capital inclusive), and all other expenditures (capital inclusive). These dependent variables will then be compared to actual state year-end balances in the general fund from the previous state fiscal year. As discussed above, this data will be analyzed to determine if there is an association between actual state year-end balances and state expenditures for the following state fiscal year and to determine the degree of change the independent variable produces in the dependent variable. It is expected that if state year-end balances in the general fund decline, then less financial resources would be left for the succeeding year's expenditures.

While state general fund (actual) data can be obtained in several different manners, this information is readily accessible from the Book of the States provided by The Council of State Governments. The Book of the States is produced annually by the Council of State Governments and contains state general fund data. Since the range of general fund data for this study was 2007-2011, the Book of the States published during the period of 2009 through 2012 have been utilized for this study.

Similarly, state expenditure data is accessible from a variety of sources; however, for the purposes of this study, the expenditure data was pulled from the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) in their State Expenditure Reports. The State Expenditure Reports have been produced by NASBO since 1987, and reportedly represent more than 99 percent of total state spending (NASBO 2012). In addition, the State Expenditure Reports are produced annually by NASBO and cover the last three years of state expenditures. For example, the 2012 State Expenditure Report included data from actual fiscal 2010, actual fiscal 2011, and estimated fiscal 2012. Since the range of expenditure data for this study was 2007-2011, the State Expenditure Reports published during the period of 2009 through 2012 have been utilized for this study.

Note that with the exception of Alabama, the fiscal year for each of the states in this study runs from July 1 through June 30. However, Alabama's fiscal year starts on October 1 and runs through September 30. Clearly, this difference in fiscal years can potentially cause problems when comparing the data between the states. However, the State Expenditure Reports from NASBO address this concern by basing prior year expenditures on actual expenditures that occurred during the reporting year, regardless of the year appropriated.

With the independent variable data (shown in Table 2 below) and the dependent variable data (shown in Tables 3 through 9 below), a linear regression and the Pearson's correlation was calculated to determine the association between the independent variable (state year-end balance data from the previous fiscal year) and each of the dependent variables for the next fiscal year [state expenditure data (as categorized below)]. This data was reviewed and studied via the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program.

Regression analysis is defined as the statistical technique designed to predict values of a dependent variable from knowledge of the values of one or more independent variable(s) (George and Mallery 2006). This form of analysis has been utilized in this study to determine the probability that there is a sound association between the independent variable, in this case state year-end balance data from the previous fiscal year, and the dependent variables as described above. SPSS generates a Pearson's *r* score, which designates the strength of the association between the dependent and independent variable (George and Mallery 2006). The range for the *r* value is from -1 to +1, where extremely high values indicate a strong positive association, values near zero indicate a weak association, and negative values note an inverse association (Terrell 2012).

The coefficient of determination, or R-square (R^2) multiplied by 100, indicates how much of the change in the dependent variable is caused by the independent variable (Terrell 2012). For example, an R^2 value of .28 indicates that 28 percent of the variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by the independent variable. In addition, SPSS also provides a probability (*p*) value that indicates the likelihood that a particular outcome occurred by chance (George and Mallery (2006). A *p* value of < .05 is generally interpreted as indicating a statistically significant association due to a less than 5 percent likelihood that the results are due to chance. A summary of the SPSS analysis is provided in Tables 10 through 13 below.

FINDINGS

As discussed above, data for the following states were utilized for this study: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. These states were primarily chosen due to a work-related connection to the State of Georgia. An interest in surrounding states was also considered due to personal interactions with state government employees from other states within the region. Based on the results of this study, a follow-up study may be warranted that would expand the study population to all states in the Union to determine if there are any regional variances.

The first step in analyzing the data for this study was to examine fiscal stress by calculating actual state year-end balance in the general fund data as a percentage of the annual general fund expenditures (percent carryover). This calculation is an indicator of the capacity of governments to meet financial and service level obligations (Jimenez 2009). Expenditure data from the years of 2007 to 2011 were collected and the percent carryover was calculated. See Table 1 below for the results of these calculations.

**Table 1: Carryover Calculation Summary Table
Ending Balance Divided by Expenditures (as a percentage)**

Southern Region	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Alabama	6.5%	2.5%	1.4%	1.0%	1.0%
Arkansas	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Florida	12.2%	1.2%	2.7%	7.4%	3.1%
Georgia*	14.5%	11.4%	9.9%	7.1%	6.6%
Kentucky	6.6%	0.9%	0.4%	0.9%	3.3%
Louisiana	11.5%	9.0%	0.8%	-1.2%	-0.2%
Mississippi	2.0%	0.7%	0.1%	0.1%	1.1%
North Carolina	9.6%	2.9%	0.5%	1.3%	3.1%
South Carolina*	3.1%	4.5%	2.1%	4.8%	13.8%
Tennessee	16.5%	3.2%	0.7%	2.5%	6.0%
Regional means	8.3%	3.6%	1.9%	2.4%	3.8%

Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, *The Fiscal Survey of the States* (2009-2013).
Key: In states with an asterisk (*), the ending balance includes the balance in the budget stabilization fund.

As shown in Table 1 above, actual state year-end balance in the general fund data as a percentage of the annual general fund expenditures (percent carryover) has been calculated as an indicator of the capacity of governments to meet financial and service level obligations. The results of the calculation show a drop in the percentage carryover starting in 2008 continuing to a low point of 1.9 percent in 2009 and beginning to increase in the years 2010 and 2011. As expected, this drop followed by a slow increase generally follows the timeline of the economic recession that began in late 2007 and continued through 2009. Note that the state of Arkansas is an outlier in that the state does not carry a balance in the general fund at the end of their fiscal year, and therefore, the percent carryover for that state is shown as 0 percent. Instead of a rainy day fund, Arkansas utilizes a revenue stabilization policy, which allows legislators to distribute revenue to state programs via a fund prioritization system (Jordan 2006).

In an effort to study how southeastern states have responded to fiscal stress during the period of 2007 through 2011, actual state year-end balance in the general fund data from the previous year (independent variable) was compared to the following dependent variables in the next state fiscal year: elementary and secondary education expenditures, higher education expenditures (capital inclusive), total public assistance expenditures, Medicaid expenditures, corrections expenditures (capital inclusive), transportation expenditures (capital inclusive), and all other expenditures (capital inclusive). The independent variable data (actual state year-end balance in the general fund) is shown in Table 2 below and the dependent variable data for each year (2007 through 2011) are shown in Tables 3 through 9 located further below.

**Table 2: State Fiscal Year Ending Balances Summary Table
Ending Balances in the General Fund by State (in Millions)**

Southern Region	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Alabama	515	219	105	72	72
Arkansas	0	0	0	0	0
Florida	3,434	321	631	1,573	746
Georgia*	2,786	2,217	1,738	1,138	1,131
Kentucky	579	86	40	80	290
Louisiana	1,088	866	76	-108	-14
Mississippi	435	36	7	5	50
North Carolina	1,221	599	92	237	582
South Carolina*	1,081	324	121	245	712
Tennessee	1,007	348	77	240	595

Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, *The Fiscal Survey of the States* (2009-2013).

Key: In states with an asterisk (*), the ending balance includes the balance in the budget stabilization fund.

**Table 3: Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures Summary Table
Total Expenditures (in Millions)**

Southern Region	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Alabama	5,011	5,490	4,947	5,003	5,243
Arkansas	3,054	3,153	3,217	3,427	3,523
Florida	13,041	12,997	11,852	12,695	14,243
Georgia	9,402	10,177	9,241	10,279	10,199
Kentucky	4,485	4,740	4,739	5,020	5,009
Louisiana	4,625	4,554	4,855	5,288	5,188
Mississippi	3,052	3,171	3,108	3,131	3,291
North Carolina	8,701	9,320	9,540	9,419	9,360
South Carolina	3,636	3,917	3,593	3,474	3,838
Tennessee	4,279	4,662	4,942	5,031	5,204

Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, *The Fiscal Survey of the States* (2009-2013).

**Table 4: Higher Education Expenditures (Capital Inclusive) Summary Table
Total Expenditures (in Millions)**

Southern Region	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Alabama	3,887	4,222	4,081	4,423	4,274
Arkansas	2,617	2,747	3,058	3,057	3,239

Florida	5,919	6,392	5,662	4,801	5,336
Georgia	2,667	2,891	6,321	6,898	6,909
Kentucky	4,600	5,548	5,713	5,818	6,050
Louisiana	2,683	2,879	2,816	2,328	2,325
Mississippi	2,435	2,623	2,703	2,780	2,881
North Carolina	5,985	4,907	6,172	6,062	6,410
South Carolina	4,031	4,277	4,384	4,252	4,651
Tennessee	3,410	3,764	3,721	3,730	3,995

Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, *The Fiscal Survey of the States* (2009-2013).

**Table 5: Total Public Assistance Expenditures Summary Table
Total Expenditures (in Millions)**

Southern Region	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Alabama	46	41	42	49	54
Arkansas	440	376	373	448	449
Florida	157	156	204	214	206
Georgia	515	536	575	556	503
Kentucky	171	166	183	207	230
Louisiana	187	160	138	174	178
Mississippi	27	27	30	963	1,019
North Carolina	215	248	242	242	245
South Carolina	67	75	64	112	109
Tennessee	132	114	125	136	130

Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, *The Fiscal Survey of the States* (2009-2013).

**Table 6: Medicaid Expenditures Summary Table
Total Expenditures (in Millions)**

Southern Region	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Alabama	4,554	4,400	5,048	5,394	5,244
Arkansas	3,204	3,431	3,577	3,990	4,317
Florida	14,370	14,922	16,202	17,919	19,101
Georgia	7,413	7,211	7,619	7,884	8,307
Kentucky	4,531	4,905	5,402	5,693	5,808
Louisiana	5,174	5,780	6,169	6,835	6,884
Mississippi	3,158	3,493	4,307	4,187	4,144
North Carolina	10,494	10,994	11,819	11,796	11,298
South Carolina	4,475	4,383	4,577	4,596	4,587
Tennessee	7,093	7,497	7,389	8,181	8,968

Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, *The Fiscal Survey of the States* (2009-2013).

**Table 7: Corrections Expenditures (Capital Inclusive) Summary Table
Total Expenditures (in Millions)**

Southern Region	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Alabama	550	577	573	605	601
Arkansas	354	393	404	425	442
Florida	2,913	3,080	2,970	3,133	2,864
Georgia	1,131	1,217	1,181	1,199	1,213
Kentucky	526	572	568	571	585
Louisiana	730	814	957	857	848
Mississippi	309	349	347	337	333
North Carolina	1,277	1,384	1,738	1,412	1,443
South Carolina	585	629	608	577	558
Tennessee	714	690	789	652	770

Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, *The Fiscal Survey of the States* (2009-2013).

**Table 8: Transportation Expenditures (Capital Inclusive) Summary Table
Total Expenditures (in Millions)**

Southern Region	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Alabama	1,254	1,243	1,289	1,692	1,443
Arkansas	905	975	935	968	1,072
Florida	7,758	6,896	6,034	5,839	6,255
Georgia	3,087	2,170	2,472	2,479	1,908
Kentucky	2,154	2,472	2,094	2,085	2,017
Louisiana	2,137	1,570	2,559	2,047	2,146
Mississippi	1,549	1,351	1,284	1,338	1,320
North Carolina	3,327	3,793	3,654	3,465	4,433
South Carolina	1,640	1,562	1,452	1,252	1,270
Tennessee	1,525	1,747	2,606	1,816	1,882

Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, *The Fiscal Survey of the States* (2009-2013).

**Table 9: All Other Expenditures (Capital Inclusive) Summary Table
Total Expenditures (in Millions)**

Southern Region	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Alabama	21,808	24,186	3,757	3,438	3,712

Arkansas	5,539	5,824	6,629	7,607	7,442
Florida	21,954	19,936	17,749	17,449	17,457
Georgia	10,978	12,560	12,774	11,453	11,419
Kentucky	5,813	4,592	5,361	6,547	5,738
Louisiana	10,792	14,238	10,549	14,155	13,631
Mississippi	5,343	4,586	5,602	10,024	9,270
North Carolina	9,509	10,942	14,152	16,351	17,937
South Carolina	5,555	5,944	6,088	5,439	7,175
Tennessee	7,386	7,850	9,500	8,903	9,148

Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, *The Fiscal Survey of the States* (2009-2013).

Table 10: Pearson's r and R-Square Values for Previous End of Year Balance and Dependent Variables (2008)

Dependent Variable	2008 r value	2008 R ²	p value
Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures	r = .904	R ² = .817	.000
Higher Education Expenditures	r = .413	R ² = .171	.118
Total Public Assistance Expenditures	r = .340	R ² = .115	.169
Medicaid Expenditures	r = .798	R ² = .637	.003
Corrections Expenditures	r = .877	R ² = .770	.000
Transportation Expenditures	r = .770	R ² = .593	.005
All Other Expenditures	r = .448	R ² = .200	.097

Table 10 above provides a summary of the linear regression analysis for the independent variable (2007 state year-end balance data) and each of the dependent variables (2008 state expenditure data for each of the categories as shown above). The r values in Table 10 range from a low of .340 for Total Public Assistance Expenditures to a high of .904 for Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures. For the purposes of this study, r values between .500 and 1 have been considered to show a moderate to strong association between the two values. Therefore, there appears to be a relatively strong association between 2007 state year-end balances and the following expenditures for 2008: Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures (r = .904), Medicaid Expenditures (r = .798), Corrections Expenditures (r = .877), and Transportation Expenditures (r = .770).

