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“Diversity: the art of thinking independently,
together.” – Malcolm Forbes

Department of Political Science and International Affairs



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Letter from the Editor

Dear Reader,

It is my pleasure to present Volume II, Issue I of *Spectrum: The Kennesaw Journal of Politics*. I am overjoyed to have taken the title of the new Editor-in-Chief. The title of the journal has been changed from *Comitium* to *Spectrum* in order to reflect the diversity of topics and students represented in the following pages and to appeal to more students in the future. The journal has received submissions from both undergraduate and graduate students on topics ranging from domestic policies to international crises and functions under a blind review process, adding great value to the academic world.

I would like to thank all of the students that worked patiently and diligently with our staff in order to have their work published. I would also like to thank Dr. Barbara Neuby for all of her guidance and help in this endeavor. The journal would surely not succeed without her.

It is our hope that with this journal students will become more interested in research and see the value in academic work such as this journal. I hope you enjoy reading the fine work of the students at Kennesaw State University.

Best,

Carley Cole
EIC Spectrum
Class of 2016

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FEATURE ARTICLES

Ruth Forsyth recently graduated from KSU in May 2015 with a degree in International Affairs, a minor in Chinese Studies, and a certificate in European Union Studies. Since graduation, she has been considering various job options, and is currently working as volunteer staff for an international Model UN conference in Germany. She is also preparing to start graduate school to focus her studies on international governance, policy, and law. Ruth has a special interest in the politics of the European Union and in American-European relations. She completed this term paper in Fall 2014 as a research project for her course in European Union Politics.

The Effects of Attitudes toward Immigrants And Immigration Levels on Welfare Spending across the EU-27.

Ruth Forsyth

Introduction

Among the developed states of the world, European states in particular have a reputation for providing generous amounts of welfare spending to their citizens. While the redistributive nature of welfare spending alone sparks debate, the issue becomes more complicated with the consideration of other issues that may potentially affect the amount of public money spent on social expenditures across EU member states. One of these issues is immigration, currently a heavily debated and heated topic within Europe.

As stated before, while European states are known for their generous amounts of welfare spending, not all states are equal in this respect; some states certainly spend more than others. The same goes for levels of immigration; some European countries see greater influxes of foreign immigrants each year than other states do. With the current troubled economic situation, the debate over welfare spending becomes more complicated when also considering the foreign immigrants who may benefit from public social expenditures. Tied in to this issue is not only the number of immigrants coming into European countries, but also how the citizens of these countries may feel about the immigrants and immigration in general.

This paper seeks to further explore the relationship between immigration and welfare spending. Specifically, this paper will analyze two relationships: the effect that *Attitude toward Immigrants* (the independent variable) of the public has on government *Welfare Spending* (the dependent variable), as well as the effect that *Immigration Levels* (the independent variable) has on *Welfare Spending* (the dependent variable). Previous studies have used what is now outdated data in their analyses, and/or have based their studies on a limited amount of European countries. This paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature by utilizing the most up-to-date data available in order to widely analyze the research question across 27 EU member states (henceforth referenced in this paper as the EU-27).

Literature Review

Oorschot and Uunk note that many empirical studies have demonstrated that negative attitudes toward immigrants are widespread in many European countries.¹ Their study of 18 European states found that “countries with higher welfare spending and countries with higher immigration have higher relative concern for immigrants than other countries”.² The results suggest that a positive correlation exists between attitudes of concern toward immigrants/higher immigration levels and higher amounts of welfare spending.

In a case study of Sweden, an EU country known for its particularly high levels of welfare spending, the results demonstrated that recent increased levels of immigration and higher proportions of foreign-born people in the population reduced Swedish public support for the welfare state.³ In a democratic country such as Sweden, changing attitudes could theoretically sway the vote toward politicians who would implement policies more in line with public opinion; thus, increased negative attitudes toward immigrants and the welfare state could potentially result in policies of decreased welfare spending.

In another study, Malchow-Møller, Munch, Schroll, and Skaksen analyzed attitudes toward immigration across 15 EU member states (members before the 2004 enlargement), conducted in the context of procuring potentially useful data for policymakers when considering the harmonization of EU immigration law.⁴ The results found that attitudes toward immigrants varied substantially both between the 15 countries and between people of different socioeconomic groups across the countries.⁵ People who were poor, unemployed, and/or lacking higher education tended to feel more negatively toward immigration, along with people who perceived immigrants to threaten their own job options or the public finances.⁶ These results suggest that people in lower socioeconomic classes view immigrants as economic competition who represent a threat to native citizens (themselves); thus, it might be reasonable to guess that countries with more significant levels of people in lower socioeconomic classes might have overall lower attitudes toward immigrants, and by extension, of welfare spending.

Malchow-Møller, et al.’s study also found that people living in urban areas, of an immigrant background themselves, and/or with higher levels of education tended to have more overall positive views of immigrants.⁷ These results might suggest the reverse of the study’s previously mentioned results; that is, countries with higher populations of these particular groups may demonstrate more overall positive attitudes toward immigrants as well as higher levels of welfare spending.

¹ Oorschot, W. V., & Uunk, W. (2007). “Welfare Spending and the Public’s Concern for Immigrants: Multilevel Evidence for Eighteen European Countries.” *Comparative Politics*, 40(1), pp. 63.

² Ibid, pp. 72.

³ Eger, M. A. (2010). “Even in Sweden: The Effect of Immigration on Support for Welfare State Spending.” *European Sociological Review*, 26(2), pp. 211.

⁴ Malchow-Møller, Nikolaj, Jakob Roland Munch, Sanne Schroll, and Jan Rose Skaksen. “Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Attitudes Towards Immigration in The EU-15.” *Social Indicators Research* 91, no. 3 (2008): 371-90.

⁵ Ibid, pp. 373.

⁶ Ibid, pp. 373.

⁷ Ibid, pp. 373.

Hypothesis

With Europe having recently experienced a major financial crisis as well as rising levels of populism and Euroscepticism, the current situation in Europe has changed dramatically in a way that could potentially hold implications for this study. The imposition of austerity measures and the rise of far-right political movements (who tend to support strongly anti-immigration policies) are a few of the potentially contentious issues that may affect levels of welfare spending in Europe.

Given that European states with high levels of social spending also tend toward a reputation of employing socially tolerant policies, this paper will operate on the hypothesis that *Attitude toward Immigrants* among the public will tend to positively correlate with *Welfare Spending* levels; that is, positive attitudes toward immigrants will be associated with higher levels of welfare spending, while negative attitudes toward immigrants will be associated with lower levels of welfare spending.

The second hypothesis put forth by this paper is that *Immigration Levels* will also tend to positively correlate with amounts of *Welfare Spending*, in the same way as described for the first hypothesis. The justification for this hypothesis is that if a country has higher levels of immigration, this may indicate a more tolerant stance toward immigrants that may also be indicative of other liberal social policies; as stated before, these kinds of policies are often associated with higher levels of welfare spending.

Methodology

The data utilized for the analysis was taken from the publicly available Eurostat and Eurobarometer databases online. Only data from the year 2011 and corresponding to the respective EU-27 countries was used, as that year includes the most recent complete set of data for each of the necessary countries. (The EU-27 excludes the 28th member of the EU, Croatia, which joined in 2013, two years after this study's data was collected.)

The analysis required the use of three variables: *Immigration Levels* and *Attitude toward Immigrants* (the independent variables), and *Welfare Spending* (the dependent variable.) The dependent variable information was taken from the Eurostat database, using the total "social protection" expenditure amounts (by amount of euro paid per inhabitant) for each of the EU-27 countries. According to Eurostat, social protection expenditures include the amounts spent on social protection benefits, administration costs, sickness/healthcare, and other expenditures.⁸

The independent variables required more data manipulation. To find *Immigration Levels*, the 2011 Eurostat data of the total number of new immigrants in each country was divided by the respective total populations.^{9,10} This resulted in a number representing immigration to each

⁸ Eurostat: Social Protection data. See Table "Expenditure: main results (spr_exp_sum)", last updated 12 November 2014. <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/social_protection/data/database>.

⁹ Eurostat: Population data. See Table "Immigration by five year age group, sex and citizenship (migr_imm1ctz)", last updated 20 June 2014. <<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database>>.

country as a percentage of the total population, in order to fairly represent the levels of immigration across the 27 countries.

Next, Eurobarometer survey data was used to calculate the last variable: *Attitude toward Immigrants*. Four questions from the Eurobarometer survey asked European citizens from the EU-27 their opinions on immigrants and immigration, with the respondents answering “Totally agree”, “Tend to agree”, “Tend to disagree”, and “Totally disagree”.¹¹ (See **Appendix A.** for a copy of these Eurobarometer questions as asked by the survey.) These answers could be interpreted to represent a positive or negative attitude toward immigrants, based on how the respondent answered the question. Using SPSS software, the response data from these 4 questions was computed into a single index, using a scale of 1 to 4 to coincide with the respondent answers, with 1 representing the most negative attitude toward immigrants, and 4 representing the most positive attitude (all “Don’t know” answers were removed from the calculations.) Calculating the mean responses of the index for each of the EU-27 yielded a score between 1 and 4 representing the average attitude the citizens hold toward immigrants in each country. (See **Table 1.** to view the figures.)

With the three variables now established, SPSS software was then used to analyze the relationships between the data. Since two relationships were being analyzed, separate tests had to be run for each of the relationships. First, a simple bivariate correlation test was run using the two variables *Attitude toward Immigrants* and *Welfare Spending*, yielding data that included correlation strength (as denoted by Pearson’s correlation), significance value, the mean, and the standard deviation. Next, a linear regression test was run using *Attitude toward Immigrants* as the independent variable and *Welfare Spending* as the dependent variable to yield more figures of significance. The same bivariate correlation and linear regression tests were run to analyze and yield the same information regarding the second relationship between the *Immigration Levels* (independent) and *Welfare Spending* (dependent) variables.