The R² values shown in Table 10 range from a low of .115 for Total Public Assistance Expenditures to a high of .817 for Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures. As noted above, the R² value shows the degree of change the independent variable produces in the dependent variable. Therefore, moderate to strong causal relationships were noted for the independent variable (2007 state year-end balance data) on each of the following dependent variables: Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures (R² = .817), Medicaid Expenditures (R² = .637), Corrections Expenditures (R² = .770), and Transportation Expenditures (R² = .593).

Lastly, the p values shown in Table 10 range from a low of .000 for both Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures and Corrections Expenditures to a high of .169 for Total Public Assistance Expenditures. As noted above, an indication of the significance between the independent variable and each dependent variable is a p value of $< .05$, which is generally interpreted as indicating a statistically significant correlation. Therefore, the following dependent variables appear to have a statistically significant association with the independent variable (2007 state year-end balance data): Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures ($p = .000$), Medicaid Expenditures ($p = .003$), Corrections Expenditures ($p = .000$), and Transportation Expenditures ($p = .005$).

Table 11: Pearson’s r and R-Square Values for Previous End of Year Balance and Dependent Variables (2009)

Dependent Variable	2009 r value	2009 R ²	p value
Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures	r = .474	R ² = .224	.083
Higher Education Expenditures	r = .453	R ² = .205	.094
Total Public Assistance Expenditures	r = .707	R ² = .500	.011
Medicaid Expenditures	r = .177	R ² = .031	.313
Corrections Expenditures	r = .214	R ² = .046	.277
Transportation Expenditures	r = .166	R ² = .027	.324
All Other Expenditures	r = .452	R ² = .204	.095

Table 11 above provides a summary of the linear regression analysis for the independent variable (2008 state year-end balance data) and each of the dependent variables (2009 state expenditure data for each of the categories as shown above). The r values in Table 11 range from a low of .166 for Transportation Expenditures to a high of .707 for Total Public Assistance Expenditures. As previously discussed, r values between .500 and 1 have been considered to show a moderate to strong association between the two values for the purposes of this study. Therefore, there appears to be a relatively strong association between 2008 state year-end balances and Total Public Assistance Expenditures ($r = .707$).

The R² values shown in Table 11 range from a low of .027 for Transportation Expenditures to a high of .500 for Total Public Assistance Expenditures. As noted above, the R² value shows the degree of change the independent variable produces in the dependent variable. Therefore, moderate to strong causal relationships were noted for the independent variable (2008 state year-end balance data) on Total Public Assistance Expenditures ($R^2 = .500$).

Lastly, the p values shown in Table 11 range from a low of .011 for Total Public Assistance Expenditures to a high of .324 for Transportation Expenditures. As noted above, an indication of the significance between the independent variable and each dependent variable is a p value of $< .05$, which is generally interpreted as indicating a statistically significant correlation. Only one dependent variable [Total Public Assistance Expenditures ($p = .011$)] appears to have a statistically significant association with the independent variable (2008 state year-end balance data).

Table 12: Pearson's r and R-Square Values for Previous End of Year Balance and Dependent Variables (2010)

Dependent Variable	2010 r value	2010 R ²	p value
Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures	r = .656	R ² = .431	.020
Higher Education Expenditures	r = .618	R ² = .382	.028
Total Public Assistance Expenditures	r = .213	R ² = .045	.278
Medicaid Expenditures	r = .312	R ² = .097	.190
Corrections Expenditures	r = .408	R ² = .166	.121
Transportation Expenditures	r = .344	R ² = .118	.165
All Other Expenditures	r = .275	R ² = .075	.221

Table 12 above provides a summary of the linear regression analysis for the independent variable (2009 state year-end balance data) and each of the dependent variables (2010 state expenditure data for each of the categories as shown above). The r values in Table 12 range from a low of .213 for Total Public Assistance Expenditures to a high of .656 for Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures. As previously discussed, r values between .500 and 1 have been considered to show a moderate to strong association between the two values for the purposes of this study. Therefore, there appears to be a moderately strong association between 2009 state year-end balances and both Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures (r = .656) and Higher Education Expenditures (r = .618).

The R² values shown in Table 12 range from a low of .045 for Total Public Assistance Expenditures to a high of .431 for Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures. As noted above, the R² value shows the degree of change the independent variable produces in the dependent variable. Therefore, moderate to strong causal relationships were noted for the independent variable (2009 state year-end balance data) on Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures and Higher Education Expenditures.

Lastly, the p values shown in Table 12 range from a low of .020 for Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures to a high of .278 for Total Public Assistance Expenditures. As noted above, an indication of the significance between the independent variable and each dependent variable is a p value of < .05, which is generally interpreted as indicating a statistically significant correlation. The following two dependent variables appear to have a statistically significant association with the independent variable (2009 state year-end balance data): Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures (p = .020) and Higher Education Expenditures (p = .028).

Table 13: Pearson's r and R-Square Values for Previous End of Year Balance and Dependent Variables (2011)

Dependent Variable	2011 r value	2011 R ²	p value
Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures	r = .897	R ² = .805	.000
Higher Education Expenditures	r = .567	R ² = .322	.044
Total Public Assistance Expenditures	r = .047	R ² = .002	.449
Medicaid Expenditures	r = .798	R ² = .636	.003
Corrections Expenditures	r = .853	R ² = .728	.001
Transportation Expenditures	r = .677	R ² = .458	.016
All Other Expenditures	r = .508	R ² = .258	.067

Table 13 above provides a summary of the linear regression analysis for the independent variable (2010 state year-end balance data) and each of the dependent variables (2011 state expenditure data for each of the categories as shown above). The r values in Table 13 range from a low of .047 for Total Public Assistance Expenditures to a high of .897 for Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures. As previously discussed, r values between .500 and 1 have been considered to show a moderate to strong association between the two values for the purposes of this study. Therefore, there appears to be a moderate to strong association between 2010 state year-end balances the following dependent variables: Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures (r = .897), Higher Education Expenditures (r = .567), Medicaid Expenditures (r = .798), Corrections Expenditures (r = .853), Transportation Expenditures (r = .677), and All Other Expenditures (r = .508).

The R² values shown in Table 13 range from a low of .002 for Total Public Assistance Expenditures to a high of .805 for Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures. As noted above, the R² value shows the degree of change the independent variable produces in the dependent variable. Therefore, moderate to strong causal relationships were noted for the independent variable (2010 state year-end balance data) on each of the following dependent variables: Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures (R² = .805), Medicaid Expenditures (R² = .636), and Corrections Expenditures (R² = .728).

Lastly, the p values shown in Table 13 range from a low of .000 for Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures to a high of .449 for Total Public Assistance Expenditures. As noted above, an indication of the significance between the independent variable and each dependent variable is a p value of < .05, which is generally interpreted as indicating a statistically significant correlation. The following dependent variables appear to have a statistically significant association with the independent variable (2010 state year-end balance data): Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures (p = .000), and Higher Education Expenditures (p = .044), Medicaid Expenditures (p = .003), Corrections Expenditures (p = .001), and Transportation Expenditures (p = .016).

LIMITATIONS

There are multiple limitations that cannot be controlled, such as the time constraint used in the study. For example, it would be helpful to have more current budget data, because there appears to be a recent increasing revenue trend. However, the most recent actual state fiscal year data has not been published from the data sources utilized for this study. In addition, this study focuses on a specific region and a select number of indicators. Since there are other potential influences out there, this limitation must be considered. However, the indicators selected should still help to explain state budget outcomes.

In addition, there are other plausible unknowns that could potentially explain the variance in state expenditures to their programs. For example, other sociodemographic and economic indicators not included in the study may substantially affect state fiscal sustainability. In addition, states obtain money through a variety of ways (i.e. federal grants, fines and penalties, taxes), each of which, affect the amount of revenue that each state receives. Therefore, an expansion of the study provided above may be warranted in an effort to address the concerns described above. The expansion could potentially include a larger population (i.e. all fifty states in the Union) and more parameters such as additional independent and dependent variables.

The recent economic recession has undoubtedly affected state government finances over recent years. State revenues have begun to increase, with a projected increase of 3.9 percent in 2013, which may be a positive indication that the situation may be changing (Sigritz 2013). However, the situation may still be fluid as it will likely take several years for states to be able to return to pre-recession levels of service. As noted above, states utilize carryover funds to avoid tax increases during times of increased fiscal demand and to save money during more favorable years.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The recent economic recession has undoubtedly affected state government finances over recent years. State revenues have begun to increase, with a projected increase of 3.9 percent in 2013, which may be a positive indication that the situation may be changing (Sigritz 2013). However, the situation may still be unstable as it will likely take several years for states to be able to return to pre-recession levels of service. As noted above, states utilize carryover funds to avoid tax increases during times of increased fiscal demand and to save money during more favorable years.

The fiscal condition of southeastern states was studied in an effort to determine how those states have responded to the recent economic downturn. Fiscal stress was calculated by taking actual state year-end balance in the general fund as a percentage of the annual general fund expenditures, was studied in an effort to determine state fiscal condition. It was determined that the resulting percent carryover calculation for southeastern states generally followed the timeline of the recent economic recession in that the average percent carryover took a drop in 2008, continued to a low point in 2009, and began to slowly increase in the years 2010 and 2011.

In addition, actual state year-end balance in the general fund data from the previous year was also compared to multiple total expenditure variables in an effort to measure the effects of fiscal stress to program funding for southeastern states. The results of the analysis indicate that there was a moderate to strong association between the state year end balances from the previous year and state expenditure levels for the following year. This association was noted for several variables as noted in the findings section for Tables 10 through 13 above with the highest number of significant associations were noted for the years 2008 and 2011. Additionally, in several instances, the R^2 values indicate moderate to strong causal relationships for state year-end balance data on the dependent variables. Further, p values, indicating the significance between the independent and dependent variables, were noted as being statistically significant in several instances with the majority of significant p values noted for the years 2008 and 2011.

The results of this study indicate that states reacted to reduced year-end balances by making funding cuts to their programs during the economic downturn. However, funding cuts were not unilaterally reduced during the recession. Certain categories of expenditures were noted as statistically significant more often than other categories during the reporting period. For example, a statistically significant association was noted between actual state year-end balances in the general fund from the previous year data and elementary and secondary education expenditures data for a total of three separate years. Since education funding is provided at least in part by state funds, a reduction in funding levels from the previous year could have prompted officials to begin balancing funding by making cuts to education.

The study of state fiscal health and the tracking of expenditures is an important part of the budgeting process. The study of fiscal stress, and its effects to the overall fiscal condition of states, warrants further study due to the measureable correlations between state year-end balances and expenditures as noted above. It is the responsibility of public administrators to maintain a high level of program performance by monitoring both revenues and expenditures and to take corrective action when necessary. Therefore, states should seek to continually improve their budgeting and reporting efforts in order to maintain effectiveness and to ensure responsibility to their stakeholders.

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An Exploratory Analysis of Developmental Disability Services in the State of Georgia

Michelle Rae Robison

*This paper looks at the current elements of quality in the state of Georgia's service delivery system in meeting public administration principles of equity, efficiency, and effectiveness. For most of the twentieth century, people with developmental disabilities across the nation and in the state of Georgia have been living in institutions. Traditional institutionalization paradigms assume people with intellectual and developmental disabilities need to be congregated into institutions. These practices began to change in the 1990s with the passing of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and subsequently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1999 decision in *Olmstead et.al. v. L.C. et.al.* to end the isolation of persons with disabilities. The catalyst for a paradigm shift in the state of Georgia began in 1991, with two women who were both residents of Georgia Regional Hospital in Atlanta. Since the sentinel event of the *Olmstead* decision, the development of community based services has progressed and, to date, the state of Georgia provides a variety of day programming and community living service options for adults with developmental disabilities. This paper asks the question of how the state of Georgia is defining, implementing, and meeting standards of quality. Documents from Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities (DBHDD) such as their internal quality review management report, the Department of Justice Independent Reviewer Report, the Ombudsman Biennial Report, literature across the developmental disabilities service field, and attendance in community focus groups, along with critical analysis were used to arrive at the conclusion that much work remains if the state is going to develop and implement impactful public administration standards of quality.*

INTRODUCTION

For most of the twentieth century, people with developmental disabilities across the nation and in the state of Georgia have been living in institutions. The American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) is well respected as the world's largest and oldest organization of intellectual disability professionals and have played a major role in evolving ideas regarding quality service approaches for adults 18 years of age and older living with intellectual and developmental disabilities. AAIDD regards developmental disabilities (DD) as an umbrella term that comprises intellectual disabilities (ID). The elemental factors of a diagnosis of developmental disability consist of: age of onset prior to the age of twenty-two, impairment of general adaptive functioning, chronic and attributable to cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or any other condition other than mental illness (DBHDD Provider Manual, 2013a). Intellectual disability diagnosis is identified by the following: age of onset prior to the age of 18, assessment findings from standardized instruments recognized by professional organizations (AAIDD, APA) of substantially sub-average intellectual functioning and impaired adaptive functioning. Historically, definitions focused on the failure to adapt socially and insisted individuals with ID/DD be segregated into institutions. As professional knowledge, skills, and society in general have progressed over the years, so too, have definitions as evidenced in 1992 when the definition

first delineated intellectual disabilities has conditions that could be enhanced by provisions of supports, rather than as a static, lifelong disability. Traditional institutionalization paradigms assume people with intellectual and development disabilities need to be congregated into institutions. These practices began to change in the 1990s with the passing of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and subsequently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1999 decision in *Olmsted et.al. v. L.C. et.al.* to end the isolation of persons with disabilities.

The catalyst for a paradigm shift in the state of Georgia began in 1991, with two women who were both residents of Georgia Regional Hospital in Atlanta. Both of these women were suffering from the daily isolation and boredom of institutional life and wanted to go home. Their doctors believed they would fare better if they lived in the community (Institute on Human Development and Disability, 2013). Unfortunately, the state of Georgia's Department of Human Resources, now known as the Department of Behavioral Health and Development Disability, maintained that they had no resources for supporting them to live in the community and were unwilling to allocate funds (Institute on Human Development and Disability, 2013). As a result, these women sued the state of Georgia and on June 22, 1999, Supreme Court Justice Ginsberg stated in the majority opinion that, "Unjustified isolation is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability" (527 U.S. at 598). In her summary Justice Ginsberg wrote that continuing to institutionalize and isolate individuals with disabilities is, in itself, discrimination and would only serve to perpetuate this wrongful assumption that individuals with disabilities are somehow incapable, and even unworthy of life outside of an institution. Despite this decision substantial disparities remain across states. "Ten states and the District of Columbia have no large state institutions and have found ways to provide care in the community to all people with intellectual disabilities or developmental disabilities (ID/DD), regardless of the severity of their disability (National Council, 2012). The state of Georgia on the other hand, began work on closing institutions in 2005 by committing to closing admissions to children. The state's process was expedited by Department of Justice intervention in 2007, with the signing of the Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) settlement agreement for the period of 2009-2014, which focused on the safety and effectiveness of treatment in state hospitals (DBHDD, 2013b). Additionally, the Department of Justice intervened again and entered into another settlement (American with Disabilities Act) with the state of Georgia in 2010 – 2015 focused on expanding community services for Adults with Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities and the creation of a department wide Quality Management program (DBHDD, 2013c).

The Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities (DBHDD) is the agency in the state of Georgia that focuses solely on policies, programs, and services for people with mental illness, substance use disorders, and developmental disabilities. Per the DBHDD website, they were created by the Governor and the General Assembly in 2009 and began operations on July 1st, 2009. The Department's published policy mission statement regarding community based services states that the goal of community-based services is to serve people as close to home as possible in the least restrictive setting. Doing so allows them to draw on natural supports, such as family, neighbors, churches, and community activities. It gives them a better chance to maintain the kind of quality of life that all of us want with self-determination and independence (DBHDD, 2013d). Since the sentinel event of the Olmstead decision, the development of community based services has progressed and, to date, the state of Georgia

provides a variety of day programming and community living service options for adults with development disabilities.

As a result of the 2010 Department of Justice settlement agreement, admissions into state hospitals stopped in 2011. Per DBHDD, as of August 2013, 342 individuals with developmental disabilities remain in state institutions. Georgia has some exemplary providers, who are under pressure to expand while recognizing the need to find ways to help others create similar programs. However, funding, murky state-wide elements of quality and program infrastructure challenges continue to impact the ability to identify and provide quality community services. These challenges, such as ensuring a uniform quality standard for services throughout the state, and developing adequate capacity to serve people where they want to live remain entrenched. While closing state run institutions is important, it is only a first step. It is imperative that these individuals are ensured equitable access to efficient services and supports in their communities that will facilitate the development of rich and meaningful lives. How is the state of Georgia defining, implementing and meeting standards of quality? This is the questions this study aims to examine and answer.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Over the last 40 years, more than 230,000 people with intellectual and developmental disabilities were discharged from state institutions (National Council, 2012). Equity refers to the fundamental right to opportunity or access to services, such as in the community verses an institution. People should have equal chances at achieving similar life goals, and outcomes produced by society and government should not result in deprivation of some in favor of others (Lee, 2008). What strikes at the core of both of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Olmstead decision in that courts have consistently upheld a person's right to receive services in the least restrictive environment possible (National Council, 2012). Closing institutions requires a review of how resources are distributed to provide opportunities for community living while fostering inclusive community supports. Life in the community provides equality of opportunities for dignity, freedom, choice, and a sense of belonging that are not possible in an institutional environment (National Council, 2012). The term "institutionalization" has a strong rhetorical value as an effective, powerful short-hand for a long history of discrimination and exclusion (Cremin, 2012). Under the Olmstead decision, the key question is whether individuals with disabilities are being unnecessarily segregated from community (Cremin, 2012). An institution has been defined as a large 16 or more resident, state residential facility in which people with developmental disabilities were cut off or segregated from society (Taylor, 2001). Community is understood to mean a facility or home located in ordinary housing or a residential neighborhood (Taylor, 2001). Norman-Major's definition of equity includes simple fairness, distribution of resources to reduce inequalities in programs and services with the end goal of creating equality of access (Norman-Major, 2010).

In calling for the inclusion of social equity as a pillar of public administration, the scholars argued that it is not sufficient to have economical and efficient government services if we do not also consider who is being served at the same time (Norman-Major, 2010). Equity in practice has three keys to consider; simple fairness and treatment, distribution of resources to reduce inequalities in universal programs and services, and redistribution of resources to level the playing field through targeted programs (Norman-Major, 2010). At the core social equity is

essentially calling for equality of opportunity or access to services. For the purpose of this case study, the state of Georgia's Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disability (DBHDD) access to services criteria was reviewed. Per DBHDD website, any resident of the state of Georgia is eligible for DBHDD services. The DBHDD system of services is administrated through six regional offices that are responsible for the following: overseeing statewide initiatives, developing new services, expanding existing services as needed, monitor services to ensure quality and access to services, investigate and resolve complaints, and conduct special investigations and reviews when warranted (DBHDD, 2013d). The institutional model costs \$6 billion a year nationwide at a time when less costly and more effective service delivery models focused on community-based services are available (National Council, 2012).

Woodrow Wilson's *The Study of Administration* discussed efficiency as resources and the quality or the degree to which these resources produce a desired effect without wasting time or money. Therefore, for the purpose of this case study the following state of Georgia resources were reviewed regarding their efficiency: number of contracted state providers, number of services offered, and service allocation amounts. DBHDD currently has Grant-In-Aid (GIA) contracts with eighty providers of community services through-out the state. Additionally, there are approximately 270 providers of community services who serve only Medicaid waiver clients. These community-based services are available in a variety of types but commonly include group homes, independent apartment/homes, apartment programs, parent/relative homes, foster/Host Homes and day program settings.

In 1981, Congress established the Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) waiver program that allowed states to receive federal matching funds for a variety of residential services and supports to Medicaid beneficiaries who would otherwise require institutional care (National Council, 2012). Research and experience show the benefits of community living compared to living in an institution such as increased quality of life, cost savings, and the opportunity to provide services to people who currently are not served (National Council, 2012). This strategy of community living creates the opportunity for the state to rethink how it serves and supports its citizens. Medicaid is a federal-state program administered at the federal level by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in the Department of Health and Human Services (Lee, 2008). Since the development of this program in 1981, by 2009, forty-eight states, which include Georgia and the District of Columbia, operated 125 different HCBS waivers for people with disabilities (National Council, 2012). In addition to waiver funding, state funds also known as grants in aid (GIA) are available to state of Georgia residents who meet eligibility criteria. In an effort to ensure equity, efficiency and foster effectiveness, this GIA state funding has recently undergone significant changes so that service allocations closely mirror the allocation process of the waiver program. Public spending per person in state-operated 16 plus institutions in the United States in 1977 averaged \$183 per day to an average of \$603 per person per day in 2011 (Braddock, Hemp, Rizzolo, Tanis, Haffer, Lulinski, and Wu, 2013). The type and intensity of the services and supports a person needs vary dramatically depending on the functional, medical status, family situation, goals, dreams, and must be considered in the development of policies. Public administrators' inherent focus on impacting the greater good must not be on the backs of individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities.

The final dimension of quality under review via this case study is effectiveness. Literature varies regarding a definitive definition of effectiveness. In the article, the continuum and current controversies in the USA, Taylor postulates that adults with developmental disabilities should not be denied the opportunity to live and participate in community life (Taylor, 2001). He furthers his position in asserting that quality of life elements are to be considered fundamental measures of service effectiveness. Quality of life elements are multi-dimensional in the world of research and as a construct have borne considerable shifts (Sheppard-Jones, 2003). Quality of life is an idiom that everyone recognizes, regardless of profession, community, or education. In the field of disability, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s as evidenced by the deinstitutionalization movement, citizens and governments began to grasp that a person's quality of life was not solely tied to material wealth, but to the more elusive but no less important aspect of individual happiness and community belonging (Sheppard-Jones, 2003). As a result of decades of research, quality of life has become a measurable outcome in evaluating service delivery systems (Sheppard-Jones, 2003). In her research, Sheppard-Jones posits that one's life is comprised of components that are subjective in that it involves a perceived satisfaction of the individual with regarding his or her life. Quality of life is multidimensional and is most reliable when several items are used as scales rather than attempting to assess it as a simple, global item of satisfaction or happiness (Sheppard-Jones, 2003).

The existence of a disability does not necessarily mean an individual will experience a diminished quality of life. Measuring quality of life characteristics to improve the development of the systems delivery services for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities is an important enterprise (National Council, 2012). It is not only important to know where a person lives or what he or she does during the day, but also how that individual feels about that living situation and daily activity (Sheppard-Jones, 2003). The same society that can stigmatize millions of people deemed unworthy of help behaves quite differently toward those it deems genuinely needy, as evidenced by the worthy poor, including persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities now receiving substantial supports from federal, state, and local governments (Pollack, 2011). Quality of life can have many elements but for the purpose of this research the four dimensions outlined in Sheppard-Jones' research, well-being, access, community participation, and autonomy were considered (Sheppard-Jones, 2003). Determining quality of life outcomes in the state of Georgia's service delivery system is more and more important not only due to limited funding but perhaps most importantly to meet the principles of freedom, authority, support, and responsibility people with disabilities are demanding.

METHODOLOGY

The method for this research is an exploratory case study regarding the implementation of quality community services for adults with development disabilities. Community services were reviewed in the hopes of understanding why they were developed, how they were initially organized, what changes were made, and how individuals chose services. Methods of data inquiry included a literature review regarding adults with developmental disability and their acquisition of state community services. To be considered for state community services individuals must meet disability and financial criteria reviewed by each of individual regional offices. The Department of Behavioral Health and Disabilities eligibility criteria are outlined in the provider manual on page eight as follows (DHDD, 2013a):

A. Most in Need: The individual demonstrates:

1. Substantial risk of harm to self or others; or
2. Substantial inability to demonstrate community living skills at age appropriate level; or
3. Substantial need for supports to augment or replace insufficient or unavailable natural resources

AND

B. Diagnosis or Sufficient Evidence of a Developmental Disability: The individual has an established developmental disability diagnosis or determination of sufficient evidence of a developmental disability, as assessed by a professional licensed to make the diagnosis or determination.

OR

C. Individuals with Co-Occurring Disorders and Urgent, Complex Support Needs: Individuals with co-occurring disorders and urgent, complex support needs may receive state funded developmental disabilities services when they meet the following criteria:

1. Established developmental disability diagnosis or sufficient evidence of neurological condition with origin prior to the age of 22 years that resulted in substantial impairments in general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior;
2. High risk behavioral challenges and/or symptoms of co-occurring emotional/mental disorders and/or forensic involvement that contribute to presenting urgent, complex support needs; documented no other resources to address urgent, complex support needs.

Here community access services as defined by DBHDD's Community Developmental Disability Provider Manual to be reviewed include: community access services which are designed to assist individuals in acquiring, retaining, or improving self-help, socialization, adaptive skills, or supported employment designed to assist an individual in obtaining, maintaining employment, or pre-vocational services that are designed to prepare an individual for competitive employment, or community living supports designed to assist an individual in continued residency in his or her own or family home, and community residential alternative services for those who require intense levels of residential supports (DBHDD Provider Manual, 2013a).

Data collection for this study reviewed the existence of dimensions of quality in the state of Georgia's Developmental Disability Services as well as how the state defines: equity, effectiveness, and efficiency. Other secondary resources included current policies, community services provided by the state of Georgia's DBHDD, the Department of Justice's Monitoring results, client surveys, the department's Quality Management System, National Core Indicators, and state contracted provider websites. There are no readily identifiable documents that clearly delineate the elements of quality to be reviewed. Therefore, the goal is to recommend commonly accepted definitions of equity, effectiveness, and efficiency.