Results

The results of the analyses ultimately confirmed both of the hypotheses. The first relationship between the independent variable *Attitude toward Immigrants* and the dependent variable *Welfare Spending* were found to be correlated. The SPSS tests yielded a Pearson’s correlation value of 0.546, which indicates a positive correlation between the two variables. The tests also yielded a significance value of 0.003, which indicates that these correlations are statistically significant. (See **Table 2.** for a scatterplot comparing the relationship between *Attitude toward Immigrants* and *Welfare Spending* across all of the EU-27.)

Regarding the second relationship between the independent variable *Immigration Levels* and the dependent variable *Welfare Spending*, the tests also indicated a positive correlation, with a Pearson’s correlation value of 0.549. This relationship correlation was also found to be

¹⁰ Eurostat: Population data. See Table “Population on 1 January (tps00001)”, last updated 31 October 2014. <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/main_tables>.

¹¹ ZA5596: Eurobarometer 76.4, December 2011. GESIS: Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. See QB9 questions on immigrants under the section “Variable Group Awareness of Home Affairs (QB)”. <<http://goo.gl/PIO5mJ>>.

significant with a value of 0.003. (See **Table 3.** for a scatterplot comparing the relationship between *Immigration Levels* and *Welfare Spending* across all of the EU-27.) The correlation and significance values mentioned here are also listed in **Table 5.**

Conclusion

The two relationships that were tested (*Attitude toward Immigrants* and *Welfare Spending*, *Immigration Levels* and *Welfare Spending*) ultimately demonstrated very similar results, with both yielding positive correlations, similar correlation values (0.546 and 0.549, respectively), and the same significance value (0.003) for both relationships. This indicates that a meaningful relationship likely exists between the independent variables and the dependent variable, respectively; that is, this paper concludes that immigration (represented in this study by two different variables) and levels of social welfare spending are related.

Interestingly, Luxembourg represented a notable outlier in both analyses. This result may be interpreted as potentially consistent with Malchow-Møller, et al.'s previously mentioned study analyzing 15 EU states in which Luxembourg was found to move “further and further from the EU-15 average”, after controlling for socioeconomic factors and perceptions toward immigration.¹² Given the results of the 2008 study as well as this one, Luxembourg's situation may represent a special case that would merit further investigation and research.

It is important to remember that this study only tested for correlation and significance between two specific relationships, and while this may demonstrate that both of the independent variables do indeed have a real effect on the dependent variable, this study cannot demonstrate exactly why these effects have occurred. Further research would be needed to answer these questions.

The two independent variables—*Attitude toward Immigrants* and *Immigration Levels*—were both chosen to represent different aspects of the wider immigration issue. That is, while both are obviously relevant to immigration, measuring the public's attitude toward immigrants in their country would not necessarily be related to assessing the levels of immigration into the country. However, though these two factors (acting as the independent variables in this study) both demonstrated a very similar relationship to the dependent variable in this particular study, it is possible that further interesting data relevant to the issue could be produced if these variables were tested against each other. Given the results of this paper, further research into relationships not addressed in this study is certainly merited and encouraged.

¹² Malchow-Møller, Nikolaj, Jakob Roland Munch, Sanne Schroll, and Jan Rose Skaksen. “Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Attitudes Towards Immigration in The EU-15.” *Social Indicators Research* 91, no. 3 (2008): pp. 386.

Table 1: Dependent and Independent Variable Data Across the EU-27 (2011).

COUNTRY	Welfare Spending (euro per inhabitant)	Immigration Levels (immigrants / total population)	Attitude toward Immigrants (1-4 scale)*
Belgium	10,147.01	1.31536%	2.5533
Bulgaria**	927.43	0.19137%	2.5228
Czech Republic	3,025.44	0.25856%	2.3789
Denmark	14,795.54	0.95013%	2.9238
Germany	9,389.97	0.59867%	2.7358
Estonia	1,962.82	0.27894%	2.3592
Ireland	10,712.02	1.16441%	2.5951
Greece	5,662.80	0.99631%	2.5223
Spain	5,810.12	0.79570%	2.8467
France	10,277.59	0.49219%	2.6495
Italy	7,895.58	0.64987%	2.6643
Cyprus	4,782.80	2.74331%	2.1667
Latvia	1,478.75	0.49330%	2.1178
Lithuania	1,741.88	0.51383%	2.6875
Luxembourg	18,136.02	3.95983%	2.8767
Hungary	2,196.33	0.28058%	2.2470
Malta	3,009.68	1.31690%	2.4901
Netherlands	11,578.16	0.78122%	2.8833
Austria	10,608.79	0.98183%	2.4916
Poland	1,833.39	0.40763%	2.8044
Portugal	4,298.59	0.18602%	2.8732
Romania	1,070.21	0.73115%	2.7057
Slovenia	4,409.55	0.68691%	2.7013
Slovakia	2,332.32	0.08955%	2.5609
Finland	10,522.02	0.54846%	2.9154
Sweden	12,105.32	1.02455%	3.2671
United Kingdom	7,842.54	0.89816%	2.7381
EU-27 average***	6613.06		2.6399

Blue: highest figure within that variable.


Red: lowest figure within that variable.

* **Scale:** 1 represents the most negative attitude toward immigrants; 4 represents the most positive attitude.

** **Bulgaria:** Immigration data used was from 2012, as 2011 data was unavailable.

*** **EU-27 average:** Mean data not included in analyses; provided for comparison purposes.

Table 2: Attitude toward Immigrants and Welfare Spending (2011).



* **Scale:** 1 represents the most negative attitude toward immigrants; 4 represents the most positive attitude.

Table 3: Immigration Levels and Welfare Spending (2011).




Table 4: Correlation Significance between the Independent and Dependent Variables.

** Indicates a significant statistical correlation.
Pearson Correlation: #.### outside the parentheses.
(#.###) indicates the level of statistical significance.*

Independent Variables:	Dependent Variable: Welfare Spending
<i>Attitude toward Immigrants</i>	0.546** (0.003)
<i>Immigration Levels</i>	0.549** (0.003)

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.010 level (2-tailed).*

Appendix A: Eurobarometer Immigration Questions (2011).

QB9	About 4% of the people living in the EU come from a non-EU country. There are different views regarding their integration in European societies. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about integration?
-----	---

(SHOW CARD WITH SCALE – ONE ANSWER PER LINE)

	(READ OUT)	Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	DK
1	Immigration enriches (OUR COUNTRY) economically and culturally	1	2	3	4	5
2	Legal immigrants should have the same rights as (NATIONALITY) citizens	1	2	3	4	5
3	Immigrants may have difficulties to integrate largely because of the discrimination they face in (OUR COUNTRY)	1	2	3	4	5
4	Immigrants may have difficulties to integrate largely because they don't want to	1	2	3	4	5

QB9	Environ 4% de la population de l'UE est originaire d'un pays hors UE. Il y a plusieurs façons de considérer leur intégration dans les sociétés européennes. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord ou non avec chacune des propositions suivantes en matière d'intégration ?
-----	---

(MONTRER CARTE AVEC ECHELLE – UNE REPONSE PAR LIGNE)

	(LIRE)	Tout à fait d'accord	Plutôt d'accord	Plutôt pas d'accord	Pas du tout d'accord	NSP
1	L'immigration enrichit (NOTRE PAYS) économiquement et culturellement	1	2	3	4	5
2	Les immigrants légaux devraient avoir les mêmes droits que les citoyens (NATIONALITE)	1	2	3	4	5
3	Les immigrants peuvent avoir des difficultés à s'intégrer principalement à cause des discriminations qu'ils subissent en (NOTRE PAYS)	1	2	3	4	5
4	Les immigrants peuvent avoir des difficultés à s'intégrer principalement parce qu'ils ne le veulent pas	1	2	3	4	5

The data from respondents across the EU-27 from these four questions (QB9-1, QB9-2, QB9-3, and QB9-4) was utilized in this research paper. These are the four questions as they appear in the ZA5596: Eurobarometer 76.4 Basic Questionnaire (2011, in English & French) <<https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/download.asp?db=E&id=48507>>.

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Becky VanHorn received a Bachelor of Science degree from Kennesaw State in the summer of 2015. She had two majors: English and Political Science, where she concentrated on array of global studies. Her academic focus centers on Russian and Eastern European politics, international terrorism, political philosophy, and Alternative Dispute Resolution. Today, Becky is an intern at BlazeSports America where she works on projects in Haiti, Turkey, and Brazil. She assists in building sport for development projects internationally. In Fall 2016, she plans to attend a graduate school where she will continue to focus on project development and implementation in conflict management studies. Becky wrote this paper for her senior seminar class with Dr. John Moran in the fall of 2014.