Because the documents studied for the purpose of this research all exist in the public domain this case study method does not require consent forms or Institutional Review Board certification. No human subjects were part of this research. The exploratory case study serves as the basis for establishing new research questions, new hypotheses, and a continuing research agenda. Case studies also may alert us to new management techniques, programs to solve chronic problems, or strategies to improve the quality of agency or community life (O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner, 2008). Context-dependent knowledge and experience are at the very heart of expert activity as a research and teaching method to enhance learning. The advantage of the case study is that it can “close in” on real-life situations in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice (Flyvbjerg, 2011). Case study research surpasses traditional research methods in drawing in an audience while cultivating a profound understanding. The main strength of the case study is depth – detail, richness, completeness which allows for the understanding of the phenomenon day programming services for adults with disabilities in thoroughness, therefore the case study method is warranted (Flyvbjerg, 2011). The case study method is useful particularly in Developmental Disability Services research because of its context in an historical and social framework.

In *Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research*, Bent Flyvbjerg (2011) contemplates five common misunderstandings about case study research. These misunderstandings are generally viewed as inaccuracies of case study research. However, Flyvbjerg’s illumination of the five misunderstandings and subsequent clarification result in illustrating the pros and cons of case study research. The first misunderstanding is that theoretical context-independent knowledge is more valuable than concrete context-dependent knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2011). Well-chosen studies may help achieve competence in a topic but context-independent facts bring one simply to the beginner’s level (Flyvbjerg, 2011). The second misunderstanding is that one cannot make generalizations from a single case; therefore it lacks scientific contribution but that social science rarely achieves “hard” theory, whereas learning is always guaranteed in case study (Flyvbjerg, 2011). The third misunderstanding Flyvbjerg, outlines is that case study is primarily useful for the hypothesis, yet is not suitable for other methods, while pointing out that in science a single case can puncture years of scientific testing. Flyvbjerg states that the fourth misunderstanding is that case studies serve as confirmation of the researcher’s preconceived notions while reminding readers that in scientific theory “falsification” means that a scientist may throw out any observation which does not fit with his or her original position. Lastly, Flyvbjerg’s fifth misunderstanding discloses the difficulty in summarizing and developing propositions and theories based on case study research.


FINDINGS

The Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities (DBHDD) is the state agency directed to focus solely on policies, programs, services and monitoring of all facets of the state funded system of care for people with mental illness, substance abuse disorders, and developmental disabilities. DBHDD was created by the Governor and the General Assembly in 2009 and is responsible for providing high-quality choices of health care and service programming opportunities for individuals with developmental disabilities or behavioral health challenges close to their homes, so they can live a life as independently as possible with dignity and respect. DBHDD provides and funds a variety of community-based services, including:

- Treatment through providers such as with Community Service Boards;
- Mobile Crisis services for adults as well as children and adolescents;
- Services funded through Medicaid waivers for people with developmental & intellectual disabilities;
- Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) teams that can visit those with persistent mental illness on a daily basis if needed;
- Group homes;
- Crisis Stabilization Programs;
- And many others for all three of the major populations served.

The Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities currently contracts with a network of private and public community-based providers to deliver services. This system of services is administered through six regional offices as seen in Figure 1. These regional offices administer the hospital and community resources assigned to each specific region. The primary function of the regional structure includes the following: 1.) oversee statewide initiatives, 2.) develop new services and expand existing services as needed, 3.) monitor the services being received to ensure quality and access, 4.) investigate and resolve complaints, 5.) conduct special investigations and reviews when warranted.

DBHDD Regions: Figure 1



DBHDD Website Regional Map (DBHDD, 2013e)

Given the layout of the state’s service delivery system and current federal Department of Justice settlement agreements, a comprehensive evaluation of the documents listed is needed. The

documents include: Office of Disability Services Ombudsman, Biennial Report FY 2012-2013, the Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities, the 2013 Interim Quality Management Report and the, report of the Independent Reviewer in the matter of the *United States of America v. The State of Georgia*, September 19, 2013. The contention here is that each evaluation, review, and survey will play an essential role in how the state of Georgia develops, implements, and delivers Developmental Disability Services to its citizenry.

Office of Disability Services Ombudsman Biennial Report FY 2012-2013

The mission of the Office of the Disability Services Ombudsman (ODSO) is to promote the safety, well-being, and rights of individuals with disabilities (Office of Disability Services, 2013). It is known widely that during this biennium, Governor Nathan Deal combined the Disability Services Ombudsman and the Olmstead Coordinator positions in the Office of the Disability Services Ombudsman (ODSO). In effect the combining of the two positions has proven complementary in that it involves all levels of government in responding to requests for assistance, complaints and in reducing institutionalization of individuals with disabilities. In January 2011, there were 626 individuals with developmental disabilities in our state hospitals and 338 as of June 2013 (Office of Disability Services, 2013). Individuals with developmental disabilities are no longer admitted to a state hospital which has contributed to the decline in numbers as these individuals are served in the community. As an alternative to state hospital care, state agencies such as DBHDD and their contracted providers are building a more comprehensive system of care within the community (Office of Disability Services, 2013). To meet requirements in the Settlement Agreement, Georgia has invested significant funding to transition individuals out of state hospitals, to expand the community system of care, and to prevent future institutionalization of individuals with disabilities (Office of Disability Services, 2013). These changes have impacted the nature of requests that come into the Ombudsman office and therefore provided recommendations for improvement with the community system of care via their complaint investigation process, community visits, and participation in state level meetings.

The Ombudsman office continues to address reported unmet needs that place an individual's safety, well-being, and rights at risk. Most notably reported within the Ombudsman Biennial Report, is that state and federal agencies are not always able to provide timely and effective services and supports: providers may be inadequately funded or not meeting standards of care, and others are distraught as they try to maneuver through the eligibility and application processes (Office of Disability Services, 2013). Their charge to us is to reduce the bureaucratic obstacles and redundancies so needs are addressed through a system that is equitable, effective, and efficient.

Georgia Department of Behavioral Health & Developmental Disabilities: 2013 Interim Quality Management Report


The DBHDD quality management program was formally established in 2011 in response to the DOJ Settlement Agreements as part of the Department's demonstrated commitment to the steadfast improvement of the quality of its services (Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disability, 2013e). This report is comprised of six months' worth of reviewing

quality management activities within the hospitals, community behavioral health and developmental disabilities systems of care, as well as a review of quality management activities within the state office with the purpose of synthesizing and communicating DBHDD quality management activities to all stakeholders (Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities, 2013). The Developmental Disabilities Program Quality Council (PQC) meets quarterly to address the need of ensuring individuals diagnosed with a developmental disability transitioning out of the state hospitals receive quality services in the community. During those meetings their review includes but is not limited to:

- Implemented a project to evaluate the current DD quality management system; components of the evaluation include: document reviews, assessment of the “as is” status of the system, facilitation of a workgroup to design the “to be” quality system, and design of preliminary and extended training necessary to implement the new system.
- Development of a comprehensive manual for the implementation of a Comprehensive Quality System for Georgia’s Developmental Disability System.
- Oversight of Quality Management Work Plan Goals.
- Review of ADA transition process and data in order to improve the quality of transitions to from state Hospitals to the Community.
- Review of the ongoing work of the DD Advisory Council which included quality improvement efforts in the DD system structure, system performance, and customer focus. (DBHDD, 2013e).

Current performance indicators used by DBHDD to evaluate processes include measuring the degree of person centered supports and services, the overall health and safety of the individual, as well the efficiency of developmental disability services. Person centered supports are currently evaluated by Delmarva, an independent review contracted with DBHDD, using an Individual Support Plan Quality Assurance Tool. (See Appendix A). The three elements reviewed by this tool and reported are 1. Service Life, 2. Good but Paid Life, 3. Community Life. The interim report defines each element beginning with a Service Life, which is when the Individual Support Plan supports a life with basic paid services and paid supports, where the person’s needs that are important for the person are addressed, such as health and safety as well as the development of valued community social roles (DBHDD, 2013). A Good but Paid Life is written out in the Individual Support Plan (ISP) to support a life with connections to various supports and services that are both paid and unpaid, where the person goes into the community but with only limited integration into community activities (DBHDD, 2013e). The element that the ISP Quality Assurance Tool measures is Community Life, as evidenced in an ISP supports a life where the person has developed social roles that are meaningful to that person, such as a book club, or competitive employment as illustrated in Figure 2 (DBHDD, 2013e).

Figure 2: ISP QA Checklist Results



(DBHDD, 2013e)

The distribution of the ISP ratings above presents a need to research evidenced based practices used in other states in enhancing community integration services for adults with developmental disabilities. DBHDD reported that a new ISP system is currently in development with an expected rollout in January 2014.

Health and safety measures are gathered from the National Core Indicator Survey (see Appendix B), which collects information directly from individuals and families regarding their health and safety needs. The 2011 – 2012 National Core Indicator data for Georgia shows:

- Sixty three percent of respondents from Georgia and seventy seven percent of respondents across NCI states were reported to have had a flu vaccine in the past year. This is down slightly from sixty five percent last year.
- Seventy percent of respondents from Georgia and eighty percent of respondents across NCI States were reported to have had a dental exam in the past year. This is down significantly from seventy eight last year.
- Ninety percent of respondents from Georgia and ninety percent of respondents across NCI states were reported to have had a physical exam in the past year. This is down slightly from ninety one percent last year.
- Eighty nine percent of respondents from Georgia and eighty two percent of respondents across NCI States reported they never feel scared at home. This is up significantly from eighty six percent last year.
- Ninety six percent of respondents from Georgia and ninety four percent of respondents across NCI states reported they are treated with dignity and respect. This is down slightly from ninety seven percent last year.

The above data was not received by DBHDD until mid-July 2013 and is currently under review (DBHDD, 2013e). However, the report does state that as an interim, the dental clinics at all DBHDD state hospitals will remain open and available to individuals who are supported by DBHDD (2013e).

The Interim Quality Management Report characterizes efficiency of services in part as the creation of the Georgia Crisis Response System for Development Disabilities, as a system of last resort, for an individual in the midst of an acute crisis that presents substantial risk of harm to self or others, with the goal of providing time-limited home and community based crisis services that support individuals in the community, and provide alternatives to institutional placement, emergency room care, and/or law enforcement (DBHDD, 2013e). The effectiveness of the service delivery system is assessed by what DBHDD deems as Person Centered Reviews (PCR). DBHDD has contracted with Delmarva a non-profit organization, as an external quality review entity that conducts interviews, observations, and records review. While results from the Person Centered Reviews have improved over the years, data through March 31, 2013, indicate a decline in performance on the Support Coordinator and Provider Record Reviews (2013e). As a result, DBHDD is presently evaluating the functions of Support Coordination and their continued viability as a reliable reviewing entity. Individuals transitioning from an institution to the community participated in these Person Centered Reviews. In May 2013, as result of reviews conducted by the ADA Independent Review in conjunction with these Person Centered Reviews, DBHDD placed a 45 day moratorium on community transitions (2013e). Regional Quality Review Teams were developed to go into the field using the DOJ Monitoring Tool (See Appendix C) to conduct interviews with all individuals who had transitioned from a state hospital into the community. Data from these reviews is still being scrutinized.

Report of the Independent Review in the matter of United States of America v. The State of Georgia, September 19, 2013

“The Settlement Agreement requires that the Quality Management system implemented by the state perform annual quality service reviews of samples of community providers, including face-to-face meetings with individuals, residents, staff, and reviews of treatment records, injury/incident data and other key performance data” (Report of the Independent Review, 2013, 5). By the first of July, 2012, a Quality Management system was instituted that acknowledged additional work was needed to ensure the inclusion, thoroughness and rigor required for the quality assurances mandated by the Settlement Agreement. The initial Quality Management Plan was issued on July 1, 2012 and revised in April, 2013, after much discussion with the Department of Justice and various stakeholders within the state. “The Settlement Agreement requires that 150 individuals with developmental disability transition each year from the state hospitals to more individualized integrated community settings (Report of the Independent Review, 2013, 5). The Department exceeded these numerical requirements during years one and two of the Agreement, however it was later determined that they were in non-compliance with some of the more qualitative aspects of those placements. “One area of on-going concern is the Individual Support Plan and Support Coordination (Report of the Independent Review, 2013, 5). The Department of Justice, the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner were involved in many candid conversations regarding the inadequate residential and day programs, with these inadequacies documented by the Independent Reviewer and her team. Two significant areas of

inadequacies discussed revolve around the performance of support coordination agencies and the six regional offices. These two entities play a critical role of oversight within the state's Quality Management System in monitoring the quality of state services experienced by individuals with intellectual disabilities/developmental disabilities. As a result of the continued concerns notes by the DOJ evaluators, DBHDD has brought in outside consultants to conduct additional reviews of these systems. Issues abound, from the development of duplicative and ineffective quality monitoring teams with individual and inconsistent interpretations of community standards from support coordination and the six regional offices leading to a system of poor community placements, deficiently conflicting communication with families, caregivers, and providers to inefficient use of resources. For instance, within the current quality monitoring system, support coordination and the region office quality review teams are responsible for making community placements and the oversight of those placements. Regional office leadership across the state have publically stated in numerous provider meetings that support coordination functions as their eyes and ears in the community. However, due to continued pressure from the Department of Justice to address deep concerns with support coordination performance in their quality oversight of community placements, the state office created regional office quality review teams as another layer of oversight. This decision has deepened the chasm of communication with all stakeholders and demonstrated another questionable decision regarding efficient use of resources in developing an indistinguishable layer of bureaucracy than direct services to individuals.