The Transformation from Normative to Empirical: Social Capital

Becky VanHorn

*Social capital, or the connectedness between human beings, has been studied prominently in many academic fields, but it poses for the purpose of political science a topic of transition between foundational thinking and modern day scholarship. To best understand the transition of social capital, this paper will first define the topic, and then explore the foundational literature, specifically Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*. Robert Putnam serves as the connecting link between Tocqueville and modern academia, allowing for further case by case study of social capital by modern scholars. This paper demonstrates the shift in how social capital is studied from the foundational processes of an inductive approach to a modern trend in the deductive approach. Subsequent literature by Ivan Turgenev provides understanding of the crux between the two approaches, though ultimately leaning toward inductive, a rational approach, void of scientific direction. I argue for the strength in a hybrid method of reasoning, where social capital is studied cyclically, a circular logic of both inductive and deductive reasoning.*

How has the study of social capital evolved from foundational political thinkers to modern day scholars? Over the course of history, the topic of social capital, and its many synonyms, has been discussed and disputed. The perspective of social capital has gradually transformed from a deductive approach to an inductive, where the variable of interconnectedness becomes the causer rather than the caused. This transformation process, however, has moved the topic of social capital from a study of predictions and long term effects to a reality check of consequences and short term solutions. In order to track the progression of social capital studies, this paper will analyze the method of Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, the modern scientific approach of Robert Putnam's book, *Bowling Alone*, and Susanne Karstedt's article, "Democracy, Values, and Violence: Paradoxes, Tensions, and Comparative Advantages of Liberal Inclusion," the literary perspective of Ivan Turgenev through his novel, *Fathers and Sons*, and the conclusive proposal to studying social capital. Future trends of the rivaling methods, normative versus empirical, may not keep them mutually exclusive, but they may become intertwined, a combination of science and rational choice.

Before analyzing the progression of social capital, the definition of social capital will be clarified. On the most basic level, social capital is the interconnections between individuals. Progressive Era reformer, L.F. Hanifan first coined the term social capital in 1916 as, what Robert Putnam paraphrases, a social contract theory that satisfies individual's social needs and

helps improve overall life in societies.¹³ Putnam continues to explain three components of social capital: it allows citizens to resolve collective problems more easily, reinforces communities to advance efficiently, and permits greater awareness of trust between individuals.¹⁴ Positive social capital promotes happiness and health, stimulates economic flow, reduces levels of crime and violence, and facilitates societies of association.

Alexis de Tocqueville perceived social capital in terms of associations, whether they be political or civil. The content of his book, *Democracy in America*, highlights the importance of associations, the risks of hyper-individualism, and the ultimatums of a society without association. Tocqueville's deductive method of reasoning, not only explains the topic of associations, but also allows him to predict solutions for Americans on how to prevent the dangers of declining social capital.

An association is a group of united individuals for a common purpose. Tocqueville writes that these associations bond together, hold meetings, and ultimately set up political goals.¹⁵ This sets the stage for the emergence of two types of associations, political and civil, both of which work in cyclical dependability. Tocqueville briefly recaps on this relationship between the two, "Civil associations, therefore, facilitate political association; but, on the other hand, political association singularly strengthens and improves associations for civil purposes."¹⁶ And the natural tendency for Americans to associate fuels this interdependability between the political and civil spheres. Tocqueville calls it the "spirit of association," where if community members in America are given the opportunity "to combine for all purposes" they will be more than eager to establish an association.¹⁷ The structure of the United States is ripe for opportunities to associate, but Tocqueville pursues the point that Americans are naturally inclined to do so. This American trait drastically differs from any trait similar to that of Europeans, as Tocqueville writes, "It is evident that the [European] people consider association as a powerful means of action, but the [American] seem to regard it as the only means they have of acting."¹⁸ There is an innate value and appreciation, within the community of Americans, for public association.

Within these values there is a capacity for hyper-equality and subsequent hyper-individualism. By advocating for equality, Americans may adopt an attitude of extreme equalization. Tocqueville warns of a community that makes hyper-equality the central campaign, will eventually cause individuals to isolate themselves, becoming so self-centered they will forfeit their political participation. Americans will grow weaker and consequently fail to associate. A declining associative community produces people who fear the loss of their own possessions and refuse to help one another out of selfishness.

However, Tocqueville does not only forewarn these problems, but he provides a solution for the American people – to re-associate with one another, circulate ideas again, build social trust, and ultimately establish an intermingled community. He mentions in *Democracy in America* that if

¹³ (Putnam 2000)

¹⁴ (Putnam 2000)

¹⁵ (Tocqueville 2004)

¹⁶ (Tocqueville 2004)

¹⁷ (Tocqueville 2004)

¹⁸ (Tocqueville 2004)

men become more involved and associative, then “the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased.” The “equality of conditions” that Tocqueville promotes is not a materialistic equality, but it is an equality of legitimacy, an agreement among the people that each will be judged equally. Overall, it is his advice to Americans, who may become hyper-individualistic, that they return to an associative lifestyle and concurrently accept an equality of conditions.

While the core of Tocqueville’s associations, or social capital, is imperative, the methodology by which he conveys his arguments is equally significant. He takes a specific approach on these associations, a deductive syllogism on the capacities of American individualistic and egalitarian values. The American society is inbred with strong values that allow for freedom to associate; furthermore, if these political and civil associations are not regularly active, they then open the doors for hyper-individualism, or self-centeredness. Therefore, Americans will inevitably become hyper-individualistic if associations dissipate. Tocqueville’s use of deductive syllogisms is directly seen in his comparison of aristocratic nations to democratic ones in their exercise of associations:

Among democratic nations, on the contrary, all the citizens are independent and feeble; they can do hardly anything by themselves, and none of them can oblige his fellow men to lend him their assistance. They all, therefore, become powerless if they do not learn voluntarily to help one another. If men living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to associate for political purposes, their independence would be in great jeopardy, but they might long preserve their wealth and their cultivation: whereas if they never acquired the habit of forming associations in ordinary life, civilization itself would be endangered. A people among whom individuals lost the power of achieving great things single-handed, without acquiring the means of producing them by united exertions, would soon relapse into barbarism.¹⁹

The syllogism clarifies the theory of democratic nations, which do not have strong individuals, and their willingness to combine together. He deduces that any country with similar structure, that does not have an associative attitude among the citizens, will revert to barbarism, or become uncivilized. The deductive approach Tocqueville uses to analyze the interconnectedness of individuals is crucial to the development of social capital, showing how in the specific case of the American population, a decline in political and civil associations can be detrimental to a society, even down to the individual. But it is the deductive method that makes Tocqueville’s argument applicable to others, a theory from which many predictions may stem. His warnings of diminishing social capital are not only pertinent to Americans, but it is a warning to all other communities of people that if political and civil associative behaviors fade, then individuals will become weaker, more feeble, and eventually become totally dependent on a governing body.

If Tocqueville was to survey the approach to social capital in the modern day, he would recommend his approach as the most viable methodology. He explicitly makes social capital, or political and civil associations, and lack thereof, his dependent variable. A failure to associate is caused by hyper-individualism, or self-centeredness over community interaction. It differs from the modern approach, where social capital is the cause of a variety of dependent variables.

¹⁹ (Tocqueville 2004)

Tocqueville also offers suggestions and warnings, something modern scholars do not necessarily include in their analyses. When discussing political associations, he goes at length to provide advice, specifically asserting, "...it may perhaps be easy to demonstrate that freedom of association in political matters is favorable to the prosperity and even to the tranquility of the community."²⁰ It is the moral prospect that Tocqueville endorses regarding associations. He clearly sides one way over the other, urging a strong, positive social capital among citizens. Whether it is a warning or a solution, Tocqueville keeps in mind the value of ethics and morality when looking at community interconnectedness, something lost in modern scholarship.

Before plunging into modern research, Robert Putnam, in *Bowling Alone*, sets the bar for which other modern scholars use to analyze social capital. As a popular modern leader in social capital studies, Putnam exercises an inductive methodology, where specific examples and observations explain how trends can be generalized. The surplus of data sets and Putnam's conclusive theory, which suggests a need for positive social capital, illustrates his inductive approach. The outline of Putnam's book exemplifies this modern method of reasoning by considering the trends, the causes, the capacities, and the conclusions.

Putnam tracks trends where social capital is most often seen, all of which involve participation. A society experiences social capital in the participation of politics, civic activities, religious organization, workplaces, volunteer opportunities, and even informal settings.²¹ In the case study of American social capital, each of these forms of participation, Putnam writes, adheres to a simple theme, "For the first two-thirds of the twentieth century a powerful tide bore Americans into ever deeper engagement in the life of their communities, but a few decades ago—silently, without warning—that tide reserved and we were overtaken by a treacherous rip current."²² He explains that these tides, or consequences, correlate with a lack of social capital and include time pressure, monetary prudence, mobility and sprawl, technological advancements, expansion of mass media, and generational shifts.²³ These variables essentially predicate a decline in the aforementioned trends of participation. The problems that arise due to poor social capital capacities involve a weakening of education and welfare, an increase in crime and violence, a dwindling economy, a lessening of happiness and health, and a faltering democracy. In correspondence with Susanne Karstedt's study, Putnam induces that any capacity of a failing social capital will lead to higher crime rates.

His comprehensive conclusions look at the transition from the Gilded Age to the Progressive Era, from a highly interconnected and reliant society to a period of innovation and industry.²⁴ For example, Putnam illustrates this era shift through the invention of the railroad and telegraph. Enterprise boomed, communication abilities grew exponentially, albeit unevenly, and social capital transformed. He goes on to summarize, "Weakened social capital is manifest in the things that have vanished almost unnoticed – neighborhood parties and get-togethers with friends, the unreflective kindness of strangers, the shared pursuit of the public good rather than a solitary

²⁰ (Tocqueville 2004)

²¹ (Putnam 2000)

²² (Putnam 2000)

²³ (Putnam 2000)

²⁴ (Putnam 2000)

quest for private goods.”²⁵ It is through a variation of observations, even a transition into a new era, by which Putnam makes generalizations that produce a theory – others should connect with one another and focus on reviving participation.

While Putnam served as a pioneer of modern social capital studies, many others followed in similar fashion. Business professors, Seok-Woo Kwon and Paul S. Adler, wrote an article titled “Social Capital: Maturation of a Field of Research,” where they discuss the modern movement of social capital from a concept, or simple variable, to a major field of study that is applicable to multiple disciplines. They conceptualize the source of social capital into a trifold schema, “(1) The opportunities provided by the network structure of [social] relations, (2) the norms and values that constitute the content of [those] social network ties and give them their motivational force, and (3) the abilities at each of the nodes of this [social] network that can be mobilized by such goodwill.”²⁶ Though their schema of Opportunity, Motivation, and Abilities (OMA) uses the example of business studies, they mention OMA and its applicability to all fields that incorporate the studies of social capital.

Kwon and Adler explore the opportunities and their correlation to social capital. Many fields have the opportunities now to apply social capital theory to their specific topic, whether it is sociological, economic, historical, etc. Essentially, they are exhibiting the trend of making social capital the independent variable of any given study. The motivations that lead to social capital are built on trust, values, and norms, three factors modern scholars are urged to consider in their studies. At the individual level, trust is crucial to producing social capital and at the community level, the “we-feeling,” or in German, *Gemeinschaft*, provides a framework for individuals to interconnect.²⁷ If social capital is the resource, then the capacity of the actor providing the social capital is also surveyed. Kwon and Adler clarify this capacity, or abilities, as the “social skill” among individuals and communities.²⁸ For modern scholars, the ability to create social capital should be explored as it predicates what form of social capital they are investigating. Altogether, these three sources structure how a study defines social capital within their subject matter.

Within modern scholarship, social capital is typically identified as the independent variable, but the dependent variable is far more discretionary and often numerous in count. Susanne Karstedt, a professor of criminology at the University of Leeds, targets the dependent variable of crime in her study on violence between democracies and authoritarian.²⁹ She breaks down what she refers to as “The Paradox of Democracy,” in which democracies promote social capital but often lead to hyper-individualism.³⁰ A democracy’s paradoxical social capital has to handle inclusionary issues, but it still has to keep a pluralistic mindset.

Before she formalizes an argument, Karstedt explains the purpose for social capital in a democracy, “‘Civil society’ is universally seen as a necessary condition for effective liberal democracies (as opposed to low-intensity democracy) as it counterbalances state and majority

²⁵ (Putnam 2000)

²⁶ (Kwon and Adler 2014)

²⁷ (Kwon and Adler 2014)

²⁸ (Kwon and Adler 2014)

²⁹ (Karstedt 2006)

³⁰ (Karstedt 2006)

power by complex relationships between the citizenry, establishes the dominance of choice, and produces trust among citizens.”³¹ It is the combination of individual and egalitarian values that fosters social capital within a democracy, but if the two values are not properly balanced, then the capacity for violence and crime expands.

Imbalanced individualistic and egalitarian values cause hyper-individualism, but Karstedt looks at the imbalance as the independent variable that causes violence. Because of this imbalance, tensions arise within a democracy’s inclusive community. Karstedt describes the four causes of these tensions:

This will happen when individualistic values of autonomy, self-expression, and self-assertion are not balanced by inclusionary mechanisms and sufficient mechanisms of social control, when structural inequality is high and thus egalitarian values are violated, when parts of the population are denied fairness and justice, and when exclusionary processes affect specific groups of the population.³²

These conflicts created by the imbalance of values combined with democracy’s innate capacity for tension will ultimately lead to violence, according to Karstedt as well as Alexis de Tocqueville. She involves Tocqueville’s analysis of democratic inclusion as support to her argument for why values of social capital should be balanced correctly. However, Tocqueville offered the solution of recreating social bonds through mechanisms of associations. Karstedt jumps aboard another ship shared with French sociologist, Emile Durkheim. Both induce that a more individualistic society will develop a morality based on universal bonds and solidarity and subsequently decrease the possibility of crime and violence.³³ By establishing the contrasting approaches of Durkheim and Tocqueville, Karstedt is laying the groundwork for a comparison of inductive versus deductive methods of reasoning.

In Karstedt’s study, she takes an empirical approach, calculating 26 countries, eighteen of which are democratic, and comparing their individual values and egalitarian values to their crime rates.³⁴ There are two time frames Karstedt pulls from, 1968-1972 and 1960-2000, one micro level and one macro level. Her data concludes that democracies have less violence than authoritarian governments, but between individualism and egalitarianism, individualism leads to lower levels of crime. However, Karstedt specifically warns about egalitarianism in democracies that “if however, economic discrimination prevails [in democracies], the tensions between egalitarian values and actual discrimination generate higher levels of violence.”³⁵ If paired with economic discrimination, individualism does not have such a risk of higher crime rates like egalitarianism.

Furthermore, Karstedt uses the inductive approach in resemblance to other modern scholars, where the independent variable of the study is social capital, particularly in terms of individualistic and egalitarian values. Social capital serves as the causer of the dependent

³¹ (Karstedt 2006)

³² (Karstedt 2006)

³³ (Karstedt 2006)

³⁴ (Karstedt 2006)

³⁵ (Karstedt 2006)

variable, crime and violence, as low levels of social capital will lead to high levels of crime. By surveying observations of eighteen democratic countries, Karstedt generalizes the probability of higher crime rates if these countries do not uphold balanced individualistic and egalitarian values.³⁶ There is no need for concluding advice from Karstedt as she set out only to test cases for patterns that predict short term outcomes. Tocqueville kept to his deductive method, whereby he made predictions based on a theory and offered long term suggestions. Karstedt maintains the modern approach by using observations to make generalizations.

Incalculable amounts of studies have been conducted with the use of social capital as the independent variable; moreover, there are countless studies where scholars have induced causes of social capital. However, in semblance to Karstedt, many scholars have targeted crime and violence as their focused dependent variable. In several journal articles to follow, these modern scholars put to work the inductive method of reasoning and demonstrate the empirical approach to calculating the consequences of low social capital.

To begin with, firstly, Steve C. Deller and Melissa A. Deller analyze social capital on a micro level in their article, “Rural Crime and Social Capital.”³⁷ They track patterns of crime in rural areas of the United States and subsequently comparing the various types of crime and their respective patterns. By using social capital as the independent variable, they operationalize their dependent variable of crime through three theories: social disorganization, anomie/strain, empiricism, and rational choice.³⁸ While their study brings back hints of old school thought, the Dellers’ heavy use of the formulaic approach, notably plugging data through equations, shows a lack of normativity altogether. Their conclusion is short termed and while there are some suggestions for policymaking among rural communities, they do not provide predictions or substantial solutions.

Second, in an article, “Fear of Crime Revisited: Examining the Direct and Indirect Effects of Disorder, Risk Perception, and Social Capital,” Randy Gainey, Mariel Alper, and Allison T. Chappell revisit the dependent variable, crime, and the fear of it, as it is caused by four factors: the demographics of a community, prior victimization, the potential for social and physical disorder, and the perception of risk.³⁹ However, in their analysis, they import social capital as the thematic independent variable and maintain a pattern throughout the study by considering the relationships between the factors. The study gathers data from “A 2008 telephone survey of residents living in a medium sized southeastern U.S. city with an approximate population of 220,000.”⁴⁰ Their results were correlational and cross-sectional in nature, but their methodology of inductive reasoning shows how fear is directly related to poor social capital. Again, they are inducing from the data how fear can be avoided, but all in short terms.

Third, the article, “Does Corruption Have Social Roots? The Role of Culture and Social Capital,” by José Pena López and José Sánchez Santos, elaborates on the connection between culture and social capital and how they may cause corruption. With trust (social capital proxy)

³⁶ (Karstedt 2006)

³⁷ (Deller and Deller 2010)

³⁸ (Deller and Deller 2010)

³⁹ (Gainey, Alper and Chappell 2011)

⁴⁰ (Gainey, Alper and Chappell 2011)

and a small set of cultural dimensions as the independent variables, López and Santos create six hypotheses that are tested empirically, specifically adopting the New Economic Sociology.⁴¹ Both observe their results, “The universalistic trust (linking and bridging social capital) constitutes a positive social capital that is negatively linked to corruption. In contrast, the particularistic level of trust (bonding) can constitute a negative social capital directly related to corruption levels.”⁴² This conceptualization of trust, or social capital, works inductively by illustrating how these two forms, linked with a plethora of cultural dimensions, cause more or less crime. López and Santos theorize that certain types of trust open the doors for crime and violence.

Fourth, David Halpern, in his article, “Moral Values, Social Trust and Inequality: Can Values Explain Crime?” writes about poor social capital as the cause for poor morality and consequent higher levels of violence. Though Halpern uses social capital as his independent variable, he breaks it down into several factors: economic inequality, social trust, and self-interested values. Their empirical approach examines a survey sampling of two groups, one with 24 countries between 1981-1984 and the other with 48 countries from 1990-1993, and supporting evidence from the International Crime Victim Survey.⁴³ Halpern concludes, “Inequality provides the ‘motive’ through a gulf of material difference in society. Social trust helps provide the ‘opportunity’ through ensuring a fuller supply of easy victims. Finally, self-interested values provide the ‘means’ through releasing, or psychologically allowing, a behavioral repertoire that more readily includes offending.”⁴⁴ His research is inductively sound in that three variables are tested as cause for the theory of crime and violence.