As a result, in May 2013, the DBHDD Commissioner instructed his staff to begin reviewing the seventy-nine placements completed since July 1, 2012 (Report of the Independent Review, 2013, 5). Additionally, he halted all transitions from state hospitals. The result of this directive was varied but included the removal of individuals placed within the community under the Settlement Agreement from three unsatisfactory provider agencies (Report of the Independent Review, 2013, 6). These actions were augmented by the support of the Attorney General's Office and Department of Community Health as they are responsible for issuance of provider licenses, and Medicaid reimbursement to intervene when the health and safety of individuals are in question. Provider agencies that failed to meet the expected standards for care and habilitation were fined or closed and individuals removed from their care (Report of the Independent Review, 2013, 1). Regional Office Quality Review teams were developed and subsequently trained on the Department of Justice's Quality Monitoring Tool. Those reviews have been completed but are not been available for public viewing. The Department is committed to the evaluation of community placements along with the development of quality protocols with equitable and efficient implementation processes to ensure reliable and sustainable transitions for individuals moving out of state hospitals. These transition outcomes as described by DBHDD's Assistant Commissioner include but are not limited to the following:

- Safety and security focuses on whether or not an individual's services are provided in a safe, secure, and comfortable environment.
- Rights, respect and dignity focuses on how an individual is treated and if inappropriate restrictions are prohibited.
- Health focuses on whether an individual receives appropriate and timely access to necessary health care services.

- Choice and decision making focuses on whether an individual/family is involved in making decisions about their services and if the provider supports them in making those decisions.
- Community integration focuses on whether an individual has opportunities to develop meaningful relationships, participate in community activities, access to transportation, and employment.
- Individual planning and implementation focuses on whether their support plan is individualized based on the individual goals, needs, and preferences and how the implementation of these goals will be monitored for compliance.

The state of Georgia is extremely fortunate in that it has a well-established network of peer supports and actively engaged advocacy community whose involvement in the reform of Georgia's support system is tremendously strengthened. However, because of the critical issues yet to be resolved in order to reach compliance with the Settlement Agreement and related obligations to these transitions such as Individual Support Plans and the provision of Support Coordination, the court has approved the State's request to deferred the full Independent Review of quality for six months (Report of the Independent Review, 2013, 21). Georgia is using this period to continue the utilization of the DOJ Monitoring tool to assess its work while also enhancing the statewide transition protocol. Georgia has brought in technical assistance consultants from the field to review its Individual Support Plan and Support Coordination services. Although these have been difficult times, it is clear that DBHDD is taking deliberate action to restructure its system of system of supports to ensure the expected quality of community services and supports (Report of the Independent Review, 2013, 27).

CONCLUSION

This essay sought to answer how the state of Georgia is defining, implementing, and meeting standards of quality? People live together most productively and harmoniously if they have the opportunity and freedom to participate in the decision making process alongside their public administrators (Ashworth, 2001). Three key pillars of public administration at play within this analysis are equity, effectiveness, and efficiency. Last year DBHDD was appointed a new Commissioner by the Governor, who has a long established track record within the community focused on these key pillars. However, to provide responsible leadership, he must adhere to certain public administration values and principles of consistency which will lead to efficiency, effectiveness and equity with the DD service delivery system. He has made changes within his DD leadership by appointing an assistant commissioner who has engaged all components of the DD Service Systems and has made great strides in improving this system. But much work remains in rebuilding a fragmented system. Transformation is consistently intricate but not elusive. It is clear that the state of Georgia is in the midst of another paradigm shift. There exists in this state for perhaps the first time, multiple governmental agencies, state leaders, and the federal Department of Justice working in partnership to align the vision and quality of services for all individuals living with disabilities in Georgia. Many key building blocks for positive change are in place with new state office leadership, but there is ample evidence of fragmentation, lack of professional knowledge within other layers of the DD system of services that results in individuals' lack of choice and access to essential supports. Challenges remain that will require courageous leadership in the decision making process, if DBHDD is going to

transform the developmental disability service system. To date standards of quality within the DD system of care remain nebulous because they remain under review. All stakeholders agree that quality services lead to living meaningful lives but challenges remain in agreeing to what those standards of quality should be. Perhaps part of the reason the state has requested an extension of a full DOJ Independent Reviewer Report for the DD service system until FY 14 is so that they could develop and finalized generalized standards of quality.

The Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities published vision states: *“Every person who participates in our services leads a satisfying, independent life with dignity and respect.”* The underlying principle providers share with DBHDD is to provide quality services that are equitable, efficient, and effective. The sense of mission is lost in the murky bureaucratic waters of redundant oversight measures and individual interpretations of quality because no clear standard has been established. Impactful public administrators can develop a standardized tool to measure shared elements of quality that can be accomplished with the three key pillars addressed in this essay, equity, effectiveness, and efficiency. Equity refers to the shared mission of who we serve and the expansion of choice for rapid service entry of those individuals languishing on the short-term and long-term planning list thru no know fault of their own. Individuals we are charged to serve will continue to be at the mercy of an inept support coordination system, an inefficient regional office structure and left to languish on planning lists, experience poor community placements due undeveloped transition protocols and cannot experience our stated vision if the vision is not first centralized and enforced.

As a result, I recommend three key areas for timely and targeted change. First, cease all new caseload assignments of individuals to support coordination and terminate contracts due to a demonstrated lack of effectiveness in quality monitoring of the health and safety of individuals. Current and new individuals would transition onto regional office planning list administrator caseloads. Second, to promote clarity and consistency of mission implementation at the regional level, the director of regional operations would report directly to the DD Assistance Commissioner. Reinvestment of the money freed from the elimination of duplicative and ineffective support coordination contracts would be used to invest in the development of new services and an electronic authorization system with the intent of creating equitable access to services and elimination of waiting lists for services. Third, to assist in the transition process of providing quality customer service and the fostering of collaboration with providers, state, and regional partners I propose a Rapid-Service Entry Quality Improvement Pilot Project. This pilot is designed to achieve the goal of increased customer satisfaction, increased inefficiency within existing resource allocations through rapid service entry. I propose at least four providers (two public and two private) to take part in this pilot project in an effort to establish a foundation for substantial discussion and subsequent change to the service entry process and the impact within the entire service delivery system.

Focusing on quality is intended to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in services and processes. It is not a static process but rather a fluid candid examination of what is working, what is not working, and how can we fix it. Therefore, because support coordination and the regional offices work in conjunction and have demonstrated a lack of quality monitoring and consistency in mission implementation, the current regional office structure should be evaluated as another measure of effectiveness and efficiency. Many advancements in technology since the

advent of the regional office structure has added to the question of their need and if those resources could be used more efficiently. As a result, to broaden equity of choice in accessing services for all citizens of Georgia I propose eliminating the regional office structure, centralizing operational oversight, and reinvesting those dollars into modern technology such as a centralized web-based service authorization portal for services to remove the duplicative and costly layers of bureaucracy that delay access to needed services. The elimination of redundant, inefficient, and ineffective use of state dollars could be used to increase equity related to who are served, timely admission into services such as the pilot project mentioned above. Enhance freedom of choice, efficiency, and effectiveness in service entry, maintenance, and discharge by creating public/private peer review community engagement teams based at the provider level who take on quality management functions using the DOJ Monitoring Tool and DBHDD's Community Standards for all DD Providers and report those results directly to DBHDD's Quality Management Office at minimum on a monthly basis. Impactful change is possible with courageous leaders willing to lead at all levels of service.

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Mary Zaher recently graduated from Kennesaw State University in fall 2013 with a Bachelor of Arts in International Affairs and a minor in Peace Studies. While having spent most of her life in the United States, Mary was born in Nazareth, Israel to a Christian Palestinian family. She recently returned to spend the last month of 2011 in Israel. While there, she traveled throughout Israel and the West Bank, noting the continual ethno-religious tensions in the region. Her heritage has motivated her to pursue research on the Middle East and eventually acquire a graduate degree in International Conflict Resolution.

The Role of State Policy on Declining Christian-Muslim Relations in Israel

Mary Zaher

This paper attempts to analyze the overlying tensions and conflict between Israeli Muslim and Israeli Christian groups which share the same heritage. The paper provides a brief history of the Palestinian situation in Israel. The focus here is on finding a root cause of the split of interest between these two Israeli subgroups. A discussion of discriminatory Israeli policy toward certain ethno-religious groups within its borders is followed by an evaluation of the growth of the Islamist movement in Israel and the effect this has had on Muslim-Christian relations since the founding of Israel in 1948. A case study of the events that transpired in Nazareth during the Millennium project and the role of these events in furthering the division of these two groups are assessed. Finally, all these events are tied back to the discriminatory and ineffective Israeli policy towards its prominent Palestinian minority.

INTRODUCTION


Historically, the land of Palestine consisted of modern day Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. The land has been under the rule of many empires, including the Roman, Ottoman, and British. This small territory was home to both Arabs and Jews; Muslims, Christians, and Jews coexisted in relative peace for hundreds of years prior to the 20th century's chronic violence. Regardless of the size of the territory, Israel and Israeli-occupied territories have only grown more diverse since the founding of Israel in 1948. Of the population living inside Israel, Palestinians constitute a diverse minority, with each subgroup facing different levels of discrimination from the Israeli government.

As a people, the majority of Palestinians are in fact refugees who are either externally or internally displaced. By the end of 2011, about 42 percent of the total population in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) consisted of refugees.²⁴ Palestinians are also the largest nation of refugees in the world. It is estimated by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics that 66 percent (or 7.4 million) of the entire worldwide population of Palestinians is forcibly displaced persons.²⁵ The largest part of this population forced to flee its homeland during the 1948 *Nakba*, an Arabic term for catastrophe which also refers to the creation of Israel as a state. The second largest group was displaced as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.²⁶ This created an environment of mostly displaced individuals and a large international diaspora.

²⁴ Al-Azza, N. 2012. "Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons." *BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights*.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*



Source:

<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/164333B501CA09E785256CC5005470C3>

After WWII, the British announced that they planned on terminating the Mandate of Palestine, requesting that the United Nations make suggestions for the future status of Palestine. In order to produce a proper plan, on 15 May 1947, the UN appointed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which consisted of eleven states and excluded the global powers in an attempt to remain neutral in the formulation of its policy recommendations. Both the Arab state and the Jewish state proposed by the Plan of Partition of the UNSCOP report of 3 September 1947 were composed of three major sections. The Arab state would receive Western Galilee, with the towns of Acre and Nazareth, the hill country of Samaria and Judea, and the southern coast stretching from north of Isdud (now Ashdod), which encompasses what is now the Gaza Strip along with a section of desert along the Egyptian border. The Jewish state would receive the Coastal Plain, stretching from Haifa to Rehovot, Eastern Galilee surrounding the Sea of Galilee, and the Negev desert, including Eilat. An international zone was to include Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and the surrounding areas. In preparing this plan, there was an attempt to encompass as many Jews as possible into the Jewish state, while leaving the sparsely populated Negev desert to account for immigration. As a result of the mixture of Jewish and Arab presence in certain areas or towns, it was difficult to determine which state these towns should be a part of. Thus, there would

have still been a minority of Jews in the Arab state and a significant minority of Arabs in the Jewish state.

This partition was not fully accepted by either side. It was publically accepted by a majority of Jews but was opposed by Zionists since the borders were not the true Biblical borders of Israel.²⁷ Arabs, contrastingly, were completely opposed to the partition as it only granted them 45 percent of the land even though Arabs represented the overall majority.²⁸ Although a majority of votes cast at the UN plenary meeting favored the partition, it was never implemented. Between the months of April and October 1948, the entire region of Galilee was conquered by the Jewish Haganah forces. A majority of the Arabs (nearly 950,000) and almost all of the Jews who lived in the area became part of the new State of Israel. As a result of mass expulsions throughout

²⁷ Shindler, Colin. 2009. "Opposing Partition: The Zionist Predicaments After the Shoah." *Israel Studies* 14, no. 2: 88. Advanced Placement Source, EBSCOhost

²⁸ Yusuf, Muhsin. 2002. "The Partition of Palestine (1947) - An Arab Perspective." *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture* 9, no. 4: 39. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost

1948, only 10 percent of Palestinians (or 150,000) remained living within the Israeli border. Nearly 780,000 became refugees in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and neighboring Arab countries.²⁹

The Galilean cities of Arab and mixed populations, including Tiberias, Safed, Acre, and Nazareth, and all of their rural surroundings, were conquered. In the process of conquering these cities, many sites were destroyed and the Arab populations were expelled completely from Tiberias and Safed and partially from Acre. Nazareth was the only city the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) refrained from destroying and where the Arab population was allowed to remain.³⁰ This non-expulsion has allowed Nazareth to grow into the largest Arab-populated city within the 1948 Israeli borders. After the 1948 war, only 10 percent of the total Israeli population was Palestinian, a number which has grown to approximately 20 percent in recent years.³¹ As a minority, the Palestinians of Israel have faced much discrimination not only socially from the Jewish population but from the government as well. Arabs can be divided into three sub-groups: Muslims, Christians, and Druze (which are excluded from this study because the Israeli government already excludes them as a Palestinian group).³² These groups are all culturally and linguistically the same and have lived as such for millennia. Yet in the sixty years after the war of 1948, rather than under their shared grievances, the post-1948 decades have been characterized by a lack of organization and a division of the Arab identity within Israeli Arab Palestinians. The intention of this study is to compare the relations of Christian Palestinians and Muslim Palestinians and analyze what factors led to the current state of relations.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Studies have been conducted on nearly every aspect of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict. A variety of work has been published in recent years specifically regarding the Palestinian minority living within Israel. Some studies have focused on the identity of Arabs living in Israel, particularly the distinction and importance of religious identity for Palestinians in Israel. Asaad Ganim, a lecturer and researcher at the University of Haifa's Department of Political Science and the Peace Research Institute, notes the importance of identity for Arabs living within Israel. He observes that events and processes that should have created cohesion among all Palestinians resulted in the complete opposite.³³ He discusses the dispersions of the Palestinians, noting that it resulted from the war of 1948, when 90 percent of the Palestinian population was displaced. The first difference he cites is between Palestinians who remained in Israel and Palestinians who emigrated. The Palestinians who remained in the new Israeli borders were allowed to become Israeli citizens yet faced discrimination and hostilities. His study describes how the general "Arabization" of the Palestinian problem resulted in the Israeli government taking political and social measures which ended the possibilities of an organized political movement for Palestinian Israelis. Ganim does this through discussion of the different political ideologies which grew out of the Palestinian community: The Israel-Arab Stream, who wish to be integrated as full

²⁹ Ganim, Asáad. 2001. *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 1948-2000: A Political Study*.

³⁰ Abbasi, Mustafa. 2010. "Nazareth in the War for Palestine: The Arab City that Survived the 1948 Nakba." *Holy Land Studies: A Multidisciplinary Journal* (Edinburgh University Press) 9, no. 2: 185-207.

³¹ Ganim, Asáad. 2001. *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 1948-2000: A Political Study*.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

members of Israeli society; the Communists, who wish to see a change in the definition of Israel as a Jewish or Arab state; The Nationals, who advocate Arab nationalism and autonomy of Arabs in Israel; and, the Islamists, who wish to base the Palestinian government on Sharia. Ganim examines the differences among these different factions of Arabs living in Israel, yet he does not answer key questions regarding the impact these factions have on overall Palestinian identity. He focuses on Palestinians as a single entity while not sufficiently discussing the different divisions within.

Others have conducted studies which focus on one faction of Palestinians. Mitri Raheb,³⁴ Justus Weiner,³⁵ and Una McGahern³⁶ focus their research on the Palestinian Christians who live inside Israel. Other studies, such as those written by Tilde Rosmer³⁷ and Sobhi Rayan,³⁸ portray the role of Islamic Palestinians inside Israel. The purpose of these studies is to focus on the role of an individual Palestinian religious group in Israeli society. The relevance of these studies is that they provide readers with in-depth information on the different religious factions of Arab-Israelis. These works, while providing relevant information on just one subgroup, are broader and tend to lack any comparison between the two factions in question. They also do not discuss the effects that one group's identity has on the other, or on the whole of Palestinian identity.

Laurence Louër, author of *To Be an Arab in Israel*, shows the diverse Palestinian Israeli opinions regarding which nationality they identify with the most. Louër presents points of views of individuals on different aspects of society. Her primary focus, however, is discussing differences based on ethnicity, specifically whether Arab citizens of Israel identify more with their Palestinian nationality or Israeli citizenship. She even discusses relations between Arab and Jewish university students and the "modernization" of Israeli culture. While it is relevant to examining the topic of relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel, the book does not go in-depth into the relations between Muslims and Christians. The minimal exposure the author gives to this topic suggests that relations are generally neutral between these groups and she broadly places both religious groups under the same category of Palestinian. This is a reasonable approach but still remains too broad regarding religion as it does not discuss the grievances of particular religious groups.

The final approach which previous authors tend to take regarding this issue is examining specific case studies. Chad Emmett looked at the relations of Christians and Muslims within the city of Nazareth.³⁹ Emmett took into account the divided loyalties that led to this conflict of interest, discussed the effect of loyalties on Muslim-Christian relations, and then applied these relations to

³⁴ Raheb, Mitri. 2002. "Sailing Through Troubled Waters: Palestinian Christians in the Holy Land." *Dialog: A Journal of Theology* 41, no. 2: 97.

³⁵ Weiner, Justus. 2005. "Palestinian Christians: A Minority's Plea for Rights Silenced by the Politics of Peace." *Journal Of Human Rights* 4, no. 3: 363.

³⁶ McGahern, Una. 2011. *Palestinian Christians in Israel state attitudes towards non-Muslims in a Jewish state*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

³⁷ Rosmer, Tilde. 2012. "Resisting 'Israelization': The Islamic Movement in Israel and the Realization of Islamization, Palestinization and Arabization." *Journal Of Islamic Studies* 23, no. 3: 325-358.

³⁸ Rayan, Sobhi. 2012. "'Diversity' in Arab Society in Israel: The Islamic Movement as an Example." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 32, no. 1: 62-79.

³⁹ Emmett, Chad F. 1995. *Beyond the basilica: Christians and Muslims in Nazareth*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. And Israeli, Raphael. 2002. *Green crescent over Nazareth: the displacement of Christians by Muslims in the Holy Land*. London: F. Cass.

the larger Israeli community. This study is primarily focused on events that have directly affected religious relations among Israeli Arabs. But by only examining one town, this study is conducted very narrowly and makes broad assumptions. This is problematic because the whole approach is based on observations of the effects of specific events on a small fraction of society and then using these observations to explain a larger, more complex society. There is much generalization used when applying observations of a small sample to a large society; which can result in inaccurate information.

When evaluating the relations among religious groups, there is an important aspect which all of these studies lack: an evaluation and explanation of the causes of the slow decline in relations between Christian Arabs and Muslim Arabs living inside Israel. This paper looks at the causes and events that have led to the growing degradation of relations between these groups, the role of Israeli government policy on differentiating between religious minorities, and finally the overall effect all of these have had on the Palestinian identity of Arab Israelis.

THE STATUS OF ARABS IN ISRAEL (1948 – PRESENT)

Since 1948, the Arab population in Israel has grown tremendously from 150,000 to 1.2 million (currently 20 percent of the population). As a result, Israel continues to struggle with this growing minority as it threatens the Jewish identity of Israel. Arab leaders and critics argue that it is impossible for Israel to be a democratic state and a Jewish state simultaneously while the minority is discriminated against in all socially, economically, and politically.⁴⁰ The fact that Israel's Arab citizens also belong to a larger Palestinian, Arab, and religious world with which Israel has fought bloody wars has made their situation much more complicated. Palestinians are not the only victims of Israeli discrimination, yet it is significant to note the effects this discrimination has had on relations and divisions between Muslim and Christian Palestinian subgroups.

Discrimination against Arab citizens is mostly consistent regardless of religion. Palestinians have limited freedom of speech, expression, and movement and they are limited in the land or homes they can buy. Socially and economically, Arab schools receive less funding in Israel, religious sites of the Arab Christian and Muslim populations are not protected, Arab citizens face discrimination in employment, and in the unrecognized Bedouin villages of the Naqab very few social services are provided at all. While these Arabs hold Israeli citizenship and passports and should be considered equal, they are not given the same self-determination as their Jewish counterparts.⁴¹ Citizenship, though, is based only on an Arab's willingness to pledge allegiance to the State of Israel, which creates a conflict of interest for Arab allegiance, specifically whether or not to be true to one's Arab heritage or Israeli location.

Despite pledging allegiance to Israel, historically, Arabs have been exempt from the military service required of their Jewish counterparts. This measure was taken in an effort to safeguard


⁴⁰ Turner, Bryan S., and Guy Ben-Porat. 2011. *The Contradictions of Israeli Citizenship: Land, Religion, and State*. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, [England]: Routledge, 2011. And Halkin, Hillel. 2009. "The Jewish State & Its Arabs." *Commentary* 127, no. 1: 30-37. Literary Reference Center.

⁴¹ Heins, Volker. 2012. "Three Meanings of Equality: The 'Arab Problem' in Israel." *Res Publica* (13564765) 18, no.1: 79-91. Humanities International Complete.

Jewish Israeli troops who would be in the field against other Palestinians or Arabs, and because Israelis have questioned the allegiances of their remaining Arab. However, a move by former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to end the exemption of Christian Arabs from joining the military was countered with a move to exempt Muslims from this requirement. This has resulted in critics accusing Israel of plotting to further divide the religious groups, warning that Nazareth is already at risk of violence if Israel keeps pushing its sectarian agenda.⁴² Palestinian minority leaders point towards Israel's divide and rule strategy, which keeps the minority divided while Israel continues to assert and expand its strength over the occupied land. The fact that Israel is currently discussing such a change of its policy with Christian leaders leads one to wonder what has changed among Christian Palestinians that has led the Israeli leadership to distinguish Christian and Muslim Palestinians.

In a 2012 article by Volker Heins in *Res Publica*, three Palestinian struggles for equality are identified: those who wish to assimilate into Israeli society, those who wish to maintain each group's respective identity; and, those who want an independent Palestine.⁴³ Heins does not go on to place subgroups into any of these categories, nor does he discuss possible reasons as to why certain groups tend to fall into one of these categories. While it is impossible to conclude that all individuals of a certain subgroup will fall in either category, observed evidence seems to point to the conclusion that Christians tend to turn to assimilation strategies while Muslims either

tend to be more bi-national or in favor of complete independence. These tendencies are a result of the different Israeli treatment of these groups. Christians comprise a minority within the Palestinian community. Not only does the Israeli government already marginalize them, but recent events have also led to the marginalization of Christians by the larger Muslim community. The dispersal of the Palestinians in 1948, and again in 1967, disrupted and impeded social and political processes that had been at work among them before the 1948 war as many villages were destroyed, either totally or



Source: CIA world fact book (2008)

partially. Their inhabitants fled the country or moved elsewhere in Israel where they

became "internal refugees," or internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁴⁴ This upheaval of the status quo has only created more tensions between Christians and Muslims who are now in difficult positions within their own community.

⁴² Cook, Jonathan. 2013. "Israel Wants Its Arab Christian--but not Muslim--Citizens to Join Military." *Washington Report On Middle East Affairs* 32, no. 8: 16-17.

⁴³ Heins, Volker. 2012. "Three Meanings of Equality: The 'Arab Problem' in Israel."

⁴⁴ Ganim, Asáad. 2001. *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 1948-2000: A Political Study*.

THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND RADICALIZATION

Since the 1970s, the Islamic Movement in Israel has aimed to create an Arab-Palestinian-Muslim identity among Israeli Arabs. The movement has operated through educational and religious institutions which teach Palestinians in Israel about Islam and Palestinian history as well as the current state of Arabs in Israel.⁴⁵ It was not until the 1980s that the Islamic movement began to step into Israeli politics, starting with local municipality elections. In 1996, there was a split within the movement over whether or not to participate in Israeli national elections for the Knesset, the Israeli parliament.⁴⁶ While both factions of the group continued to base their activism on creating an Islamic Palestinian identity, one participates in larger Israeli politics and the other does not.

Today, the Islamic Movement is considered one of the most prominent political movements in Arab Israeli society.⁴⁷ Tilde Rosmer has noted that the Islamic Movement was created in response to the "Israelization" of the Arab population living in Israel. This group specifically opposed the fact that Palestinians had forgotten the past, by embracing their Israeli identity and citizenship while forgetting their heritage; the movement understood the reality and contradiction of being non-Jews living in a Jewish state. While they may have been right about this travesty, the growth of political Islam within the Arab Israeli community has contributed to putting a wedge between the interests of both Muslim and Christian communities.

As a minority of the Palestinian and Israeli population, Christians in Israel were forced to heavily weigh their options. Regardless, they would remain a minority, whether as Israelis or as Palestinians. For them to stay genuine to their Palestinian heritage would mean accepting the reality of being under Islamic leadership, which put forward a Muslim social and political agenda. There is a growing fear within the Christian community in Israel of living under Sharia. This fear has been a result of growing Islamic radicalism. As a result, Christian leaders have found it to be in their interest to accept and make the best of their current situation as Israeli citizens, even if it means living in a Jewish state.

The significance of this realization is that Christians feel threatened by the presence of Muslims around them. Not only have they been more exposed to Western values and a much larger Christian community in the West, they have also suffered discrimination in Israel for associating with Muslims and Arabs as a whole. In addition, extreme conservative groups were on the rise in the Middle East and this threatened the peace with the Christian Arabs who felt displaced within their own community. In the Palestinian community, religion has become a significant identifier because that is seen as the highest form of status in Israel. This form of Jewish conservatism has entered the Muslim and Christian communities, which in turn have highlighted their religious identities and focused on their differences.