Fifth, Frank J. Elgar and Nicole Aitken discuss income inequality as reason for higher crime rates in their article, “Income inequality, trust, and homicide in 33 countries.” However, while income inequality may correlate with crime, Elgar and Aitken surmise that poor social capital connects with inequality to foster more violence. They study how inequality stirs a lack of trust among individuals, which ultimately opens the doors for crime. By analyzing 33 countries and their homicide rates and income comparisons, the scholars take this formula of poor social capital and high income inequality as the independent variable and produce data to support how it causes crime.⁴⁵ Much like the Dellers’ study, Elgar and Aitken do not spend time making predictions or offering suggestions.

Sixth and finally, in “Social Capital and Homicide,” Richard Rosenfeld, Steven F. Messner, and Eric P. Baumer look at the levels of social capital and how each pertains to crime. Social capital is again the independent variable with direct correlation to crime rates. The three scholars explain how they conducted the empirical study, “We measure social capital as a latent construct with aggregated voting and organizational membership data, and survey data on social trust, and examine its relationship with homicide rates for a nationally representative sample of geographic

⁴¹ (López and Santos 2014)

⁴² (López and Santos 2014)

⁴³ (Halpern 2001)

⁴⁴ (Halpern 2001)

⁴⁵ (Elgar and Aitken 2011)

areas.”⁴⁶ The study’s discourse was heavy with a scientific vocabulary, which pulled it farther away from any normative influence.

Of all the journal articles that mirror Karstedt’s study, there are several themes, or commonalities, among the research. The most obvious similarities are the practice of inductive reasoning and the exercise of social capital as the independent variable, in whatever way, shape, or form. Some correlated social capital with another independent variable, whether it be inequality, self-interested values, and so on, but each kept the topic of social capital as the front running causer of crime and violence. Though more minute in significance, all of the studies incorporated methodologies also used by Putnam, with some even referencing *Bowling Alone*. By referring to Putnam, modern scholars pay tribute to his pioneering approach to social capital, again following his implementation of inductive reasoning. A final theme among all of the aforementioned sources was the lack of applicability, or furthermore, the long term effects. Though inductive reasoning is not naturally predictive, there is still a missing link among modern scholarship of social capital, that being the ability to manifest data into reality. Unlike Tocqueville, Karstedt and the other modern scholars merely presented results, ubiquitously showing that poor social capital causes a higher potential of crime. There were few suggestions as to how to conduct the study if it were replicated, but the long term end of the spectrum was hardly touched.

Altogether, the themes of these modern scholars point back to one umbrella approach: empiricism. Compared to the normative approach, empiricism accounts for the scientific methods of studying political science. Michael J. Sodaro, a professor at The George Washington University, defines empiricism in his book, “Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction,” as an analysis involving facts and hard evidence, where the ultimate goal is to discover, describe, and explain these facts and the correlations.⁴⁷ Empiricism promotes the applicability of science by analyzing data and producing theories. Sodaro offers realistic applications of the empirical approach to political science:

Indeed, many of the practical policy choices facing governmental decision makers and average citizens are rooted in some overarching theory. Debates over welfare reform and crime are connected with theories about the ability of governments to change the population’s behavioral patterns. Debates on tax policy are connected with theories about how or whether governments can stimulate economic growth while cutting budget deficits and keeping inflation low. The list of theory-related policy issues could be extended indefinitely.⁴⁸

Due to the reliability of factual evidence, the empirical approach has become the preferred method in modern scholarship of social capital.

However, alongside this empiricism trend, there are three future movements within social capital studies that Kwon and Adler bring to attention: the need to focus on vertical as well as horizontal structures of society, the various forms of social capital, and the causality of social capital.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ (Rosenfeld, Messner and Baumer 2001)

⁴⁷ (Sodaro 2007)

⁴⁸ (Sodaro 2007)

⁴⁹ (Kwon and Adler 2014)

Primarily, Kwon and Adler suggest that modern scholars look to perceive societies in other ways, specifically by analyzing inequality. They provide the example of the Occupy Wall Street Movement and how it brought to light the vertical structure of society, “The inequalities characterizing contemporary social relations—of wealth and income, between races and genders—shape social capital very deeply, and, in turn, social capital is implicated in both the reproduction of these inequalities and in movements attempting to challenge them.”⁵⁰ This up to down approach may open a new door within social capital. Also, there is a lack of scholarship, according to Kwon and Adler, toward the exploration of social capital’s dark side and “its capacity to fragment broader collectivities in the name of local, particularistic identities.”⁵¹ Future trends should harness the numerous forms of social capital and define all the benefits and risks thereof. Finally, Kwon and Adler discuss the investigation of social capital causality. Since social capital is applicable to countless fields of study, it therefore has a nature of multicausality. Whether it be socioeconomically spurred, or due to levels of poverty, or derivative of economic inequality, the causes of social capital should be considered in any modern research.⁵² Modern scholarship will even consider the possibility for endogeneity.

With the expansion of empiricism, there are any number of strengths and weaknesses. In their book, “Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research,” Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba outline four factors of empiricism that work toward its benefit: observability, measurability, reliability, and replicability.⁵³ Observability ensures that the empirical approach can provide factual evidence that is relevant universally. The measurability of empiricism allows data to be collected and processed for public comprehension. Reliability is “applying the same procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure.”⁵⁴ And replicability, which King, Keohane, and Verba explain, makes the methods useable to anyone. But while these four traits reinforce the scientific purpose in modern methods, there are other strengths to empiricism that Sodaro also explores, “It makes us check our generalizations against available evidence. It forces us to consider evidence against our prevailing assumptions and biases, not just evidence supporting them. It requires us to be systematic and logical in analyzing the evidence and drawing conclusions from it. It clarifies what we know, and what we don’t know, about political life.”⁵⁵ There is an element of empiricism that normative methods cannot account for – the prevention of outright bias. Though no study is entirely free of bias, the scientific approach uses hard facts to where preconceived notions and opinions do not hold merit.

In contrast, the drawbacks to the empirical approach are quite compelling. Empiricism may succeed in diluting bias, but it cannot quantify abstract thoughts and concepts. Social capital, or the interconnectedness of individuals, is a prime example of an abstraction. There is an abundance of components that fall under the macro topic of social capital, some easier to test empirically than others, but no amount of science can account for the value of such concepts. For example, there is no quantification of interconnections between individuals, as there cannot be a

⁵⁰ (Kwon and Adler 2014)

⁵¹ (Kwon and Adler 2014)

⁵² (Kwon and Adler 2014)

⁵³ (King, Keohane and Verba 1994)

⁵⁴ (King, Keohane and Verba 1994)

⁵⁵ (Sodaro 2007)

numerical value placed on friendship, or love, or feeling. While Tocqueville shows preference to the normative, deductive approach, Ivan Turgenev and Leo Tolstoy also strongly uphold this value of qualifying concepts and this antagonism of science. Both warn the development of scholarship to be wary of the impending scientific trend by keeping afloat the exercise of normative methodology. In *Fathers and Sons* as well as *War and Peace*, Turgenev and Tolstoy respectively promote normativity and degrade empiricism by connecting it to nihilism.

Turgenev's novel, *Fathers and Sons*, works as a critique of the trend of the scientific method. He approaches this rivalry of normativity and empiricism through two spheres of characters: the Scientific and the Moral. The main representative of Turgenev's Scientific is Yevgeny Vasilyevich Bazarov, who embodies empiricism and its ultimate failure. Bazarov comes to the stage as a rationalist, theorist, nihilist, and adversary of love. Throughout his relationship with Madame Anna Sergeyevna Odintsova, his empirical endurance wears down and he succumbs to love and beauty. In one instance, Bazarov marvels beauty and sentiment, "Is there anything in the world more captivating than a beautiful young mother with a healthy child in her arms?"⁵⁶ This demonstrates the inevitability of qualification of abstract thought, according to Turgenev, where he concedes to the idea of beauty. When Bazarov dies, Turgenev shows how science cannot account for all aspects of life, that is must eventually die out or succumb to abstract thought and feeling. Madame Odintsova plays a minor role in Turgenev's depiction of empiricism, namely nihilism, but when she conclusively abandons the notion of love and opts for a life alone, her soul has faded away.

The first Moral character, Pavel Petrovich Kirsanov, stands on the opposite side of the spectrum to Bazarov as he epitomizes a moral compass, who will unconditionally surrender to love, even if it brings him pain. However, while Pavel sings the praises of love, he outright rejects Bazarov's nihilistic lifestyle by stating, "Only immoral or silly people can live in our age without principles."⁵⁷ Pavel embodies the romantic and the opponent of nihilism, or science. Arkady Nikolaevich Kirsanov portrays the second of Turgenev's Moral characters. He begins the story as an aspiring nihilist, but like Bazarov, he eventually commits to normative thinking by falling in love with Katya. Turgenev demonstrates through both Pavel and Arkady the sentiment of love, but more so, the ultimate commitment to normativity, for better or for worse.

Similarly to Tocqueville, Turgenev would endorse the deductive approach in correlation to normative reasoning. In the case of Bazarov, his transition from nihilist to romantic is fundamentally deductive, but his trial and error methodology also follows suit. Bazarov's attempt to understand love has successes and failures, but he eventually commits to the idea of it. Furthermore, Turgenev finds that quantifying love is illogical and he would most likely recommend to modern scholars that social capital should not be put through a data set but rather considered in its variety through deductive reasoning.