⁴⁵ Rosmer, Tilde. 2012. "Resisting 'Israelization': The Islamic Movement in Israel and the Realization of Islamization, Palestinization and Arabization."

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Rayan, Sobhi. 2012. "'Diversity' in Arab Society in Israel: The Islamic Movement as an Example."

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NAZARETH

Nazareth is a small town in northern Palestine in the Galilee region. While there was a presence of both Muslims and Christians in Nazareth prior to 1948, the Christian population consistently outnumbered the Muslim population. Nazareth is home to the Church of Annunciation and has attracted many Christians for being the hometown of Jesus. This has been attributed as a reason why the city was not destroyed in the 1948 war and why the Arabs living here were not expelled.⁴⁸ The population prior to 1948 was approximately 15,000 inhabitants. However during the 1948 war, the population increased by over 20,000 refugees, primarily Muslim, who were seeking protection because they were expelled from their own homes and had nowhere else to go.⁴⁹ Nazareth became the largest Arab city in Israel in less than one year, and Christians, who historically were the majority, suddenly found themselves the minority. The new refugees who immigrated into the city primarily lived along the outskirts of the city in their own quarters separate from the city, but their presence was felt nonetheless. They tended to be associated with crime and disorder, something that in actuality was likely a result of war trauma on the refugees as well as the dramatic jump in population.

Over the years, as the Islamic Movement slowly became involved with the politics of Nazareth, Islamic fundamentalism began taking hold and tensions began to rise until 1997 when the Shihab a-Den controversy occurred. Shihab a-Den was Saladin's⁵⁰ nephew, and he was buried on the land adjacent the Basilica in Nazareth.⁵¹ They proceeded to illegally begin construction of a mosque on this land. It has been noted that "The local Christians feared that Muslim claims to property that was not theirs under the pretext of it being *waqf* (holy endowment) land was but a stratagem to pursue the take-over by Muslims of the Christian city of Nazareth."⁵² Then on December 19, 1997, the Islamic group, fearing a lengthy process to obtain a permit, erected a large tent on the land lined with rugs and declared it a temporary mosque until a permanent one could be built.

At the same time, the Christian community of Nazareth was preparing a large project to celebrate the passing of two millennia since the time of Christ. The plan was to use the land adjacent to the Basilica for the construction of a city square where the tent now stood.⁵³ This move by the Muslim community, who claimed their equal right to construct a religious center on this plot of land as well as the slow response of the local and national government, enraged the Christian community. Tensions continued between Christians who were outraged by the illegal take over and Muslims who felt that, as the majority, they had the right to do as they wished in the city since in the local 1998 elections Muslim had won a majority of seats on the city council.⁵⁴ Between the years of 1997 and 1999, tensions often turned violent between the two groups in Nazareth. On April 18, 1999, the Israeli government, in response to the Islamic groups' request,

⁴⁸ Abbasi, Mustafa. 2010. "Nazareth in the War for Palestine: The Arab City that Survived the 1948 Nakba."

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Note: Revered hero of the Crusades who notably fought against Richard the Lionheart

⁵¹ Israeli, Raphael. 2003. "The Anti-Millennium: The Islamization of Nazareth."

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

and to alleviate tensions in Nazareth, allowed a mosque to be built on half of the land the group requested.⁵⁵

When the time came to lay the cornerstone of the mosque in November of 1999, Christians in Nazareth closed the doors to all of their churches in protest. The Vatican issued a strong reprimand of Israel's actions, "accusing it of causing the tensions between the various communities."⁵⁶ The Christians in Israel were devastated, especially after a local ruling that had rejected the Islamic claim to the land. Since 1995, other historically Christian cities started to be overwhelmed by the influence of a strengthening Muslim community. But the significance of such a move on Nazareth, one of the most revered Christian sites in the Holy Land, was overpowering. In 2003, under pressure from the United States government and the Pope John Paul II, the Israeli government, which had yet to address the situation, deemed the construction of the mosque illegal and had the foundation destroyed. The disappointment of Muslims was not hidden, and Muslim leaders vowed to continue pressing the issue.⁵⁷ Christians did not consider this a victory; for it only signified what they had originally feared would happen—the betrayal by their brothers in the Muslim community. This was a victory for the Islamists, who learned that if they remained persistent and aggressive enough, they could have their way with the Israeli government through manipulating the sympathies of the sizable Muslim community in Israel. The Islamists were easily able to rally the local and regional Muslims to their cause. Christians, however, learned not to underestimate their position as a shrinking minority within the Arab community.

CONCLUSION

Religious tensions within the Palestinian community have not always been so. For the majority of history, the separate communities have coexisted alongside each other with little conflict. While differences of allegiance and identity still are a prominent part of life in this region, they have rarely been at such odds with one another to the point of conflict. Yet there is a commonality to all the evidence presented. The unjust and unequal laws, the rise of Islamist agendas within the Arab Israeli community, and the staging of events in Nazareth all have one common thread—they are a result of discriminatory and ineffective Israeli policy toward its prominent Palestinian minority. Instead of uniting Arabs in Israel under one flag, the community has splintered into many pieces. A primary reason behind this division is the extent of discrimination by the Israeli government toward the Palestinian sub-groups groups, particularly on the basis of religion. The Israeli government no longer recognizes the Christian community as a threat as they do the Muslim community, which continues to closely identify with the larger Arab world. This has had a significant effect on the role of religious identity in the lives of individuals. For example, Christian Arabs in Israel might feel they are more entitled than Muslim Arabs as a result of more lenient laws against them, or these laws may marginalize or victimize the Muslim community into adopting more violent behavior in the pursuit of change and equality.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

The growth of Islamist political organizations and activities within the Israel was also a result of the effects of Israeli policy on the Arab community. Conservative Islamist leaders who asserted that the Arab community was assimilating into Israeli culture rose up in objection. They resisted by gaining the sympathies of the Muslim community which was quick to value its integral religious identity over its artificial Israeli one (in the form of state citizenship). Through the manipulation of religion, leaders of the Islamist parties and other Islamist groups were able to appeal to the emotional frustrations of Muslims. In the end, this realpolitik on the part of Islamist leaders resulted in a falling out between the Muslim and Christian communities, Christians could not possibly place themselves in line with the Muslim agenda as it would have conflicted with their own interests as a group and their own identity, even more so than aligning with the Jewish state. The scandal in Nazareth was surely demonstrative of this fear and represented a “tipping of the iceberg” for Muslim-Christian relations in Israel. Not only did it increase the prevalence of violence between the two ethno-religious communities, but it also left lasting uncertainties about the futures and roles of both communities in the region of Palestine.

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REVIEWS

Plamen Mavrov is an Honors Program senior International Affairs and Political Science major and Economics minor. His interests within IA particularly focus on international political economy, especially that of developing and transitional areas. He currently serves as President of Global Society, the umbrella organization that oversees the KSU model conference simulation teams (MUN, MAU, MAL, and MNATO). He is currently serving as a research assistant in the Department of Political Science and International Affairs, focusing on cross-border ethno-religious conflict in Europe. After graduating, Plamen plans to pursue a graduate degree in International Affairs with a focus on international development.

Demographic and Economic Consequences of Conflict

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INTRODUCTION

War is an experience that has been and will likely continue to be deeply entrenched in the human condition in the foreseeable future. In a world of finite and unevenly distributed resources as well as periodic shifts in regional and global power configurations, war seems to be the ultimate consequence of the realpolitik governing the activities of most states seeking to ensure their survival and prosperity. While studies on war's causes, development, and resolution seem to cover the gamut of this field of study, the literature concerning post-war environments seems more scant. Why does recovery occur in one state and not in another? What roles do the demographics and preexisting capital stocks, that latter of which is reflective of a state's level of modernization and industrialization, play in post-conflict recovery patterns? How does a country spiral into the "poverty trap"? In "Demographic and Economic Consequences of Conflict," Kugler et al attempt to "provide a comprehensive assessment and a tentative explanation for the puzzling post-conflict recovery patterns that are still not fully understood" (1).

PART I: CAPITAL

Solow Growth Model

The authors divide their study of the question of post-war recovery into two parts: demographics and economics.⁵⁸ The central reason for this division of analysis is because they are focusing on the fundamental component variables of a state's overall wellbeing: labor and capital; they are

⁵⁸ The authors detail their control variables, among them is "foregone years" of growth/production. They note that demographic structures pose a problem when attempting to make complex estimates and, as a result, they simply "reserve that task for the future" (6). The authors also "cannot account for accelerations and possible depressions during war periods" (6).

analyzing growth rates from the paradigm of the classical Solow growth model, which is formulated around the premises set forth by the Cobb-Douglas production function:

$$Y = A \cdot F(K^\alpha, L^{\alpha-1}),$$

where total output/income (Y)⁵⁹ is a function of total capital stock (K) and the size of the labor force (L) multiplied by a constant level of technology (A) with (α) representing capital and labor's respective shares of income/output.⁶⁰ The Solow growth model, therefore, sans the technological factor included in the production function, is written as

$$\Delta k = sf(k) - (\delta + n)k,$$

where (Δk) is the change in capital stock per worker, (δ) is the rate of capital depreciation, (n) is the population size (assumed to be all in labor), and [sf(k)] is savings as a function of capital.⁶¹ In this growth model, capital stock growth or decline is dependent on two variables: rate of capital depreciation and population size, both of which are assumed to be growing in a linear manner as represented by the 45° line.

Below is a standard graph⁶² of the model in the context of post-war recovery. The authors note that “[t]he straightforward implication illustrated in *Figure 3* is that regardless of the size of war losses suffered, all devastated economies will converge to a steady state or balanced growth” (3). This is where the authors assert their first conclusion to be proved empirically later in the article, “Solow’s neoclassical model...explains why belligerents




FIG 3. Post-Conflict Recovery in the Neoclassical Solow Model

that suffer the most drastic reductions in capital and labor will accelerate the most...[since] economies that experience larger capital losses from war will extract greater marginal returns from each unit of capital” (3).

⁵⁹ Y is commonly referred to as Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

⁶⁰ The function denotes constant returns to scale because the shares of capital and labor devoted to production must equal one (i.e. (α) + (α-1) = 1)

⁶¹ In other words, [savings, sf(k)] - [break even investment, (δ + n)k], or the minimum investment in capital required to offset depreciating capital and maintain the same level of capital for a given population size = [Δk, or a positive, negative, or no change in capital]. If there is no change, then the economy is said to be in steady-state equilibrium. If savings exceeds break-even investment for capital depreciation, then capital deepening will occur and the total capital stock will increase, thereby increasing production; the reverse is true for the scenario in which break-even investment is higher than savings, at which point capital widening will occur and the total capital stock will fall until it reaches steady state.

⁶² Found on page 3 of the article.

The reason behind this phenomenon is that whenever an economy starts off with almost zero capital and labor, or at least a significant reduction from a previous period/quarter, then the marginal productivity of labor (MPL) and the marginal productivity of capital (MPK) increase at an initially rapid rate because the economy (or sector) is not saturated with capital or labor, this increase of course occurring if technology is present to allow for the development of new capital. The more capital and labor that build up, the lower the MPL and MPK become, thus showing a decrease in the productivity gained from each additional unit or labor or capital. The article mentions Germany and Japan as excellent examples of rapid recovery and Cambodia and Sub-Saharan countries as examples of stagnated recovery.

Overlapping Generation Growth Model

However, the authors point out a shortfall in the Solow model: it is monotonic. This means that it does not account for individual re-optimization in a changed environment. However, using the overlapping generation (OLG) growth model⁶³, “variations in the recovery process and convergence” are allowed and therefore multiple steady states are possible (4). This explains why some countries recover back to their former level of growth while others do not recover or actually regress, thus falling into the “poverty trap”.

The author’s illustration of the OLG’s starker conclusions is provided below in **Figure 5**.




Fig 5. S-Shaped Transitional Trajectory during Post-Conflict Recovery

states, such as those in Africa, will experience either no growth or negative growth, regardless of whether or not they receive foreign aid, which the authors mention is “ineffective unless massive

The graph shows that states will experience the “Phoenix Factor” (i.e. recovery within one generation) if they were developed to start with and had, as mentioned previously, a technological base already established. This would allow for rapid capital accumulation and a quick achievement of a higher steady state. Therefore, ironically, developed states benefit from war due to one type of “creative destruction”⁶⁴ as political economist Joseph Schumpeter noted. This is evident in the post-war booms that the victors in Europe and the United States experienced after both world wars.⁶⁵ On the contrary, less developed

⁶³ The derivation of the model is provided in the article’s appendix.

⁶⁴ While the term was coined by Schumpeter, it was done so after his extensive study of Marx, who described the process and who had developed this starker conception of capital relations from an analysis of Smith’s “Invisible Hand.”

⁶⁵ Even the losers in these conflicts experienced this but due to the aid of the Marshall Plan. The authors here note that foreign aid is a strong catalyst for the emergence of the “Phoenix Effect.”

infusions overcome the anticipated “corruption” spillage (5).⁶⁶ Their conclusion is that “for developed societies and some developing societies, wars are only costly in the short term, but positive in the long term. On the other hand, for some developing and the least-developed societies, war effects are permanent and can turn into protracted declines even with a great deal of external aid.”

The Long-Run Benefit Conclusion

This conclusion deserves scrutiny. War is not beneficial in the long run economically; it does not even fulfill its supposed Malthusian benefit of keeping population under control since, as the authors mentioned, “in the long term the overall effect of all conflicts on the global population is nil or slightly positive...[and] [p]opulation growth recovers faster than GDP per capita” (1, 7). Therefore, the labor force would grow even in the absence of conflict. In addition, if the proper legal and market conditions are present,⁶⁷ then technology will continue to develop and capital deepening will proceed regardless. Moreover, based on their choice of analyzing World War II, the authors appear to be concerned solely with traditional total warfare. Such warfare is considered to be between states of parity or near-parity and is thus usually near-symmetric; such warfare also has a definitive beginning and end, usually the capture of the enemy’s capital and the total submission of the loser, whereby the loser’s resources are exploited and benefits are accrued by the victor, thus offsetting the economic losses suffered during the war.

However, post-WWII conflicts have tended to be 1) civil 2) asymmetric 3) non-traditional and 4) sporadically recurrent. In such cases and cases prior to WWII, wars such as the Vietnam War, the Second Iraq War, the American Civil War, the Russian Civil War, and the American and Soviet wars in Afghanistan, to name a few, have actually had the opposite effect of hurting or destabilizing the victor since 1) in the case of civil wars, the victors inherited a destroyed state, and 2) in the case of Cold War and post-Cold War superpower-insurgent wars, the superpower was financially drained from a protracted guerilla war resulting in no spoils.⁶⁸ The loser is also in no position to recover because the victor has usually had no intentions of assisting the loser in recovery. The authors do mention Afghanistan at the end of their study, but in mentioning how

⁶⁶ Some scholars, such as Dambisa Moyo and William Easterly, have made similar arguments but offer a contrasting prescription to “massive infusions.” They suggest that all aid should be completely stopped because the corruption factor simply cannot be overcome no matter how large the infusions. Therefore, since the aid never reaches its intended recipients, or does so in very small quantities that make barely perceptible changes, aid is not a successful program of stimulating development. There are many critics of this perspective who argue that aid does not always enter a country in a top-down approach. Non-governmental organizations and some states directly implement their aid rather than having it go through the national government prior to distribution.

⁶⁷ Such conditions include clearly defined property rights, stable macroeconomic environment (especially a stable currency), and non-overwhelming tax or regulation burdens, to name a few.

⁶⁸ Certainly the military-industrial complexes of the superpowers benefitted, but that was in the short run. Therefore, the authors’ conclusion ought to be reversed to say: war is beneficial in the short run (because it reduces employment to near 0%, often below the economy’s natural rate of unemployment, and because it stimulates spending and building. However, because such spending is on military affairs, once the war is over, the sectors supporting the military efforts will likely be hurt because there is now no war for which to produce. The solution to this would be to continue producing military hardware, but that would have to be bought with government fiat money since it cannot normally afford to spend on the military in peacetime as it does in wartime. This discussion leads to one on government deficits and debts, which is for another paper.

nation-building in Afghanistan will likely fail, they do not mention how the conflict has also impacted the United States.⁶⁹

PART II: DEMOGRAPHICS

Baby Booms and “Echoes”

A brief critique must be made on the demographic aspect of the study since it constitutes one of the two subjects of analysis of the article. The authors write of the uncertainties among scholars at the moment as to why the post-war baby boom phenomenon briefly mentioned above occurs in all countries, developed and least developed alike; nevertheless, such growth is what results in a postwar baby boom as shown in *Figure 1* below. The baby booms are a result of a “an increase in infant mortality and a sharp decline in life expectancy, which are then followed by dramatic rises in fertility that linger after the conflict” (2). The authors fall short in their explanations in this part of the study. Why are the echoes present? What are the parameters that define an echo? Could there be a compounding variable causing the echoes that is unrelated to the war which caused the primary boom? Post-war immigration or later immigration due to other conflicts occurring nearby could not be causing the “echoes” since the chart shows a clear pattern in the time of occurrence and proportion of each and such events are not predictable. However, internal factors irrelevant to or loosely connected to the war in question out to be kept in mind as potential compounding variables in the baby-boom echoes.⁷⁰




FIG 1. Effects of the Post-war “Baby Boom” on Populations

In addition, human capital is said to increase in the immediate post-war period and thus provide capital stocks with labor. However, even though in the post-war period “the potentially active population is temporarily distorted, favoring the employment of females and the very young” ten

⁶⁹ This is likely because, again, they focus on “traditional” warfare, and their criteria for countries which suffered significant loss had to have lost at least 5% of their population. However, population loss in warfare is not the only factor that should be taken into account when analyzing post-war losses and gains. Additionally, the measurement the authors use to designate a conflict as “major” seems arbitrary since the only justification they provide for using this threshold is that recovery from “overall losses in excess of 5% of the population...should be hard indeed” (6).

⁷⁰ Regarding this chart, the authors only mention, “Assessments summarized in Figure 1...” (1). Citing directly the sources of data that produced this chart would have been beneficial for those wishing to further explore the nature of these “booms” and “echoes”.

or more years would have to pass before the young in question are capable of contributing to GDP (2). This lag time between population and growth does not make sense and does not explain the immediate takeoff of developed economies following a conflict. While foreign aid may be a contributing factor to the immediate resumption of growth, it alone cannot be the main factor because labor productivity is the essential stimulant of growth, not injection of money and capital, both of which are useless without labor. Also, the injection of aid would have to be truly massive to mimic normal resumption of pre-war or near pre-war production; this simply cannot be.⁷¹

The authors' final conclusion is that "pre-war levels of economic development seemingly determine to a large degree the rate and level of post-war economic recovery" (8). The population booms in developed states result in new human capital that is eventually trained and employed as a result of already extant technology and an industrialized economy; least developed countries, however, only add more people to a state that, due to not being industrialized and having low levels of technology, cannot employ them or care for them, thus setting the stage for a new, internal conflict.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This is a very well composed, researched, and timely study of the demographic and economic impacts of conflict on developed, transitional, and least-developed states. The authors acknowledge shortcomings in several places, but there are also some less perceptible ones that are present within the article, which the authors left as accepted or given. This article does well to set the stage for further research in growth economics by providing an improved way of analyzing growth trajectories using the Overlapping Generation Model. With this model, factors in growth or non-growth other than conflict, such as natural disasters and trade relations, may be analyzed and scrutinized with regards to their impact on developed, transitional, and least-developed states. With the use of predominantly⁷² WWII as the benchmark for traditional war and its impacts on economies and populations, further studies can deviate and provide comparative studies analyzing other forms of conflict (ex, asymmetric or civil), thus providing an increasingly holistic understanding of all major types of conflicts' impacts on economies and populations.

⁷¹ The authors do mention that with regards to forecasting demographic trajectories "more complex estimates would require a full modeling of demographic structures—and we reserve that task for the future" (6). An acknowledgment of the complexity of demographic changes following conflict is a positive one on the part of the authors, for it points to an area of further study for those interested in the subject-matter at hand.

⁷² As mentioned previously, the authors include African civil wars, but as to why these cannot serve as viable benchmarks due to their non-traditional nature, review the critique of war classifications under *The Long Run Benefit Conclusion*.

FACULTY HIGHLIGHT

Dr. Kerwin Swint



Profile

Dr. Kerwin Swint is an author, speaker, and professor of political science at Kennesaw State University. Specializing in Campaigns and Elections, Mass Media, and Political History, he or his work has appeared in a number of national and international media, including CNN, FOX News, the BBC, the ABC program The View, The Wall Street Journal, The Los Angeles Times, NPR, The Toronto Star, The Daily Mail (UK), National Journal, The Chronicle of Higher Education, and numerous other media. He is the author of four books, including the recently released The King Whisperers: Power Behind the Throne from Rasputin to Rove. He was the recipient of the College of HSS Distinguished Professor Award in 2011. Dr. Swint is a native Georgian, a graduate of UGA, and has been a tenure-track faculty member at Kennesaw State since 1996. He was awarded tenure in 2001 and was promoted to Full Professor in 2006. He has been the Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Affairs since 2013, a former political campaign consultant, and a current board member of Common Cause Georgia.

1. Your career in political science is an extensive one. How did you first become interested in this field of study? What is your advice for first-year students who think they may be interested in pursuing a career in political science or international affairs but are not yet sure?

I majored in Political Science in college because that was the field that interested me the most. I wasn't thinking about making money or job prospects, I just knew that politics was fascinating and I wanted to somehow be a part of it. Young people, when seeking advice about college, careers, and life, are often confronted with the "head" versus "heart" scenario – some people tell you to follow your heart and your passion, while others tell you to follow your head and major in something that's going to get you a job. Personally, I'm on the "passion" side. But everyone has to decide for themselves.

2. How do you engage students, particularly in a course of non-majors?

I love teaching the Gen Ed course, POLS 1101. I love it because 99% of the students walk in the door the first day of class hostile to the very idea of being there. They're only taking it because it is a required course. Well, that's a challenge to me, because you really don't want to be there.

It's up to me to grab you by the lapels and shake some sense into you. And I do like to shake things up.

3. *If you could choose a course on a topic that you have always wanted to teach, what would it be and how would you teach it?*

I always loved teaching the Campaigns & Elections course because that is my specialty. But there are a lot of special topics courses I could see myself teaching. I also love History, and I would love to teach a course on a topic like Machiavellianism, or "How to run a negative campaign and get away with it." I could teach a whole course on my last book *The King Whisperers*.

4. *What do you consider to be the appropriate role of service in the teaching, research and service mix?*

The role of service has changed since I came to KSU in the 1990s. For faculty members, it is not rewarded the same way it used to be, yet it is no less important than it was 20 years ago. It still has to be done. And community service and certain types of "engagement" are more important than ever. Research/Scholarship has become so much more important for most faculty as KSU has risen in the ranks of national universities.

5. *As an expert scholar on American politics, what are your thoughts on the fact that the current political dialogue in the country, and especially in Washington DC, seems to have become particularly polarized since 2008? Do you see this as a newly developing trend and cementation of ideology? Or, is it a continuation of a long tradition of partisanship in American politics?*

I see it as one of the major problems we have as a society today, and one of our biggest challenges. Politics has always been a contact sport, and filled with negativity. But yes, it has gotten worse in the last 10 to 15 years. Ronald Reagan and House Speaker Tip O'Neil could at least work together. Bill Clinton and Newt Gingrich put differences aside to accomplish some things. But today is far different. Both parties are to blame, as well as the national media. The "gotcha" mentality is prevalent, as elected officials in both parties care about nothing more than winning at all costs, and one's opponent is not worthy because they're not your side. The parties have gotten too extreme. Legislative redistricting, or "Gerrymandering," has abetted this hostility, as it results in very ideological districts in the House, with fewer competitive districts, which also effects Senate races as the party members become more ideological.

6. *What do you make of the obsession in the US with elections? The day after the 2012 election was over, pundits and newscasters were already making speculations about the 2016 election. Is this phenomenon present only in times of close or contested elections?*

I blame the media.

7. *Not too long ago, you and Dr. Jeff DeWitt, in conjunction with the Department of Communications, took several political science and communications students to the 2012*

Republican National Convention and Democratic National Convention, respectively, as part of a field study class where two teams carried out research projects. What was your experience like and how do you see such “field” class opportunities expanding for political science students at KSU? What do you recall the students saying they took the most out from the course?

That was an amazing experience, for both sets of faculty and students. For college students to be able to meet and mix with some of the most powerful people in the country, and some of the leaders of their state, who they had only read about before, was truly inspirational. I would love to be able to reproduce such opportunities in the future. We have a template now for how to do it. The question is one of geography (where will future conventions be held?) and funding (how do we pay for it?) But I really expect we will do it, the faculty is very supportive. Many of the students were star struck; they are political science majors after all. One of the benefits for students, aside from a research opportunity, was the chance to network with the rich and powerful.

8. After reading the first and second issues of Comitium, what are your thoughts on the contents of the journal? Is there something that especially surprised or informed you?

I think it’s great, I brag on it to the other department chairs. I guess the thing that surprised me was how professional it looks. There is a level of quality to it that is really nice to see. But with our students, it really shouldn’t have surprised me. The bad news is, you set a high bar, now you have to keep meeting those high expectations.

9. What subjects within the field of political science would you like to see perhaps addressed in a future issue?

Too numerous to mention, it really depends on the interests of the individual authors and editors. I’d like to see all of the subfields represented if possible.

10. What are your current research interests? Have you conducted any recent research projects with students of yours?

When I wrote my last book *The King Whisperers* I had a research assistant, David Anderson. He’s now in a graduate history program. I’m currently working on a new book idea, which would be an international version of one of my previous books *Mudslingers: The 25 Dirtiest Campaigns of All Time*. I’m working with a graduate research assistant on that one, Caitlin King.

11. What graduation advice do you have for those political science and international affairs students who are graduating this year?

Follow your passion. And make use of your network of contacts. If you don’t have a network of contacts, get one.

This interview was conducted online on 3 February, 2014.

Department of Political Science and International Affairs



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