Leo Tolstoy wrote *War and Peace* with the similar belief that the practice of science, and its impending deification, should be rejected in favor of normativity and multicausality theory. In correlation to Zeno's Paradox, Tolstoy demonstrates how science does not account for unquantifiable and uncontrollable variables, but more importantly, it cannot parse sentiment or

⁵⁶ (Turgenev 1992)

⁵⁷ (Turgenev 1992)

abstractions. He mentioned in numerous cases the value of multicausality and the power of normative reasoning, all by disparaging science. Though Tolstoy dismisses the deification of science on several occasions, he offers the example of the War of 1812 and its multicausality nature, “And so there was no one cause for that occurrence, but it had to occur because it had to. Millions of men, renouncing their human feelings and reason, had to go from west to east to slay their fellows, just as some centuries previously hordes of men had come from the east to the west, slaying their fellows.”⁵⁸ While there is no singular causal variable, there is a slew of equally valid reasons for why the war occurred. By supporting this normative approach, Tolstoy shows how the ultimatum of nihilism, or the absence of moral principle, can be prevented.

The conclusive dilemma begs the question of which method is preferable, the deductive or inductive approach. However, the solution does not suggest either deductive or inductive, but rather deductive and inductive by which they are cyclically dependent on one another, where both methods must work together. Future studies of social capital can look to implement both strategies of reasoning, which will provide a more thorough analysis. Scholars have the capacity to begin deductively, starting with a theory and making predictions, then organizing observations into an experiment, and following up inductively by taking the observations and making generalizations, boiling down again to a theory. In his article, “Revenge Of The Nerds, Irrational Exuberance: When Did Political Science Forget About Politics?,” Jonathan Cohn explains the research methods of critics, Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, in light of new methodologies, “It’s that the only way to understand politics is to embrace a variety of methodological approaches that can compensate for the complications of personality, culture, history, beliefs, and pure chance inherent when human beings vie for power.”⁵⁹ While he is specifically adhering to the domination of rational choice theory, Cohn is also supporting the notion of a new methodology in political science – incorporating empiricism and normativity. Social capital can be henceforth studied deductively and inductively and considered the causer and the caused.

⁵⁸ (Tolstoy 2014)

⁵⁹ (Cohn 1999)

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The Challenges of Online Voting

Alex Moyher

Introduction

It is no secret that mankind's technological capabilities have grown exponentially; especially within the last 100 years. One area of citizens' lives where many have been waiting for an "upgrade" for years has been the electoral process (of public officials), or voting. The "upgrade" that they've been waiting for is online voting through the Internet. Though this is something that citizens worldwide desire, unless specified otherwise, this paper will focus on citizens and governments in the United States. As early as the year 2000, there have been online voting experiments such as the 2000 Arizona Democratic Primary, which was the first legally-binding public election over the internet.⁶⁰ However, online voting has yet to become a mainstay method of voting as late as 2015. One assumption related to the previous sentence is that online voting would be "a method" of voting, not "the method," to accompany other methods such as the classic voting on Election Day, absentee, and early-in-person.

The question of online voting has come up naturally as the internet becomes more integrated into our lives and in this case the way people interact with their governments. Citizens can already file their income taxes, renew their vehicle tag fees, and change their mailing/residential address electronically over the internet. Therefore, the next assumption is that citizens, or more specifically a growing percentage of citizens, want online voting. This leads to an assumption that some organization should provide online voting, which is tied to a number of questions. Who should provide it? The federal government? State or local governments? A private corporation? The last assumption is that developing, deploying, and maintaining online voting will cost money. The next obvious question is "who will pay for it?" Even after all of these questions are answered, there are still a plethora of questions related to ultimate question of "how do we make online voting possible?" This paper will group such questions under three main categories: security, legitimacy, technology.

Security

Security has been a constant challenge to online voting being a mainstay voting method. Many computer experts, such as the ones who hacked The Netherlands' Nedap ES3B voting system in 2006, have raised questions about the security of online voting.⁶¹ This should come as no

⁶⁰ Arizona Democratic Party Selects Votation.com to Hold World's First Legally-Binding Public Election Over the Internet.. (n.d.) >*The Free Library*. (2014).
<http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Arizona+Democratic+Party+Selects+Votation.com+to+Hold+World%27s+First...-a058272337>

⁶¹ Gonggrijp, R., et al. Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting computer: a security analysis. (2006)
<http://wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf>

surprise because of there being a news story seemingly every month about a large corporation having its computer systems hacked. Examples include Target, Sony, Anthem, eBay, Home Depot, et al.⁶² The simple fact is that even with the vast talent and resources of all levels of levels of government or the reputable organizations they could utilize as vendors, securing large scale online voting against the numerous, extremely talented hackers around the world would be challenging. Armed with such weapons as the formidable DDoS attack, hackers could act individually, as a group (i.e. Anonymous), or state-sponsored (i.e. China or North Korea). The reasons for hacking online voting could range from hackers just proving their capability to political reasons, but they all boil down to the need for security.

The effects of a successful hack would obviously be dictated by the reason for a hack. The effects could range from seemingly “nothing” to crashing the online voting system entirely. Advantages of a successful hack that has seemingly no effects include being able to alter the election results undetected or leaving a “back door” open so that the perpetrators could get back into the online voting system illegally at a later date without anyone knowing. Within the previously mentioned spectrum of effects there is a wide variety of other malicious effects. One such effect would be an attempt to not crash the online voting system, but use it as a vehicle to transport viruses, spyware, or other malicious programs to other systems. The security issue here is that of defense against malicious incoming data in general.

Instead of hackers, another security threat comes from opportunists, con artists, or generally those people who would attempt to vote when they are not eligible. Elections officials already run into this situation in regards to other voting methods: felons attempting to vote prior to full rehabilitation, non-citizens attempting to vote, people attempting to vote more than once, and more. In short, another security concern for online voting is that only those who are legally allowed to vote are voting. People attempting to vote more than once would especially need to be addressed to prevent people from voting online via their cell phone and then voting again in a polling place. For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that the people represented by this second group of security threats would attempt to compromise the security of an online voting system via methods other than hacking.

After an election is over, there are still many questions related to the data and results received via online voting (assumed not to be malicious). Where will it be stored? How exactly will it be stored? For what period of time will it be kept? Who will have access to the stored data and results? Security against both groups of previously mentioned threats will need to be a top priority when attempting to answer these questions related to data and results storage. While the online voting system (in its active form) would definitely be a target, the history of high-profile hackings show databases full of stored information to be the more likely target. Thus the security of the storage form of the online voting system would also be paramount.

Legitimacy

⁶² Collins, Keith. A Quick Guide to the Worst Corporate Hack Attacks, *Bloomberg*. (2015)
<http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2014-data-breaches/>

Legitimacy is a monumental challenge for online voting. The current integration of technology into voting via such means as direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines has already come under public criticism for a lack of transparency. In the earlier days of voting it was straightforward in that every tallied vote for a candidate could be verified via the corresponding paper ballot that was put in the ballot box. But DRE voting machines, which are used by 30 out of 50 states in some capacity, typically do not have a corresponding ballot or a paper trail.⁶³ As with any machine used in any industry, there are bound to be malfunctions or instances of the machine failing as time passes. But when it comes to the unique situation of DRE voting machines, the slightest malfunction or error seems to elicit suspicion and grounds for some citizens to question the legitimacy of the voting system. There are even citizens who accuse governments of “data mining” when they are required to provide contact information or choose a party during a primary to be able to vote.

To underscore the legitimacy hurdle for online voting, let us look at the existing method of voting using DRE voting machines. Citizens have to show up in person, complete at least some paperwork enabling them to vote on the DRE machines, and then vote on the DRE machines in the presence of elections officials; and there are still questions of legitimacy. Online voting means citizens do not have to go anywhere, fill out any paperwork (at the time of casting their ballot), or be in the presence of elections officials. It is not difficult to see why there is already an existing distrust of even the idea of online voting for various reasons by citizens. Add in the inevitability of technical issues, malfunctions, or possible failure of the system to any degree and one can get an idea of the sizeable hurdle legitimacy is to online voting.

Citizens are not the only stakeholders to be won over before online voting can be seen as legitimate. The political parties themselves would naturally need to be on board with whatever process is used to elect their candidates. In today’s currently highly polarized political climate, the same fears or criticisms of citizens would be used by each political party as weapons against the other; aka “the opposing party won not because of the actual election results, but because the online voting system [insert fear or criticism here].” The political parties would also have some specific procedural or testing concerns that would need to be addressed before they would consider online voting legitimate. The courtroom is the final place that online voting would need to be considered legitimate because any individual or group wishing to challenge online voting would obviously do so via a lawsuit or lawsuits. Courts could rule parts of an online voting system unconstitutional; undermining the entire system. Lastly, the judges within the courts (other than the Supreme Court) are themselves elected officials (albeit nonpartisan ones).

Technology

The actual “nuts and bolts” required to form an online voting system present a challenge due to the need to meet some of the concerns and criticisms already listed in this paper; in addition to others. For starters, there is no existing system that could knowingly be transformed or retrofitted to serve as an online voting system to accommodate the scale of a state, let alone the entire United States. Next, what “form” should the system take? Browser-based? Cloud-based? A

⁶³ Polling Place Equipment, *Verified Voting Foundation, Inc.* (2014) <https://www.verifiedvoting.org/verifier2014/>

downloaded program? Whatever the “form,” it would require a massive amount of computing power, which would cost money. The assumption that online voting would require an internet connection is simple enough until one realizes the *many* (different) types of devices that are capable of accessing the internet. Will online voting be supported on *all* of them or some of them? The challenge of making an online voting system available on all devices capable of is the requisite time and resources required to make it possible. The challenge of making it available on only some devices is choosing which devices to exclude and dealing with the corresponding complaints, criticisms, and lawsuits of “discrimination.”

While the technology on the “back end” of an online voting system would necessarily be highly complex, the user interface on the “front end” would need to be designed to accommodate users of *all* proficiency levels. The consequence of not addressing this challenge would be more complaints, criticisms, and lawsuits of “discrimination.” Similarly since it is guaranteed there will be issues (real or at least perceived), troubleshooting will need to be provided. Because the odds of user error or perceived issues are more likely to come from users of lower proficiency levels, troubleshooting will most likely have to be geared toward those kinds of users. Support for an online voting system, separate from troubleshooting due to it being more “maintenance” in nature than “customer service,” would not have more special considerations than any other government system; but would still be a factor in regards to planning.

One last challenge is deciding who exactly will plan and develop the online voting system. The federal government? State governments? Similar to a popular form of existing DRE voting machines, which are contracted through a company called Election Systems & Software (ES&S), some would say the planning and development of an online voting system should be contracted out to a vendor. Other citizens would say that an online voting system would need to be done entirely within the government to prevent questioning the impartiality of a vendor. At some point, it is assumed training on the technology of the online voting system would need to occur at the county/local level since currently those agencies are the point of contact for citizens. Similar to the citizens themselves, the training would have to consider *all* levels of proficiency for the training of county/local elections officials.

Potential Solutions

It is obvious with all of the challenges presented so far there will be a need for solutions. Some possible solutions are briefly offered here. In regards to the security-centered challenges, it seems there would need to be a rigorous identification and verification process prior to being able to access *or* cast a ballot via the online voting system. Citizens could be prompted for social security numbers, PIN numbers, signatures, and birthdays and also prompted to complete security questions, CAPTCHAs and passwords.

To address legitimacy-centered challenges, politicians and public administrators would need to complete a lot of public outreach and education of the online voting system and make that knowledge continually available. As with currently available voting methods, citizens frequently forget the processes, especially if they only vote in presidential elections. Education within the education system itself would (in theory) eliminate, if not drastically reduce, the need of public outreach. Therefore a strong public relations campaign complete with celebrity cameos would

improve the legitimacy of an online voting system in the eyes of citizens. Seeking input from stakeholders prior to the deployment of the online voting system as well as seeking feedback following elections would be invaluable in increasing legitimacy.

Most solutions related to the technology-centered challenges would be beyond the scope of this paper, but it will at least be noted here that the best option for the “form” would be that of a browser-based online voting system. Special consideration would need to be made in regards to the variation of browsers citizens would use and the larger variation of the versions of said browsers. The training of county/local elections offices could be achieved by giving a bigger budget to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), which was created by the Help America Vote Act in 2002.⁶⁴

Potential Benefits

So far many questions have been discussed, but one that has largely been left out is the question of “why create an online voting system?” Beyond the minimal answer of “because a growing number of citizens want it,” an online voting system has many potential benefits. The most recognizable benefit is increased ease of access.⁶⁵ Citizens could vote from any place of their choosing without having to deviate from their typical schedule to go to a polling place and save time from potentially having to stand in a line. Ease of access is especially important to citizens overseas whose only other voting method is via absentee ballot, which can run into problems because of the variation in the time it takes for a ballot to travel to and from the citizen and their county elections office.

Related to increased access is the benefit of reduced discrimination. Some citizens or groups will no doubt claim that online voting is preferential to technology savvy citizens or those with access to the internet while discriminatory to citizens at the opposite end of the spectrum. But their arguments would grow increasingly hollow as free internet and devices capable of accessing the internet become more widely available: at libraries, restaurants, airports, and more. A hopeful result of easier access to voting would be increased voter turnout for a core democratic principle for which so many American men and women have died.

Another potential benefit would be reduced costs for county/local government agencies that carry out elections, though it would take some time to offset such initial costs of: developing the online voting system, purchasing servers and other hardware, troubleshooting and support, and training local/county government agencies. The reduced costs would come in the form of a corresponding reduction in resources county/local elections offices would need to put toward accommodating voters via paper ballots, absentee ballots, or DRE voting machines. There would also be a reduction in poll worker errors (albeit at the cost of potentially an increase in user errors) as more voters use the online voting system instead of going to a polling place. The

⁶⁴ Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed, *General Accounting Office*. (2005). <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf>

⁶⁵ Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges, *General Accounting Office*. (2004). <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04766t.pdf>

turnaround of reporting results of elections would also be shorter due to votes being submitted via an online voting system already being a “finished product,” aka not needing to be transmitted or processed any further.

Recounts will most likely be something county/local elections offices will have to deal with for the foreseeable future because as stated previously, an online voting system would supplement (and not replace) existing voting methods. But the resources those agencies would need to devote to a recount would be reduced because of the automated nature of online voting (and the corresponding votes that are cast). Also related to online voting being more automated than other voting methods, there would be a benefit of enhanced analysis of election data and trends via the votes cast using an online voting system and the identifying information voters would have to provide (or have the option of providing) prior to voting. The benefits of linking the database(s) of stored results and data received through the online voting system to other government systems are potentially limitless. There could be a link to the census database, verifying or augmenting the information gathered via the census (which would lay the ground work for an improved redistricting process when it comes to political districts). A link to USA Jobs or other related jobs websites could reduce unemployment by matching unemployed voters with job vacancies. A link to the SSA, FBI and IRS could reduce social security fraud, catch criminals and help recover unpaid taxes respectively.

Conclusions

The United States is ready for an online voting system. The demand, available technology, and potential resources are present. Challenges related to security, legitimacy, and technology would need to be overcome, which is fully possible. Contributing the resources necessary to overcome the challenges of online voting would absolutely be worthwhile due to potential benefits outweighing the challenges.

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BOOK REVIEW

Jeremy Hudak is a Political Science major with a concentration in Global Studies. Upon graduating from KSU, he hopes to attend graduate school and work toward his Master's Degree in Higher Education Administration. Jeremy is a student in the Honors College, and a member of several honor societies, including Phi Kappa Phi. This paper was originally written as a Term Paper in POLS 4451- The Politics and Government of Post-Communist Era Europe in the spring of 2014.

Russian Influence on Romania: Through the Lens of Leo Tolstoy and Milan Kundera

Jeremy Hudak

Russia has had an immense amount of influence in the whole of Eastern Europe; modern Romania is no different. Romania is a country with a very rich and diverse historical background. The country underwent a drastic change during the Soviet Period as a result of Russian influence in the region. The inevitable overarching question becomes: What influence did Russia have on modern Romania?

The Historical and Political Development of Romania

In order to understand Russia's far reaching influence on Romania, it is important to first understand some key historical events in the political development of the Country. Romania is a country with a very rich history. The country has had a very tumultuous history and very little experience with independent sovereignty and self-government.

The modern nation of Romania is actually three historic principalities that were united by Michael the Brave in 1600. These principalities were those of Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia. The independence and unification of the principalities was very short lived because by 1657, they had all fallen under Ottoman control. By 1711 Transylvania became part of the Kingdom of Hungary. This begins the first period of Russian interaction.⁶⁶

In 1821 The Ottoman Empire turns over control of Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia. From this however, indigenous Romanian rulers begin to gain a tremendous amount of power in the regions. Russian rule ceases in 1856 after the Russian defeat in the Crimean war. The two principalities become unified and form the new nation of Romania under the rule of Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza. By 1878 Romania gains its complete independence from the Ottoman Empire because it aligned itself with Russia during the Russo-Turkish War. Very shortly after that, the Kingdom of Romania is formed.⁶⁷

Fast forward to World War I. Romania aligns itself with the allies, ending its ties with the many central European powers. Romania acquired much more land after the peace settlement

⁶⁶ "Romania Profile," BBC News Europe, last modified January 1, 2014, accessed April 25, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17776876>.

⁶⁷ "Romania Profile," BBC News Europe.

increasing the size of its territory substantially. By the 1930s, as was common for most European nations, a fascist movement began to form in the country and by 1938; the country had become a dictatorship under King Carol II. As a result of the fascist movement and authoritarian government, Romania entered World War II on the side of the Germans; which consequently, put them fighting against the Russians. By 1944, Romania had switched sides in the war. In the years between 1945 and 1949 Romania changed drastically as a result of Soviet influence. The country gained a soviet backed government, its own branch of the communist party, and a soviet style constitution.⁶⁸

Post World War II Soviet Influence

Before the Soviet Union's influence on Romania can be discussed, it is important to distinguish between the two opposing forces in post-World War II Romanian Society: National Communism and National Stalinism. Romanians experienced the extreme harsh reality of Stalinism, which is very different from the theoretical idea of Communism. The National Communists believed in a very innovative system that could exist with less political involvement: this idea fostered intellectuals and creativity.⁶⁹ The complete opposite of this idea, the National Stalinists, opposed any liberal influence. They were extremely opposed to democratic ideas. Some other important characteristics of the National Stalinists were that they believed in militarization, and their values were considered to be reactionary and self-centered. Any deviation from these ideas was looked upon as betrayal.⁷⁰ The political elites in Romania subscribed to the Stalinist beliefs.

Romania did not have a politically informed working class. This caused a delay in the formation of an opposition to the Stalinist rule. The opposition existed in secret and was considered to be left in its political ideology. There was a very sharp disconnect between the opposition in how to rule Romania once the Soviet rule ended. One side of the opposition advocated for a western style democratic capitalistic approach to development and governance. While the other faction advocated for a different set of ideas that avoided capitalism all together.⁷¹

Returning to the Stalinists' ideas, one of the most important roles of citizens in Romania was to identify traitors within one's own socioeconomic class. This was because these individuals were described as being much harder to find in the population. This characteristic was valued more than finding enemies of the socioeconomic class itself. This facilitated a power struggle within the country.⁷² By subscribing to this ideology and making it so ingrained in the culture, this pitted friends and neighbors against one another.

The Rise and Fall of Nicolae Ceausescu

The deeply ingrained Stalinist ideals combined with the sluggish formation of a politically informed working class created the ideal conditions necessary for Nicolae Ceausescu to become

⁶⁸ "Romania Profile," BBC News Europe.

⁶⁹ Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 23.

⁷⁰ Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons*, 24.

⁷¹ Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons*, 37

⁷² Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons*, 95

the new leader of the country in 1965. Ceausescu was not a typical “communist” style leader. He openly opposed the Soviet Union, but he ruled his own country with an iron fist. He openly denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.⁷³ Ceausescu facilitated a personality cult within the country. Through the use of his secret police, Ceausescu maintained firm control over many of the basic freedoms within the country including freedom of speech and media. He also appointed many of his family members to very high ranking government positions within the country.⁷⁴

There are several events that lead to the downfall of Nicolae Ceausescu. In 1985, his austerity program lead to an extreme food shortage.⁷⁵ Ceausescu’s rule truly began to fall apart after he ordered his security troops to fire on anti-government protesters. Soon after the protest, the army lost its loyalty to Ceausescu and joined the protesters.⁷⁶ Ceausescu and his wife attempted to flee the country but were caught and executed on Christmas Day 1989.⁷⁷

The Connection to Historical Scholarship

Romania has many similar historical parallels with Russia. The biggest of these parallels that exists in Romania is the countries struggle for identity. Just as Russia struggled to determine which region of Europe it fit into the best, Romania finds itself in a similar struggle. The best illustration for the Russian identity struggle is the classic by Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*.

In the book *War and Peace* Russia found itself seeking to westernize. This effort is best displayed by the countries deeply ingrained use of the French language in the Russian Aristocracy. The Russian Aristocracy was very cosmopolitan and liked to model themselves after Parisian Culture. This trend became very ironic because the very country that the upper class Russians modeled themselves after became their biggest enemy.

Russia’s identity crisis was very deeply rooted. The peasants and lower class Russians all spoke fluent Russian and very little, if any, French. The peasants were almost all Orthodox and very much identified themselves as Russian. As a result, the upper class began to look to the peasants because they embodied the very characteristics that many considered to define traditional Russians.

The upper class Russians were not as clear with regards to where they belonged as the peasants were. As previously mentioned, the upper class Russians were very cosmopolitan and in many ways, disconnected from their national identity. This led many to look to the peasants when Russia wanted to remake itself after the Napoleonic wars. What exactly identifies cosmopolitan culture? To understand this, it is important to look at some defining characteristics on cosmopolitanism:

The non-reflective, fast-moving aspect of metropolitan life affects the manner

⁷³ "Romania Profile," BBC News Europe.

⁷⁴ "Nicolae Ceausescu," in Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed April 26, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/100972/Nicolae-Ceausescu>.

⁷⁵ "Romania Profile," BBC News Europe.

⁷⁶ "Nicolae Ceausescu," in Encyclopaedia Britannica.

⁷⁷ "Romania Profile," BBC News Europe.

in which Parisians interact with each other. St. Preux complains that he must lower his level of discourse due the shallowness of urban thought. He writes that it is more important to be entertaining than learned in the city. In essence, humor replaces philosophy; social wit replaces wisdom and character.⁷⁸

As Moran describes, there is a very low level of thought occurring in urban environments. There was not very much in the way of deep discussions occurring in the upper echelons of Russian society. This cosmopolitan way of thinking was one of the primary factors that lead to the disconnect that existed between the socioeconomic classes in Russia and ultimately facilitated the identity crisis that the Russian people felt after the Napoleonic wars. Ultimately, the upper class Russians, as was mentioned earlier, looked to the peasants for help in rebranding the national identity of Russia.

The very identity crisis that Russia felt during and after the Napoleonic wars was the same identity crisis that the Romanians felt after the fall of communism. The Romanians have a very rich history as was described previously. However after the many years of Soviet rule, and the particularly bloody revolution in 1989, the Romanians have struggled to remake themselves in the wake of the fall of communist rule. They face many of the issues described in the quote above: the biggest issues the Romanians face that haunts them is the shallowness of their political elites. This has led to ramped corruption and numerous other social and political issues in modern Romania.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Romania has been plagued with problems. The biggest among these problems has been political corruption. The shallowness of the political elites in Romania has been a struggle for the country. The European Union has repeatedly condemned Romania for high levels of corruption in the government.⁷⁹ This is just one of the struggles that Romania faces. There are many other internal struggles that the country is also forced to deal with.

Russia and Romania's Internal East West Struggle

As was mentioned earlier in the paper, Russia is in a constant battle with itself to determine its regional identity. The Russian aristocracy in *War and Peace* were becoming increasingly westernized with their unyielding usage of the French language and slow infiltration of the Catholic Church in society. In the book there are many different characters; each of the characters displayed different regional characteristics that existed in Russian society during that time period.

Helen prominently displayed the cosmopolitan westernization that Russia was experiencing. She was very social and, as the Russians saw her, had much more moral looseness than did other members of traditional Russian society. The complete opposite of Helen would be Princess Marya. Marya was one of the best representatives of traditional Russian society during that time period. She is somewhat of an introvert but she is very loyal to her family. She holds very strongly to orthodox values.

⁷⁸ John P. Moran, "Cosmopolitanism and Its Discontents," in *The Solution of the Fist: Dostoevsky and the Roots of Modern Terrorism* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 3.

⁷⁹ "Romania Profile," BBC News Europe.

These characters are highlighted because they are the best representative of the ongoing struggle in contemporary Russian society. Russia, like many of its former Soviet brethren, including Romania, is in a constant struggle to define itself and its place in the world. Looking to Tolstoy for help in getting a general idea of what defines Russia, one could reasonably discern the following characteristics: Orthodox, Russian Language, Ethnic Russian, and identify themselves as Russian. If these are indeed some of the defining characteristics for Russia as a nation, then what defines the west?

In truth there are many characteristics that define the west. These extend far beyond Tolstoy's Helen; Keeping Tolstoy as a reference point, one could reasonably assume that Tolstoy wanted to use the French, particularly Napoleon to define the west. In the novel, the French were characterized in many ways. One of the most distinguishing characteristics for the French, was the romance based language itself, which was immensely different from Russian. In addition to the language, another distinguishing characteristic of the French was their attachment to the Catholic and Protestant religion. Napoleon, himself, was described by Tolstoy to be very idealistic and overly confident. In order to better understand the conflict that exists, it is important to go beyond Tolstoy.

Building on Tolstoy's definition of the west, Milan Kundera highlighted several defining western characteristics. According to Kundera, one of the best characteristics to define what Europe is, are the individuals who define themselves to be European. This replaced the popular middle-age identifier of a common religion.⁸⁰ Kundera goes on to describe Europe has losing its appreciation for the arts and becoming more engulfed into the technological race.⁸¹

As a result of the history of Russian-Romanian interaction, the Romanians have begun to struggle with their identity as well. To understand the struggle that the Romanians face, it is important to look back to the distinguishing characteristics that define the west. Romania shares many of those common characteristics, such as language. The Romanian language is considered to be one of the five romance languages. Other members of this language group include French, Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese; all of these languages share a common ancestor, Latin.⁸² In addition to the language group, the Romanian people make up the largest ethnic group in the country; there are very few self-identifying Russians in the ethnic population.⁸³ To this point, it would seem obvious that Romania is almost a textbook western nation, but there is one major aspect of Romanian Society that has not been introduced yet, religion. Romania's largest religious group is Eastern Orthodox, making up around 82 percent of the population; the Catholic and Protestant religious groups combined only account for just over 10 percent of Romanian religious groups.⁸⁴ Based on these figures, it is much clearer why Romania faces an

⁸⁰ Milan Kundera, "A Kidnapped West or Culture Bows out," *Granta*, no. 11 (1984): 110.

⁸¹ Kundera, "A Kidnapped West or Culture," 111.

⁸² Rebecca Posner, "Romance Languages," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, last modified February 20, 2013, accessed April 27, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/508379/Romance-languages>.

⁸³ "The World Factbook: Romania," Central Intelligence Agency, last modified 2014, accessed April 26, 2014, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ro.html>.

⁸⁴ "The World Factbook: Romania," Central Intelligence Agency.

internal identity struggle similar to that of Russia; they a nation with a very western language but a very eastern religion.

There is one other distinguishing western characteristic; European Union and NATO membership. After the collapse of the Soviet Union of 1991, there was a rush by many of the former Soviet states to join these organizations. Russia has not joined either organization. Romania became a member of NATO in 2004 then joined the European Union in 2007 pushing EU membership to 27.⁸⁵

Contemporary Romanian-Russian Relations and Conclusion

Romania and Russia have a deep history of interaction. There are no signs that that will cease. These two nations share a common internal struggle, their place in Europe, and the world as a whole. Through the lenses of Tolstoy and Kundera, one is able to discern a plausible definition for what constitutes the west and what constitutes the east. Like Russia, Romania struggles to find its place in this seemingly geographic characterization because it has characteristics that fit into either category.

Influenced in no small part by the geographic closeness of the two nations, these countries share many things with one another. Russia has had a great amount of influence on Romania in the early stages of development, then an even more substantial amount of influence during the soviet period. Romania and Russia are continuing to interact with one another. One of the best examples of this interaction can be displayed in the 2003 Friendship treaty that was signed by Russian President Putin and Romanian President Iliescu; when this occurred Russia and Romania also signed a document condemning the Romanian alliance with Nazi Germany during WWII.⁸⁶ This influence from Russia has greatly shaped the Romanian political and cultural landscape.

⁸⁵ "Romania Profile," BBC News Europe.

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